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ABSTRACT 
A Perfect Stranger: The Development of Margaret Cavendish's Natural Philosophy 
Marianne Lynch, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2008 
The natural philosophy of Margaret Cavendish is a fragmented collection of 
texts and ideas. In this thesis, the multiple lenses of learning theory, writing theory, 
history and philosophy of science, and literary studies are employed to show the 
ultimate coherence of Cavendish's science. The mechanism of a taxonomy of 
cognitive processes is applied to explore the gradual evolution of her understanding 
of her material and ideas. Writing process theories further illuminate both the ways 
that her thinking develops as she composes and the ways that she comes to 
manipulate her texts in view of her changing relationship with her reading audience. 
Exploring the social and political influences affecting the development of early 
modern science further adds to an understanding of the opinions that Cavendish 
comes to hold. Finally, the literary and linguistic elements of her text, including their 
genre, structure, rhetorical devices and figurative language, contribute significantly to 
a full recognition of Cavendish's evolving scientific and epistemic beliefs. By 
examining her eight texts most concerned with natural philosophy as revelatory parts 
of a process rather than discrete meaning-entities, it is clear that Cavendish was 
responding to complex internal and external forces that simultaneously shaped her 
writing, her thinking, her social vision, her science, and her larger conception of 
nature and knowledge. 
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NOTES ON THE TEXT 
In the original published versions of Margaret Cavendish's work, there is no 
consistent pagination of prefatory material. In this thesis, I have provided the titles of 
dedicatory verses, epistles to readers, and prefaces parenthetically in the text. In those 
works where a modern edition is used, I have provided both page numbers and the 
titles of prefatory material. In addition, page numbers in the original publications are 
sometimes incorrect and I have indicated where errors were made. 
In the original publications, words are sometimes printed in capital letters or 
in italics for emphasis. However, as this is done with little consistency, I have 
standardized the appearance and used italics only when emphasis is clearly needed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1611, John Donne used the phrase "all coherence gone*' in "The First 
Anniversary: An Anatomy of the World" to reflect the sense that the physical world was 
no longer as it had long been imagined (276). Scientific discovery and technological 
advances had put into question the geocentric conception of the universe, and all seemed 
to be confusion and chaos. By the 1650s, when Margaret Cavendish, then Marchioness of 
Newcastle, began to publish her work, the chaos was of an entirely different kind: the 
monarchy had been overthrown, the king was in exile, and traditional social order had 
been destroyed. Cavendish responded to this upheaval by writing—prolifically: 
philosophical poems, short essays, and narratives; letters, biography, and autobiography; 
plays, dialogues, and orations. The topics she broached were varied, but, like Donne, 
indicated a concern with making sense of the chaotic and disorderly universe in which 
she lived. To this end, several of her published works are overtly concerned with natural 
philosophy, matter and motion, and experimental science. Yet for the most part, none of 
her philosophical works strikes readers as especially orderly; within a twenty-page span, 
she is capable of discussing matter, motion, infinity, war, life, the senses, knowledge, 
creation, light, and the planets. In the early stages of her philosophical writing, when her 
world was in an uproar and she found herself in exile, Cavendish envisions a world of 
atoms as chaotic as her own. She offers no ultimate solution to this chaos; in fact, her 
early verse embraces the idea of willful, anarchic atoms. Later texts proclaim the ever-
present possibility of disorder in the natural world: we are but a step away from chaos, 
confusion, and ignorance. But her texts are more than a simple reflection of her world at 
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war; over time, she develops a natural system in which chaos is as essential as order, and 
hierarchy is as present as individualism. 
The concept of development is central here. Critical readings of Cavendish's 
science often focus on individual works, most notably the early atomic poems or her 
"science fiction," Blazing World. However, recent scholarship has shown increasing 
interest in the organization and language of her natural philosophy.1 I propose to examine 
the evolution of the entire body of her major philosophical texts, from the earliest verses 
of Poems, and Fancies to the final statement of her natural philosophy in Grounds of 
Natural Philosophy. In her introduction to Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, 
Eileen O'Neill hints at how these works are best approached; she states that "Cavendish's 
books of natural philosophy may appropriately be viewed as published notebooks, in 
which the features of her system of nature unfold at the same time as she develops as a 
philosopher" (xxxv). Judith Moore is more direct, declaring that "if Cavendish's 
publications are read sequentially and at length rather than in isolated excerpts, a 
considerable development does eventually emerge" (4). This suggests that these works 
are best examined as work-in-progress: a fifteen-year process of building an original 
scientific philosophy is manifested in the detailed written record of her acquisition, 
absorption, and synthesis of scientific knowledge. As the notion of 'evolution' implies, 
Cavendish's scientific works will be examined in the order they were written, with the 
eight principal texts grouped into pairs: first, Poems, and Fancies and Philosophica.il 
Fancies, both published in 1653; then the two editions of Philosophical and Physical 
'See for example Lisa T. Sarasohn, "Leviathan and the Lady"; Brandie R. Siegfried; Richard Nate, '"Plain 
and Vulgarly Express'd.'" 
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Opinions, appearing eight years apart in 1655 and 1663; next, Philosophical Letters and 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, printed in 1664 and 1666 respectively; and 
finally Blazing World, the companion-piece to Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy, and Grounds of Natural Philosophy, her final work, printed in 1668. 
The challenge of Cavendish's science is best engaged by an interdisciplinary 
approach integrating various interconnected strands of inquiry, and in this thesis, I have 
chosen to look most particularly to literary studies, history and philosophy of science, and 
various aspects of composition theory, including the study of cognition and of writing 
processes. In the mid-seventeenth century, the dividing line between literary and 
scientific discourse was yet to be fully established, and though her subject matter is 
'scientific' and philosophical, these are essentially literary works which experiment with 
style and diction in order to entertain as well as inform. Along all those disciplinary 
avenues pursued in order to decipher Cavendish's writing, the specifically literary aspects 
of her work are central: the various genres she chooses sometimes to follow and other 
times to adapt or even subvert, as well as the syntactical, lexical, rhetorical, and figurative 
constructions she employs at different times and for different purposes. In recent years, 
the rhetorical and literary structure of scientific documents has attracted the interest of 
both students of literature and historians of science.2 Work in the history and philosophy 
of science serves to illuminate her intellectual influences, the changing conditions in 
which she wrote, the central issues to which she responds, and the specific ways in which 
2
 For studies of the rhetoric of science, see Charles Bazerman, Shaping Written Knowledge; Robert 
Markley; Richard Nate, "Rhetoric in the Early Royal Society"; Steven Shapin; Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer; and Brian Vickers. For a modern version of the debate over the place of 'rhetoric' (and more 
specifically metaphor) in technical and scientific writing, see Jerome Bump. For studies which concern 
Cavendish's scientific rhetoric specifically, see Sylvia Brown; Steven Clucas, "Variation, Irregularity and 
Probabilism"; Sarah E. Moreman; and Richard Nate, '"Plain and Vulgarly Express'd'". 
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she responds. Exploring the social and historical context of her texts, we can come to see 
that the science she illustrates, analyzes, rejects or invents reflects key issues in the 
development of early modern science in the way problems were envisioned, interpreted, 
and eventually resolved. In addition, various aspects of composition theory, including 
studies of cognition and writing processes, provide insight into Cavendish's growing 
understanding of her ideas and how best to convey them. Finally, a pedagogical tool 
familiar to teachers offers an initial framework for organizing the discussion of a diverse 
body of work. 
Cognitive Studies 
Personal experience teaching science, literature and composition inspired me to 
look at Cavendish's scientific texts through the lens of Bloom's Taxonomy, a 
classification system ubiquitous if not always popular in pedagogical institutions. Though 
her formal education was patchy and she admits to having been an unenthusiastic pupil, 
Cavendish's natural philosophy evinces the development of skills that teachers seek to 
foster in their students. Her works of natural philosophy are paired here by more than just 
chronology: Bloom's Taxonomy suggests a preliminary organization of Cavendish's 
science into categories loosely defined by their dominant cognitive levels. The eponym 
for a systematic breakdown of educational objectives, or cognitive processes, Bloom's 
Taxonomy was first put forth in 1956 by Benjamin Bloom et al. and recently revised by 
Lorin Anderson et al. The Taxonomy comprises six hierarchical divisions, in order, 
Knowledge, Comprehension, Application, Analysis, Synthesis, and Evaluation. These six 
are further subdivided into types and skills, and it is assumed that students must to some 
5 
extent master the first levels before moving productively to the next. When the 
Taxonomy was updated in 2001, the order of the highest classes was inverted to reflect 
the belief that the inductive component of synthesis is more complex than the deduction 
required in judgment or evaluation; moreover, creation is also felt to imply some form of 
judgment of the organic unity of the product.4 
The Taxonomy was created for practical pedagogical purposes: classifying the 
goals of the educational system, helping educators discuss these goals with greater 
precision, providing constructive solutions for teachers, and analyzing kinds of learning 
(Bloom 3). It is the last of these that suggests the grounds for borrowing the Taxonomy to 
provide a rough framework through which we can begin to recognize the logic of 
Cavendish's work and acknowledge it as an intelligent and cognitively complex 
processing of information. Applying the revised Taxonomy is not meant simply to 
pigeonhole Cavendish's scientific texts; several if not all taxonomic levels are evident in 
each one. Often the seemingly 'higher' levels of creativity and judgment are more 
obvious than the basics of defining, explaining, and organizing, though her poetic 
creativity is significantly different from the systematic creation of "a coherent or 
functional whole" defined in the Taxonomy, just as her judgment is not the neutral and 
objective evaluation "based on criteria and standards" (Anderson 31). More useful is the 
degree to which different cognitive levels are represented in each work; it is this that first 
illustrates how the entire body of her scientific work builds in cognitive complexity. For 
3
 See Appendix A for a summary of the objectives in each version of the Taxonomy. 
4
 In the revised Taxonomy, the category names were also altered from noun to verb form to reflect the way 
that educational objectives are framed as a student's active abilities. Thus, Evaluation becomes Evaluate, 
Synthesis becomes Create, etc. (Anderson 265). The authors also now suggest that the process categories 
are not exactly the cumulative hierarchy assumed in the first version. 
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example, the early work shows her recollection of concepts learned from her husband and 
brother-in-law, but little in-depth analysis or objective critique. Later works, on the other 
hand, show a more complete mastery of the sub-stages of understanding so necessary to 
analysis and synthesis, and in her final few works of natural philosophy, the critical 
analysis of the work of others shows yet more cognitive complexity. 
An initial taxonomic 'tag' has been assigned here to each work based on 
structural and organizational elements of the documents as well as on Cavendish's 
diction, and in particular her choice of figurative language. In the atomic poems, a 
wealth of similes, metaphors and analogies illustrates abstract or difficult concepts in an 
accessible way, enlightening as they entertain. Using the extensive elaboration of sub-
classes and qualifiers in the revised Taxonomy, these figurative constructions can be 
broadly associated with various taxonomic stages. For instance, the extended metaphor of 
the war-like behavior of fire is an example of representing the action of fire, illustrating 
it with a metaphor, comparing the action to that of armies at war—all elements of 
Understand? To some extent, this is an oversimplification, since it is also apparent that 
the war metaphor is used within Cavendish's theory of matter and that it reflects a certain 
judgment of nature and its capacity for random destruction.7 In addition, the wealth of 
imagery in Cavendish's early texts points to the first stage of the advanced process 
category Create, which involves what Anderson et al. refer to as a "divergent phase in 
5
 Similarly, Darcy Haag Granello examines structural and organizational elements in her evaluation of the 
literature reviews of graduate students. This study is especially pertinent to the discussion in chapter 3 of 
this thesis. 
6
 See Appendix A, table 2. The terms in italics correspond respectively to subcategories 2.1,2.2, and 2.6 of 
the second process category (Understand). 
7
 The terms in italics correspond respectively to subcategories 3.2 and 5.2. Notably, there is little evidence 
of process category 4 (Analyze). 
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which a variety of possible solutions are considered as the student attempts to understand 
the task" (85). Nonetheless, the distinctive feature of Cavendish's two earliest works, 
Poems, and Fancies along with Philosophical! Fancies, is their focus on imaginative 
illustration of her first thoughts on natural philosophy. Subsequently, the extensive lists 
of both the first and second editions of Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655 and 
1663) represent concerted efforts at classifying, differentiating and organizing, all 
together indicating Cavendish's increasing analytic skills. Philosophical Letters and 
Observations Upon Natural Philosophy are notable for their critical, even judgmental 
evaluation of scientific trends and ideas, while her final works, Blazing World and 
Grounds of Natural Philosophy, are very different renditions that both more fully 
represent synthesis. 
Writing Theory 
The Taxonomy serves to organize the discussion into chapters, but perhaps more 
importantly it leads to further explorations of cognition and knowledge creation. Since 
the field of cognitive studies is immense, the focus here will be on the area of 
composition studies concerned with the quite specific development of meaning within the 
written text, and even more particularly on how meaning and writing evolve in tandem. 
Bloom's Taxonomy helps approximate Cavendish's cognitive abilities at different stages 
of her writing, but it is in many ways a static model which identifies cognitive evidence 
in each text as if the text is an end in itself, which further implies that the knowledge it 
reveals is somehow discrete from that of the next work. To account for the growth of 
Cavendish's thinking and writing over time means to assume that her writing—any 
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writing, in fact—is dynamic. On the common premise that knowledge is created and not 
imminent, the cognitive development theories of Piaget and Vygotsky are often used as a 
starting point to link the development of knowledge with the evolving text. It is now a 
nearly unquestioned assumption in constructivist composition studies that writing is a 
process, moreover one far more multifaceted than the early "pre-write, write, re-write" 
model that emerged in the 1960s as a reaction to formalism.8 Although she sometimes 
describes her writing as simply the product of purely intellectual contemplation, 
Cavendish's ideas evolve within and across texts, sometimes even within single (very 
long) sentences. Meaning does not leap directly out of her brain and onto the page; the 
transition from mental construction to textual inscription is a process more aptly 
described by recursion or cycles than by a narrow linearity. These ideas are briefly 
acknowledged in the revised Taxonomy, which mentions the cyclical nature of 
progression through the taxonomic levels, and in particular how "[the] process categories 
of Understand, Analyze, and Evaluate are interrelated and often used iteratively in 
performing cognitive tasks" (Anderson 80). However, Cavendish's fragmented, 
repetitive, convoluted and very clearly non-linear writing and thinking is better 
illuminated by those composition theories of the last forty years that begin with the 
premise of a "symbiotic relationship between cognitive complexity in writing and 
complexity in thinking" (Granello 302).9 
Nystrand, Green & Wiemelt have written an especially useful and detailed overview of composition 
theory and its intellectual history going back to the mid-twentieth century. The discussion that follows 
includes necessarily brief references to the complexities that they explore. 
9
 Some examples of such theories are Linda Flower and John R. Hayes, "The Cognition of Discovery" and 
"The Cognitive Process Theory of Writing"; Lee Odell, "The Process of Writing and the Process of 
Learning"; Donald M. Murray, "Writing as Process"; Kenneth Dowst, "The Epistemic Approach"; Janet 
Emig, "Writing as a Mode of Learning"; and Arthur N. Applebee, "Writing and Reasoning". 
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Research to better understand the "symbiotic relationship" between knowledge 
and writing has led to a variety of hypotheses concerning the entwined processes of 
writing and learning. In "Writing as a Mode of Learning," Janet Emig proposes that 
writing "serves learning uniquely because writing as process-and-product possesses a 
cluster of attributes that correspond uniquely to certain powerful learning strategies" 
(122). Stephen Judy acknowledges the importance of personal learning experiences, 
affirming that the structuring and organization of writing is learned as one shapes ideas 
and experiences, first, for oneself, and then for an audience; in essence, form grows from 
content (41). Similarly, Kenneth Dowst suggests that writing is the epistemic activity of 
making sense of an extremely complex set of personal perceptions and experiences of an 
infinitely complex world (66): to write is to compose understanding, meaning, and 
knowledge. Others have explored the intricacies of the process itself. By the late 1970s, 
the initial linear writing model was rejected in favor of far more complex sequences. 
Linda Flower and John R. Hayes suggest that advanced writers do not so much compose 
in discrete stages as they continually repeat the processes of planning, translating, and 
reviewing ("Cognitive Process Theory" 369). Embedded within these three processes are 
further sub-processes: generating, organizing, goal setting, evaluating, and revising. A 
key element in this cognitive process theory is its often-unpredictable iterative quality; 
reviewing can lead naturally to a new cycle of planning and translating, but generation, 
reevaluation, and revising of ideas can "interrupt any other processes and occur at any 
time in the act of writing" ("Cognitive Process Theory" 374). Donald Murray similarly 
describes a constant reiteration of the writing stages of rehearsing, drafting and revising 
and the variously competing forces of collecting, connecting, writing and reading that 
10 
affect writers at all times; furthermore, he cautions that writing is "a process of 
interaction, not a series of logical steps" ("Writing as Process" 4). In the same vein, Lee 
Odell concludes that the various conceptual activities that "writers need to engage in as 
they try to understand and write about specific sets of data" (43), do not take place in any 
"neat, sequential way" (44); instead, they recur throughout the composing process. 
Such studies often have specifically pedagogical goals, yet the fundamental 
concepts are useful in elucidating Cavendish's natural philosophy: by examining the 
writing processes manifested in her work, her learning and thinking processes are also 
further revealed. Murray warns that one cannot infer process from product; however, I 
argue that the series of texts that make up the body of Cavendish's natural philosophy act 
as markers testifying to the evolution of both meaning and understanding. Pierre-Marc 
De Biasi calls the individual rough draft "an essential link in the chain of transformations 
that [lead] from the project of the work to its definitive text" (27). In Cavendish's case, 
the draft often became the published work, both its own "definitive text" as well as "a 
crucial moment" in her larger oeuvre (27). Furthermore, the interrelated motifs of balance 
and cyclical recursion that she comes to use in her natural philosophy suggest an 
important link between her written work and writing process theories. Murray describes 
the writing process as a "sequence of balance and imbalance which takes place while the 
forces [of collecting, connecting, writing and reading] interact" ("Writing as Process" 
11). A draft requires the tentative balance of the four forces; however, this balance is 
10
 More precisely, Murray claims that "The process of making meaning with written language can not be 
understood by looking backward from a finished page. Process can not be inferred from product any more 
than a pig can be inferred from a sausage" ("Writing as Process" 3). 
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ephemeral. What Murray describes next resonates with a reader's experience of 
Cavendish's largely unedited work: 
The writer thinks the task is finished, that the balance will hold. But when 
the writer turns to read the page, it becomes apparent that the language is 
too stiff, too clumsy, has no flow. The reader will not follow it. Or, there is 
too much information; the writing goes off on tangents. Material has to be 
cut out and reordered. The writer may be able to help the piece of writing 
find its own meaning through a modest amount of rewriting and 
researching, reordering and rereading. But many times the imbalance gets 
worse ... New material has to be sought out and its order discovered. The 
piece of writing is severely out of balance and will be brought towards 
balance only by rehearsing. 
Murray's point here is that writing is a "kinetic activity, a matter of instantaneous motion, 
action and reaction which is never still" (12). The imbalance is productive, if sometimes 
uncomfortable or frustrating. 
Cavendish's writing illustrates this in many ways: in "imbalanced" and 
fragmented publications, in seemingly incomplete efforts at reordering and editing, in 
endless authorial interjections and apologies, but also, importantly, in her philosophy of 
natural balance and imbalance. Throughout her work, natural actions and physical health 
are often represented by images of tentative balance between opposing but interconnected 
forces: expulsive motions are (ideally) counterbalanced by digestive ones; excesses of 
heat in the body are resolved by cooling remedies; the death of organic matter provides 
12 
materials for a new production. At the same time, the order of nature is always at risk 
from the forces of disorder; 'irregular' motions are everpresent. In addition, what critics 
have most often defined as tiresome repetition in her writing is more accurately 
understood as manifestations of the cyclical composing—and cognitive—processes 
described by Murray, Flower and Hayes, Odell, and others. In the early stages of 
synthesizing her original philosophy of nature, Cavendish finds evidence of circular 
forms and motion everywhere: the circle is a fundamental figure of great importance to 
all natural productions, just as the quincunx was central to Thomas Browne. This figure is 
significant enough for Cavendish to structure parts of her 1663 edition of Philosophical 
and Physical Opinions as embedded spheres of discussion; her textual organization thus 
further calls to mind Flower and Hayes's embedded processes. Eventually, the simple 
circle evolves into the more complex idea of recursion: cycles of order and disorder, 
peace and war, stability and chaos. The motif permeates her writing; the philosophical 
implications of the cycle are illustrated in the figurative illustrations of her theory and 
more subtly reinforced in the organizational structures of the texts. 
The process of writing and thinking does not exist in a social vacuum, and it is 
also important to look at the circumstances—personal, historical and cultural—in which 
Cavendish creates her texts. She begins to write for publication in the middle of the civil 
unrest that precipitated her exile from England and she continues through the further 
upheaval of the restoration of the monarchy; additionally, this is a formative period in the 
establishment of institutionalized scientific thinking. These influences are felt throughout 
her texts, yet constructivist cognition, which posits "individuals as more or less 
13 
autonomous agents of knowledge" (Kennedy 287), does not significantly take into 
account the social contexts affecting the eventual knowledge-product. Vygotsky's 
cognitive theory, however, includes an important social aspect; in positing that higher 
mental functions "emerge first in social interaction before they are internalized by the 
individual ... Vygotsky specifies both the social interaction and the internal processes of 
the individual" (Dias 287, emphasis added). The emergence of social constructionism in 
the 1980s and the more recent influence of Bakhtin's dialogism have also brought the 
social aspect of knowledge production into greater focus. Social constructionism "regards 
knowledge as socially negotiated and constituted in discourse, which registers shared 
assumptions and beliefs, in a socially emerging view of the world" (Dias 287), whereas 
Bakhtin views discourse "as a forum where the forces of individual cognition, on the one 
hand, and social ideology and convention, on the other, 'dialectically interpenetrate' each 
other" (Nystrand 295). 
These perspectives on writing and discourse provide further insight into 
Cavendish's work. Though she often describes her writing as a solitary activity, she also 
openly acknowledges the influence of others on her understanding, first her husband and 
brother-in-law, later both extensive readings in natural philosophy and knowledgeable 
correspondents such as Huygens or Glanvill. Moreover, her texts are often set within 
learning communities—real or invented—from which Cavendish draws out the meaning 
of the natural world. Her ideas sometimes respond directly to the critique or theory of 
other philosophers, but even more often she creates fictional situations of debate: with an 
imaginary correspondent in Philosophical Letters, with the various beast-men in Blazing 
14 
World, and, in several works, with dissenting factions in her own brain. In addition, the 
unusual variety of genres Cavendish uses to convey her philosophical ideas demonstrates 
some of the tensions of "dialectical interpenetration." The conventions attached to the 
forms she chooses—verse, the prose essay, letters, or science fiction—create expectations 
which are both met and subverted in her work. Her light verse about atoms is amusing, 
but it also contains potentially radical social ideas; in the more conventional prose texts, 
information is accumulated and sorted to make sense of the natural world in new and 
unconventional ways; the epistles systematically clarify her theory while undermining 
dissenting opinions; her observations are as much commentary on human folly as on 
experimental science; and her fantastic tale is diverting entertainment combined with 
social commentary and philosophical treatise. 
History and Philosophy of Science 
In her prefaces, Cavendish often claims that her utmost desire is for fame and 
remembrance, yet the various ways in which she frames her ideas indicate that her 
agenda is far more involved. She also seeks to do more than put forward a viable theory 
of matter; an important concern throughout her writing is the very nature of knowledge, 
and her natural philosophy is significantly affected by her belief in the inaccessibility of 
absolute truth and the coexistence instead of innumerable and sometimes conflicting 
probabilities. Although they make only the briefest mention of the Duchess, Steven 
Shapin and Simon Schaffer's study of Hobbes and Boyle, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 
contributes to our understanding of Cavendish's seemingly fragmented epistemology. 
Shapin and Schaffer claim that, in the mid-seventeenth century, solutions to problems of 
15 
knowledge were also seen as solutions to problems of social order. They specifically 
explore how questions surrounding Robert Boyle's air-pump were construed, especially 
by Hobbes, as issues of social order, and how the solutions suggested by men on both 
sides also functioned as solutions to political, religious and philosophical issues. Shapin 
and Schaffer's study is significant for Cavendish on two fronts. First, the authors examine 
not only the philosophical content of the air-pump debates, but the method of these 
debates. They argue that the way Hobbes and Boyle chose to correspond with and 
respond to one another—the language choices, the points of inclusion and exclusion, the 
organization of the responses—contributed to the establishment of the rules and 
conventions of modern science and helped found a new (experimental) social order 
among natural philosophers. Similarly, in Cavendish's work, her rhetorical approach to 
the material is as telling as the actual 'science' content. The structure of her texts, her 
various choices of figurative language, the wide selection of genres she attempts and the 
modifications she brings to these all address questions of knowledge and social order. 
Equally importantly, Shapin and Schaffer frame their study as a "stranger's 
account" (4) of the debates surrounding the air-pump and experimental culture; in so 
doing, they deliberately reject "taken-for-granted perceptions of experimental practice 
and its products" and they "appropriate one great advantage the stranger has over the 
member in explaining the beliefs and practices of a specific culture: the stranger is in a 
position to know that there are alternatives to those beliefs and practices" (6). It is not 
only the authors who are "strangers" to the debates; Shapin and Schaffer quite 
convincingly present Thomas Hobbes as a stranger to experimentalism whose "objections 
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to the experimental programme seem plausible, sensible, and rational" (13). This role of 
the insightful outsider is remarkably appropriate to Cavendish, who throughout her life 
finds herself on the fringes of society as a woman, a political exile, and an opponent of 
increasingly-popular experimental science. Moreover, her texts repeatedly establish her 
estrangement. In the paratextual material, she frequently reflects on her preference for 
solitary contemplation over conversation; she also describes the various situations of 
social isolation which led her to write. Her desire for fame further sets her apart from 
others; she favors her singular opinions over the general consensus and repeatedly sets 
her ideas of matter, motion, medicine and knowledge in opposition to others through the 
rhetorical medium of debates, which sometimes take the form of ungentlemanly 
polemical attacks on named philosophers.11 Her later works set up fictional relationships 
that seem only to emphasize her lack of real social contact: she creates an imaginary 
correspondent in Philosophical Letters, and writes herself into her Blazing World as a 
spirit befriended by the protagonist. 
Following Shapin and Schaffer s lead, Eve Keller argues that Cavendish's 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy offers a stranger's account of the new 
science which displays the "epistemological problems and social pretensions in the 
claims of the experimentalists" (450). Cavendish's critique is insightful "precisely 
because it is spoken from outside the discursive and institutional forums it explores"; 
Keller adds that Cavendish holds "the paradoxically privileged position of the margins" 
(450). I suggest that this is true of all her natural philosophy. Cavendish is not only a 
1
 On the social condemnation that such polemical attacks could entail, see Shapin, especially 114-19 and 
307-09. 
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stranger to experimental philosophy but to theoretical atomism, mechanism, vitalism, and 
medicine; to contemporary intellectual debate; and even to her own land for the years of 
her exile. Her gender, her politics, her lack of formal education all contribute to her status 
as the "perfect stranger" to English natural philosophy: curious about natural philosophy 
but unable to fully participate in contemporary debates; as knowledgeable as many other 
virtuosi, and as limited; interested in innovation, but clinging to tradition; hoping for 
restored intellectual and political stability but also willing to take advantage of the social 
turmoil to 'speak out' in her writing. Cavendish's liminal, exiled, and alien position has 
made it difficult to see her work as plausible, sensible, and rational, but the alternatives 
she presents make it clear that the dominance of mechanism and experimental science 
were not the foregone conclusions we sometimes assume. 
In the brief description of each chapter that follows, some detail of Cavendish's 
early life is provided to set out the specific context of her thinking and writing. The 
central theme and theoretical focus of each chapter is presented to facilitate the 
navigation through a multifaceted study of multifaceted works. Combining the fields of 
cognitive studies, writing process theory and history and philosophy of science with an 
overarching close literary reading helps give new perspective on Cavendish's 
philosophical texts and it also shows how interdisciplinary tools and methods can provide 
insight into such texts. The development of Cavendish's science illustrates the circuitous, 
fragmented and complex paths taken by writers and thinkers of any generation. 
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Chapter 1: Poems, and Fancies and Philosophicall Fancies 
Margaret Lucas was born in 1623 to Elizabeth and Thomas Lucas of St John's, 
Essex. The youngest of eight children, her early years were spent happily with her 
older sisters, the closest one six years older than Margaret; her oldest brother was a full 
twenty-five years her senior. Her formal education consisted of very basic tutoring in 
traditional areas as well as singing, music, and dancing. Painfully shy and possibly 
dyslexic, Margaret preferred quiet contemplation and writing above all else. Even as a 
young girl, she wrote prolifically, filling "sixteen large notebooks ... with observations 
and reflection, stories and poems" (Whitaker 18). After her marriage in 1645, Margaret 
took up her interest in writing again, likely with the encouragement of her husband 
William Cavendish, then Earl of Newcastle, himself the author of plays and verse and, 
later, a significant book on the breeding and training of horses. Her published work 
includes an impressive twenty-three volumes written between 1651 and 1671, of which 
eight are completely or significantly devoted to natural philosophy.13 
She had been surrounded by political chaos since her late teens, and the civil war 
brought great adversity to her staunchly royalist family. Margaret fled England with 
Queen Henrietta Maria in 1644, not long after joining the court as a maid of honor. She 
was not to return until the Restoration in 1660. In 1653, however, she was in England to 
sue;—unsuccessfully—for some of William's lands and monies. While awaiting an 
answer to her petition, she passed her time by writing what was to become her first 
12
 This summary is drawn from the several interesting and insightful biographies of Cavendish, including 
those by Douglas Grant, Anna Battigelli, Kathleen Jones, and Katie Whitaker. Much of the information 
here draws on Whitaker's meticulously detailed biography. 
13
 An explicit study of the philosophical parts of Worlds Olio was left out this thesis because her opinions 
are not representative of a specific natural theory like atomism or vitalism. However, I will point out where 
later works have drawn on opinions that are first expressed in Worlds Olio. 
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published work. Margaret, now Lady Newcastle, first chose poetry as the medium for 
expressing her ideas about the natural world. Poems, and Fancies opens with fifty pages 
of verse exploring the idea of an atomistic universe where particles are endowed with a 
variety of human qualities, few of them positive: they are capricious, argumentative, 
vindictive and willful. The natural world is chaotic and unpredictable, much as her world 
is at this time. Even before this work was published, Cavendish turned to the prose essay 
and produced a series of very short, almost aphoristic essays entitled Philosophicall 
Fancies. The essays explore alternatives to Epicurean atomism in a preliminary effort to 
produce an original theory of matter and motion, but at this time there is no sense of an 
ultimate plan or a fully developed theory. 
As both titles illustrate, Cavendish is at play here, with ideas, images, forms, and 
language. These early works show a central interest simply to create: documents to gain 
her remembrance and fame, verses to entertain, philosophical speculations to enlighten 
readers. She generates a wide variety of striking images and intriguing analogies, but the 
effect is of the haphazard juggling of new ideas that occurs in a brainstorming session; 
the imaginative connections and insights indicate a great curiosity about her subject 
matter but also that her understanding of science is limited and incomplete. Nonetheless, 
the 'fanciful' manipulation of ideas and images in these two texts has repercussions 
beyond simple entertainment. These works are the starting point for Cavendish's real 
interest in natural philosophy, the inspiration for her shift to vitalist philosophy, the 
source of the notions of balance and harmony central to her innovative theory of matter. 
14
 Cavendish notes that "as for my Book entitled The World's Olio, I writ most part of it before I went into 
England" (77? 170). The Worlds Olio was not published until late 1654. Though the title page is dated 1655, 
Whitaker notes that it must have been available earlier (377n67). 
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It is through the figurations she initially employs to represent the natural world that she 
begins to formulate a new vision, one that is consciously at odds with the many systems 
from which it nonetheless draws its inspiration. 
Chapter 2: Philosophical and Physical Opinions 
Though it is in some ways a new and dramatically expanded draft of 
Philosophicall Fancies, the 1655 edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions shows 
Cavendish just beginning to formulate a full world-view. She moves beyond imaginative 
sketches of atomic nature and begins to elaborate an animist natural philosophy founded 
on a hierarchical model of matter where reason and cooperation are highly valued, but 
where faction and disorder are still evident. The second edition builds on the first with 
added detail, clarification, organization and purpose: by 1663, her natural theory is more 
or less fully established. Subsequent works expand or explain, but rarely amend the basic 
ideas set forth in these treatises. 
The availability of two very different editions of the same title offers a unique 
glimpse into the circuitous and reiterative processes of drafting and revising. In addition, 
the particular changes Cavendish brings to the content, organization, and diction show 
significant parallels between how and what is written. In these works, the range of images 
and metaphors is narrowed to a select few, all more closely related to ideas of balance 
and harmony, and the text develops a structure that further illustrates these ideas. Both 
editions of Philosophical and Physical Opinions reflect Cavendish's desire to expand her 
understanding, fit in with learned circles and distinguish her voice from others. 
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Accompanying the development of her scientific knowledge is a growing understanding 
of how to formulate a theory of matter that matches her social vision, and consequently 
she begins also to pass judgment of the ideas of her peers which fail to do the same. This 
continues in Cavendish's next philosophical works, where her need to have her ideas 
acknowledged is set against sometimes scathing criticism of those whom she would have 
accept her opinions. 
Chapter 3: Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy 
In the relative peace of the mid-1660s, with new leisure to devote to reading and 
writing, Cavendish produces her most polemical works of natural philosophy. These two 
works include some new speculation, particularly on the subject of perception, but their 
major thrust is critical and judgmental. Figurative constructions are largely abandoned in 
favor of what appears to be a more objective stance; however, this has its own rhetorical 
implications. Her assessment of other philosophers also bespeaks a change in her 
relationship with her readers, and in Philosophical Letters she chooses a genre which 
specifically engages an outside reader, albeit an imaginary correspondent. In 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, this spirit of dialogue and debate persists. 
The tone is more contentious than in the letters, but the critical style calls for some sort of 
response: Cavendish wishes both to defend her self-assigned membership among the 
community of natural philosophers and to force acknowledgment of her opinions. 
Both texts evince Cavendish's growing difficulty in accepting the ideas of her 
scientific peers; they also indicate a higher level of cognitive learning in which her 
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analytical and critical skills become more obvious. Judgment is essential to the final 
synthesis of her natural theory, and the program of study in natural philosophy that she 
sets for herself allows her to develop more confidence in her own perspective on the 
natural world. There are interesting parallels to be drawn between these texts and the 
academic literature reviews produced by university students. By reviewing the literature 
pertinent to their project, students situate themselves in a scholarly tradition, and in the 
same way, Cavendish here seeks to situate herself in the world of natural philosophical 
debate from which she is inevitably excluded by gender above all else. As she examines 
the work of others, she reevaluates her own ideas, yet reading authors with conflicting 
opinions leads to the entrenchment of her own ideas. 
Chapter 4: Blazing World and Grounds of Natural Philosophy 
Cavendish achieved some of the recognition she so desired in the second half of 
the 1660s. In 1665, the couple rose to the heights of the aristocracy when William 
received his dukedom, and subsequently literary works and laudatory verses were 
dedicated to them.'5 Some of her hunger for philosophical fame was satisfied when her 
ideas were acknowledged (though disputed) in Joseph GlanvilFs work on witchcraft.16 
Her most public moment, however, was her visit to the Royal Society in 1667, where 
Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke demonstrated objects and phenomena "designed to 
As patrons to the poet and playwright Richard Flecknoe, both William and Margaret were the subjects of 
many laudatory verses; Flecknoe dedicated some of his work to Margaret alone, and his play The 
Damoiselles a la Mode to the couple. Both John Dryden and Thomas Shadwell also dedicated work to the 
Duke and Duchess (Whitaker 320-21). 
16
 Soon after reading Philosophical Letters, Glanvill had sought to communicate with Cavendish, wishing 
to defend the Platonic doctrine of Henry More; their correspondence continued for a few years. The later 
work of Ralph Cudworth also responds to Cavendish's views; in it, he "attacked her view that matter had 
free will as the most dangerous form of atheism" (Whitaker 319). Cudworth's True Intellectual System of 
the Universe was published in 1678, five years after Cavendish's death. 
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titillate the Virtuosi rather than satisfy scientific curiosity" (Jones 163). Her final two 
publications on natural philosophy do not, however, pursue the real-world engagement 
that was increasingly available to her. Blazing World, a fictional narrative written as a 
companion piece to Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, retreats dramatically 
into a fantasy world where any philosophical debate takes place with creatures only half-
human. Her last essays on natural philosophy, Grounds of Natural Philosophy, abjure 
open critique of other philosophies in favor of a simple and concise presentation of her 
theory of matter and motion. 
Each one in its own way, these works culminate all that has come before. In 
Grounds of Natural Philosophy, her comprehension of the natural world and the various 
natural philosophies of her time is advanced enough for her to be able to finalize the 
creation begun with Poems, and Fancies: a new and wholly original world view that 
responds to and rejects these various philosophies and proposes in their stead a consistent 
and integrated model of a vital universe. In its fanciful and imaginative style, Blazing 
World also hearkens back to Poems, and Fancies. In addition, it takes up the challenge of 
Philosophical and Physical Opinions, that of finding structural and organizational means 
to illustrate her theory of balance, harmony, and variety in nature. Finally, it integrates 
her critiques of society, of experimental science, and of mankind in general. Following 
different paths, neither work arrives at an absolute end point; the cyclical nature of 
Cavendish's thinking excludes the very possibility. Instead, both works situate 
themselves as new beginnings. In these final presentations of her natural philosophy, 
Cavendish is consciously a creative woman. In Blazing World she is "Authoress of a 
24 
whole World" {BW109), while in Grounds of Natural Philosophy, the restoring-beds that 
come at the close of two decades of philosophical writing are literal and figurative 
starting-points for new life, new conceptions, and new writing projects. 
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CHAPTER 1: "let Fancy have the upper place"1 
Poems & Fancies and Philosophicall Fancies 
From late 1651 to early 1653, Margaret Cavendish experienced a kind of multiple 
exile out of which her earliest attempts at natural philosophy emerged. Her life had 
already been dramatically marked by tragedy brought on by civil war. In the summer of 
1642, her family home was invaded by local parliamentarians, the family was 
imprisoned, the house was plundered, and her brother John was imprisoned in the Tower 
of London.2 Later in the war the house was largely destroyed and the family burial vault 
was desecrated; the mob of looters even broke open the tomb of Margaret's recently 
buried mother, Elizabeth. Soon after, her brother Sir Charles Lucas, a commander in the 
King's army, was executed by the Parliamentarian forces led by Lord Fairfax. Already in 
exile with her husband, who had been a general in the defeated royalist army, Margaret 
bitterly mourned the loss of her beloved mother. In 1651 she returned briefly to London, 
a stranger in her native land, isolated from her husband and friends in Antwerp, 
dispossessed and at the mercy of a parliamentarian government she felt had destroyed 
"not only the family I am linked to ... but the family from which I sprung" (77? 163). Her 
appeal for a proportion of William's estate was denied categorically, but she spent nearly 
eighteen months in England while her brother-in-law Charles sought to restore the 
family's financial security.3 Lonely and suffering from insomnia, Margaret turned to 
writing to ward off her melancholy. 
lP&F2l3. 
2
 It is not clear, however, whether Margaret was with the family at the time (Whitaker 41). 
Margaret was denied the one-fifth entitlement the Parliament had allowed to the wives of traitors and 
delinquents because her marriage had taken place after William, already in exile at the time, had been 
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Early in 1653, she sent not one but two volumes to publication: first, Poems, and 
Fancies, and soon after, Philosophicall Fancies. In both texts, she claims that her central 
impulse is fundamentally creative. She wishes to produce documents that bring her 
remembrance and fame, verses that entertain, thoughts on natural philosophy that 
enlighten readers. She explores such notions as particulate motion, the vacuum, and the 
nature of disease, yet neither of these works of 'fancy' purports to be serious natural 
philosophy. The atomic verses of Poems, and Fancies are whimsical, nai've, and, by the 
author's own admission, not to be taken too seriously; the short essays in Philosophicall 
Fancies were composed quickly and, Cavendish claims, only for distraction. However, 
these texts evince far more than a lonely woman whiling away the hours. They illustrate 
the complex process of making rather than simply expressing meaning and knowledge. 
The fragmented nature of the atomic poems and the disconnected, almost haphazard 
organization of her first philosophical 'essays' suggest the unedited brainstorming of 
half-formed ideas; this in turn demonstrates her developing comprehension, assimilation 
and appropriation of complex concepts. In addition, the scientific content of her texts 
shows a rapidly growing understanding of the ideas of respected natural philosophers, 
both ancient and modern. Unable to participate more than tangentially in the sort of 
intellectual and philosophical debate open to her husband and brother-in-law, it is 
through her writing that Cavendish begins to make sense of many scientific topics. 
Initially drawing on her perception of the close correspondence between atomism and 
political anarchy, she anchors her understanding of the natural world in her observations 
of civil disorder. However, the process of articulating the chaos of atomism initiates a 
stripped of his estates (Whitaker 131, 134). Throughout her biography of Cavendish, Whitaker provides 
detailed descriptions of the family's complex financial maneuvers, including their income, debts, 
possessions, properties, and associated litigations. 
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significant shift in perspective: she ceases to see unruly nature as the root of social 
turmoil and instead begins to envision a natural order that foreshadows restored social 
harmony. 
Philosophicall Fancies and the atomic verses in Poems, and Fancies are closely 
connected in time and topic, yet very different in genre and philosophical perspective. 
Together, these texts reveal the mutable, protean nature of Cavendish's first attempts at 
'scientific' writing. This chapter will examine how her fragmented writing reflects the 
preliminary, even pre-textual aspects of the composing process; how the scientific 
content tests out possibilities rather than proclaiming a firm conviction; and how 
figurative language is used to explore evocative images and discover meaning through 
them. Though the atomism in Poems, and Fancies begins as a metaphor for society and 
Philosophicall Fancies is little more than a skeleton theory of matter and motion, it 
becomes clear that these two function heuristically to allow Cavendish to envision a far 
more comprehensive natural and epistemic theory. 
(Pre-)Writing Processes 
Giving free rein to her imagination, in Poems, and Fancies and Philosophicall 
Fancies Cavendish produces fragmented, exploratory texts, where any and all ideas, 
genres, rhetorical devices and associations are appropriate. The one hundred and five 
atomic verses unfold with no particular logical sequence. The most basic concept of 
matter is not defined until the seventy-sixth poem, and transitions from one topic to 
another appear arbitrary: verses on the element of fire are randomly scattered throughout, 
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and poems about physical illness are lumped together with verses about the Sun and 
others on motion. The atomic poems make up only a quarter of Poems, and Fancies, a 
book that also includes masques, elegies, orations, dialogues and moral discourses. 
Groups of poems experiment with different rhetorical devices such as simile, metaphor, 
and prosopopoeia.4 The volume covers an extraordinary range of topics, from fame to 
fairies to fishes, hunting to honor to hope, prudence to pygmies to possets. Though 
devoted to natural philosophy alone, Philosophical! Fancies is also a very preliminary 
study. Each chapter is little more than a topic sentence introducing her first thoughts on 
matter, motion, the mind, the senses, natural phenomena, celestial bodies, and other 
subjects. 
Especially in these early years of her writing career, she spent little time 
correcting or editing her work, preferring her ideas in their natural, unaltered state, and 
she had the social status, the means and the indulgence of her husband to publish her 
sprawling first thoughts.5 As a result, these first texts are what Sandra Sherman describes 
as "a flagrant display of the author's mental processes and of the 'fancies' produced" 
(186).6 They reveal aspects of the initial writing process that are usually invisible, taking 
place "within the writer's head or on scraps of paper that are rarely published" (Murray, 
"Write Before Writing" 381). One of these invisible aspects is an author's signal to write, 
On the many genres and rhetorical devices used in Poems, and Fancies, see Hero Chalmers, "Flattering 
Division." 
5
 On Cavendish's revision (or lack thereof), see James Fitzmaurice, "Margaret Cavendish on Her Own 
Writing" and "Front Matter." Whitaker points out that Cavendish risked her reputation by publishing 
Poems, and Fancies: "[modesty], silence, obedience, self-effacement—the central concepts of female 
virtue—would all be violated by publication, and women who printed their works risked shame and 
denunciation" (151). Also see Kathleen Jones 93-95. 
6
 Sherman refers more specifically to Poems, and Fancies, Sociable Letters and Blazing World, but in this 
context, the description applies equally well to Philosophicall Fancies. 
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the "way of handling a diffuse and overwhelming subject" (378). Cavendish's prefatory 
comments indicate that the signal precipitating actual composing is not the scientific 
notion of the atom but the image of anarchy that atoms kindle in her mind. Both 
documents introduce her thoughts as unruly entities which she has indulgently allowed to 
roam freely. She tells her friend Elizabeth Chaplain that "[Nature] hath given us 
Thoughts which run wildly about, and if by chance they light on Truth, they do not know 
it for a Truth" (P&F; "An Epistle to Mistriss Toppe").7 In Philosophicall Fancies 
Cavendish gives these wild thoughts voice in opening verses where they flout Reason's 
admonishments: 
Reason forebeare, our Study not molest, 
For wee do goe those waies that please us best. 
Nature doth give us liberty to run, 
Without a Check, more swift far then the Sun. ("Reason, and the 
Thoughts") 
For once in her life, the chaos of the civil war is productive, channeled into a fruitful 
metaphor for her creative instincts. 
Cavendish justifies the "general impression of wildness" of her book by 
privileging Fancy's abundant diversity above Reason's organization and method (Grant 
127). She declares that, "Fancy goeth not so much by Rule, & Method, as by Choice" 
(P&F; "To All Noble, and Worthy Ladies"). Hero Chalmers argues that this first work 
demonstrates Cavendish's "poetics of 'variety'," a conscious espousal of chaos and 
7
 As noted at the start of this thesis, the prefatory material is unpaginated and will be documented in the text 
by title. 
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fragmentation, but she also admits that the unrestrained flow of ideas gives rise to a 
structure that appears at best eclectic but at worst entirely chaotic—even "vertiginous" 
(123). Such representations call to mind the preliminary writing activities variously 
described by terms such as pre-text, avant-texte, pre-writing, brainstorming, generation, 
planning stages, free-writing, 'groping', or discovery drafts.8 Some of these are also 
understood to be invisible processes, ones that mix elements of the written and spoken 
word. Rohman affirms that pre-writing happens "within the mind" (107). Witte suggests 
that pre-text is "a writer's tentative linguistic representation of intended meaning, a 'trial 
locution' that is produced in the mind" and eventually "transcribed as written text" (397). 
Murray uses the term "rehearsal" to describe how writers begin with verbal constructions, 
thinking aloud or discussing ideas with others; these eventually evolve into written form 
as "lists, outlines, titles, leads, ordered fragments, all sketches of what later may be 
written, devices to catch a possible order that exists in the chaos of the subject" ("Write 
Before Writing" 376-77). Both these definitions evoke the haphazard organization of 
Cavendish's texts in their allusions to the relative formlessness, even aimlessness of this 
part of the writing process. 
However, the atomic poems and Philosophical! Fancies illustrate preliminary 
writing activities in more than their fragmented structure. In "Writing as Process," 
Murray further describes rehearsal as a "time for experiments in meaning and form, for 
trying out voices, for beginning the process of play which is vital to making effective 
Pierre-Marc De Biasi uses the term avant-texte to designate "the chain of writing operations that have 
preceded the appearance of the text proper" (38) and associates it with the critical readings practiced by 
literary geneticists. On brainstorming, pre-writing, discovery drafts and rehearsal, see Donald Murray, 
"Write Before Writing" 375-77. 'Pre-writing' is a term coined in 1965 by Gordon D. Rohman. Flower and 
Hayes describe generating ideas as a sub-process of planning ("Cognitive Process Theory" 372). 
Elsewhere, they explain that plans are "typically fragmentary" ("Images, Plans, and Prose" 124). 
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meaning" (5). Through these two explorations of natural philosophy, Cavendish creates 
an understanding of the natural world that is not what she had originally imagined or 
intended. Initially, she openly acknowledges her work as play, a diversion for both writer 
and reader. In Poems, and Fancies, she tells "All Noble, and Worthy Ladies" that her 
work consists of "harmlesse Fancies." She later adds that "I had nothing to do when I 
wrot it, and I suppose those have nothing, or little else to do, that read it" ("To Naturall 
Philosophers").9 Cavendish does not expect her work to be taken too seriously and 
blithely admits that she "may be absurd, and erre grossely," yet continues, "if I do erre, it 
is no great matter; for my Discourse of them [atoms and motion] is not to be accounted 
Authentick: so if there be any thing worthy of noting, it is a good Chance; if not, there is 
no harm done, nor time lost." Even her choice of genre predicates play: she writes about 
science in verse because "Errours might better passe there, then in Prose; since Poets 
write most Fiction, and Fiction is not given for Truth, but Pastimes" ("To Naturall 
Philosophers").10 
By Philosophical! Fancies, her outlook has changed, and her writing evokes the 
paradoxically aimless and essential search for purpose that Rohman associates with pre-
writing. He explains that "writers set out in apparent ignorance of what they are groping 
9
 Amy Scott-Douglass suggests that in later works, because Cavendish wishes to present herself as a "self-
crowned laureate" (35) rather than an amateur or professional writer, she is not "entirely comfortable 
approaching her writing as play" (45nl 1). 
10
 A different view is found in Bronwen Price, "Feminist Modes of Knowing." Price argues that choosing 
verse to explore natural philosophy is Cavendish's conscious attempt to keep the form eccentric to the 
content. More than simply the practice of choosing the safety of acceptable female forms of discourse, this 
is a deviation from a passive to a 'textually active' role in which the masculine subject matter (natural 
philosophy) is explored through feminine discursive methods (verse). 
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for; yet they recognize it when they find it" (Rohman 107).' In her treatise, Cavendish is 
no longer indifferent to philosophical validity. Employing mostly prose, she no longer 
envisions her work as simply fiction or pastime. The content is set out in a more 
systematic way, starting with formal definitions before elaborating on matter and motion. 
She hopes that Nature will continue to provide her with "severall Fancies," but also "as 
good a Brain may make" (PF; "A Dedication to Fame"). In the prefatory verses, 
Thoughts and Reason are actors as prominent as Fancy. The play of imagination remains 
important, but Cavendish has begun to see knowledge and understanding as the central 
purpose of her philosophical musings. Though Philosophical! Fancies is brief and its 
topics lack elaboration, it both anticipates and paves the way for later philosophical 
projects, functioning, like Witte's pre-text, as a kind of prototype prepared before a writer 
commits to an extended written text (398).n Moreover, it is here that Cavendish begins to 
search, or 'grope', for alternatives to mechanical philosophy and atomism. 
As Cavendish becomes interested in a more serious pursuit of natural philosophy, 
a certain anxiety begins to emerge in her writing that undermines her seemingly carefree 
stance. In Poems, and Fancies, she tackles natural philosophy with enthusiasm, all the 
while candidly professing ignorance "of any English Booke" on the topic and claiming 
that she has "not thoroughly reason'd on" the concepts of atoms or motion ("To Naturall 
Philosophers"). Her writing is presented as both innocuous pastime and work proper to a 
" Rohman borrows the term "groping" from John Ciardi (107). Sylvia Bowerbank uses the same term 
when she sums up Cavendish's philosophical work: "Her work represents, in a whimsical way, a groping 
toward an alternative vision to Salomon's House with its pretence of finding certain and objective 
knowledge" (406). Elsewhere, a similar allusion is made by Flower and Hayes, who use the expression 
"rummaging for an idea" ("Images, Plans, and Prose" 126). 
1
 Grant notes that Philosophicall Fancies, a duodecimo volume of less than a hundred pages, is "a pigmy 
among her extensive folios" (130). In contrast, Philosophical Letters exceeds five hundred folio pages. 
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noblewoman: alluding to the "spinster's respectable, domestic endeavours" (Rees, "Well-
Spun Yarn" 173), Cavendish claims to have "chosen my Silke with fresh colours, and 
matcht them in good shadows, although the stitches be not very true" (P&F; "To All 
Noble, and Worthy Ladies").13 Her authorial remarks in Philosophicall Fancies, 
however, are increasingly apologetic and regretful. She laments that she could not devote 
more time and thought to her work, and now she declares that the "false Stitches" are 
caused by the work being "huddl'd up in such hast." Philosophicall Fancies was written 
in less than three weeks because she wished to have it printed alongside Poems, and 
Fancies. She was obliged to cut short her observations and leave out many topics, yet 
"for all [her] hast, it came a weeke too short of the Presse" (PF; "To the Reader").14 She 
declares more than once that her thoughts have outrun reason in the preparation of this 
work, and apologizes for her weak understanding: 
I wonder, Braine, thou art so dull, when there 
Was not a day, but Wit past, through the yeare ... 
But thou, poor Braine, hard frozen art with Cold, 
Words Seales, of Wit, will neither print, nor hold. ("An Epistle to my 
Braine") 
13
 Emma Rees notes that at this time and in the context of women's lives, 'work' "refers almost invariably 
to 'needlework'." Pointing out the etymological link between textile and text (both deriving from the Latin 
verb texere), Rees suggests that Cavendish "identifies and seizes upon an opportunity to execute a literary 
transition from the occupation of needlework, or the creation of textiles, to the occupation of writing, that 
is, the creation of a text" ("Well-Spun Yarn" 172). 
In "Dismantling the Myth," Chalmers offers the more radical explanation that Cavendish's haste 
"reinforces the notion that the texts represent a form of political resistance in the face of royalist exile" 
(324). 
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Murray suggests that while an increasing concern for the subject is a powerful driving 
force for writers, it can be equally perturbing.15 Towards the end of Philosophical! 
Fancies, the enormity of her project seems to strike Cavendish. She lists six pages of 
questions she could have explored, among them, "What Motions make Civil Wars, and 
whether the Aire causes it" (72); "Why the Sun should give light, and not the other 
Planets"; and "Why some have Haire, some Wool, some Feathers, some Scales, and some 
onely Skin" (74). The wandering thoughts that she had been pleased to let roam now 
cause her to "despaire of a finall Conclusion of my Booke; which makes my Booke 
imperfect, and my Fancies unsettled" (77). 
Evolution of a Natural Theory 
Just as her writing style changes as it begins to find its meaning, so does 
Cavendish's scientific outlook shift quite evidently from the atomic poems to 
Philosophicall Fancies. The swift evolution of her ideas has often been read as more 
evidence of the jumbled and confusing nature of her texts, leading critics either to 
ridicule Cavendish the author or simply dismiss her capacity for scientific thought and 
writing. After reading Poems, and Fancies, her contemporary Dorothy Osborne famously 
claimed "that there [were] many soberer People in Bedlam" (Temple 79). Virginia Woolf 
scathingly portrays Cavendish as a rambling and "riotous" writer, like "some giant 
cucumber [which] had spread itself over all the roses and carnations in the garden and 
choked them to death" {A Room of One's Own 59). She complains that Cavendish wished 
"to erect a philosophic system that was to oust all others," yet "[order], continuity, the 
Murray quotes Winston Churchill, who said, "Writing a book was an adventure. To begin with, it was a 
toy, and amusement; then it became a mistress, and then a master. And then a tyrant" ("Write Before 
Writing" 376). 
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logical development of her argument [were] all unknown to her" (Collected Essays 56, 
54). More succinctly, Bowerbank calls her writing "muddled and indecisive" (406), while 
Sandra Sherman notes that "Cavendish's theories of the physical universe were so 
eccentric as to embarrass even committed atomists" (200nl6). Scarcely more generous is 
her biographer, Douglas Grant, who claims that "her application of the [atomic] theory 
resembles nothing so much as a child playing with a meccano set, certain basic pieces 
being used to construct all manner of things" (116). At best, he adds, her theory is no 
more absurd than others. 
Without question, Cavendish's exposition of scientific knowledge contains 
inconsistencies and contradictions that indicate that few of the theories she calls upon 
have been fully assimilated. She presents ideas attributable to such important 
philosophers as Aristotle, Epicurus, Gassendi, Descartes and Hobbes, yet in Jay 
Stevenson's words, she "ruminates rather than communicates, reiterating facts, ideas and 
opinions acquired from various sources" (529). Though Stevenson intends this as a 
critique, rumination, in its physiological sense of the sequence of partial digestions that 
eventually lead to complete absorption, is a strikingly apt metaphor for Cavendish's 
learning process. From the early days of her marriage, Margaret had been informally 
tutored by William's brother Charles, her "conversational companion, patron, protector, 
and intellectual mentor" (Whitaker 82).)6 The atmosphere of the household was one in 
which her interest in natural philosophy was able to flourish. In Paris, William and 
Margaret dedicates Poems, and Fancies to Sir Charles and also includes a dedicatory epistle to him in 
Philosophical! Fancies. Robert Kargon notes that Sir Charles was "a mathematician of some repute" and 
"an important... figure in scientific circles of the mid-seventeenth century. The loss of the major part of his 
papers was indeed a great one for historians of science" {Atomism 40). 
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Charles had been in close contact with some of the most eminent thinkers of their time: 
Thomas Hobbes, Marin Mersenne, Rene Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, Sir Kenelm Digby, 
William Petty, mathematician John Pell and others. Hobbes and Descartes were both 
occasional dinner guests, though Margaret was unable to converse with these men 
directly because of her shyness and her inability to speak French to Descartes. In Poems, 
and Fancies she draws on discussions with her husband and brother-in-law and 
subscribes to an atomism rooted in diversity. Moreman notes that early-modern atomism 
"developed within a context of intellectual ferment, involving combinations of the 
elements of ancient atomism, chemical atomism, the neoplatonic 'seminalism' of 
Paracelsus and Van Helmont, and the scholastic tradition of minima naturalia" (131).18 
Cavendish tackles natural philosophy with enthusiasm, all the while candidly professing 
ignorance "of any English Booke" on the topic and claiming that she has "not thoroughly 
reason'd on" the concepts of atoms or motion (P&F; "To Narurall Philosophers"). For the 
most part she follows Gassendi's version of Epicurean atomism, yet in some cases, she 
diverges: her fire atoms are long and piercing, unlike Gassendi's easily-moved spherical 
fire atom.19 Robert Kargon suggests that her atomism is one of the first presentations of 
Gassendi's ideas in England (Atomism 77), though Battigelli cautions that "her volumes 
were not in any sense faithful expositions of any particular atomist system" (50). 
17
 William and Charles' Parisian salon is most often referred to as the Newcastle circle or Cavendish circle. 
Anna Battigelli notes that Charles also hosted an epistolary salon "through which he acquired, reviewed, 
and circulated new ideas, including those of Hobbes and Gassendi" (47). See Battigelli 45-49; Whitaker 92-
94; Kargon, Atomism 63-76; Clucas, "The Atomism of the Cavendish Circle." 
18
 Sarah Moreman's summary of the context of Cavendish's atomism (131-33) draws on Clucas, "The 
Atomism of the Cavendish Circle," who provides more detail on Cavendish herself (259-64) as well as 
thinkers with whom she would have been familiar, notably Gassendi, Charleton, Digby, and Hobbes. For 
other works specifically concerned with Cavendish's atomism, see Battigelli 39-61; and Sheehan and 
Tillery 8-13. For more on early seventeenth century atomism, see the work of Kargon; Christopher Meinel; 
and Lisa Sarasohn, "Motion and Morality." 
1
 Clucas points out that the piercing fire atom is more like the 'stinging' aculeate Platonic atom ("The 
Atomism of the Cavendish Circle" 260). 
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In Poems, and Fancies, however, Cavendish's goal is not to present a coherent or 
comprehensive natural system. Initially she is attracted by atomism's capacity to reflect 
the chaos of the civil war: the potential wilfulness and volatility of atoms correspond to 
her sense of the world turned upside down. Her long-standing and ongoing concern with 
social order combines with an increasing interest in natural order to create what Murray 
describes as a centripetal force by which everything surrounding a writer becomes 
pertinent: 
The writer's perception apparatus finds significance in what the writer 
observes or overhears or reads or thinks or remembers. The writer 
becomes a magnet for specific details, insights, anecdotes, statistics, 
connecting thoughts, references. The subject itself seems to take hold of 
the writer's experience, turning everything that happens to the writer into 
material. ("Write Before Writing" 376) 
What becomes clear throughout Poems, and Fancies and Philosophical! Fancies is the 
pervasive influence of the personal, social, and political on Cavendish's constitution of 
scientific understanding. Everything in her description of nature is tinged by war and 
disorder. Like Hobbes, Cavendish perceives society as a subset of nature. However, while 
Hobbes interpolates from natural laws to explain the commonwealth, Cavendish 
determines nature's rules by extrapolating from herself: she seeks to make sense of the 
natural world through her observations of phenomena like thunder and lightning, through 
her perceptions of social behavior, and through her experiences of civil war and political 
exile. 
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Philosophical! Fancies shows that Cavendish has begun to struggle with the 
difference between representing the natural world as a mirror of the chaos around her and 
as a macrocosm of her ideal society. The burgeoning anxiety evident in her authorial 
comments is matched by her doubts about the atomic world-view. This is made manifest 
in the way she re-conceives the natural world. To supplant the anarchy of atomism, she 
develops a hierarchical structure that, as Sheehan and Tillery suggest, "reconciles 
organicism and mechanism by positing that nature follows physical laws in a purposeful 
and sentient way" (13). Matter is described as a unified whole made up of an inanimate 
component controlled and manipulated by sensitive spirits, which are themselves 
controlled and manipulated by rational spirits.20 Traces of Cartesian mechanism are 
retained in the way that "laws guide the action of the cosmos" (13); however, Cavendish 
breaks with mechanical theory, in which motion is external to matter and all action is the 
result of the collisions of lifeless particles. Motion is redefined as inherent in matter: a 
refined, 'thin' matter insinuates itself into inanimate matter and "makes solid Matter run" 
(PF 9). Hobbes, in contrast, describes motion in terms of impact, force, and conquest of 
the strong over the weak; motion is the "continual relinquishing of one place, and 
acquiring of another." As John Rogers argues, in such a mechanical system, the very 
rules of motion discriminate against Cavendish as a woman. She cannot accept a natural 
(and thus social) theory in which greater physical strength is equated with greater natural 
In her later works, these are called sensitive and rational matter rather than spirits. 
21
 This concept may be drawn from Hobbes's early theory, dating to about 1630, which suggests that 
certain substances emit a corporeal effluvium allowing them to move. Hobbes refutes this theory by the 
1650s in favor of an external impulse towards motion (conatus). He comes to claim that nothing moves by 
itself: motion is external to matter and must be induced by an external mover (Kargon, Atomism 55). 
2
 Hobbes, quoted in Rogers 185. Descartes and Gassendi also posit an external mover: movement is 
bestowed upon matter by God, and the sum of all motions in the universe is constant. 
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(and thus political) power.23 By appropriating only certain aspects of Cartesian 
mechanism and Hobbes' older theory of effluvia, Cavendish explains motion as the 
cooperative yet hierarchical interaction between material spirits, which retain the living 
characteristics and 'personalities' ascribed to atoms in Poems, and Fancies. 
Envisioning Nature 
The rejection of atomic and mechanical theories that emerges in Philosophical! 
Fancies indicates Cavendish's need to find solutions to the questions of nature that 
function equally well when applied to society as she wishes it to be. Her goals are 
perhaps more personal and self-interested than those of Boyle or Hobbes, who, according 
to Shapin and Schaffer, seek to justify or refute experimental methods in order to 
establish a safe space for intellectual dissent.24 The vitalist hierarchy she begins to 
formulate not only gives hope for restored social order, it also gives hope of increased 
agency for Cavendish herself, not only as an exiled royalist, but also as a woman. The 
changes in imagery, the ways that Cavendish figures and refigures the physical world, 
reveal a powerful heuristic significance in the parallels she draws between society and 
nature. Images, metaphors and analogies help her both to represent the natural world and 
to create new meaning. Flower and Hayes explain that "[as] writers compose they create 
multiple ... representations of meaning" such as "imagistic" ones, which are translated 
and inscribed in text as current meaning ("Images, Plans, and Prose" 122). In Poems, and 
Fancies, Cavendish's fragmented verse sketches mirror the civil situation and exemplify 
23
 For more on this topic, see Rogers 185-90. 
24
 On the other hand, Shapin and Schaffer imply that Hobbes's 'philosophical' objections to restricting the 
experimental community to a closed group of acceptable members may have had a personal edge, since 
Hobbes himself was never made a member of the Royal Society; see 131-39. 
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her fancy running wild but these are also dynamic resources for her developing 
understanding of the natural world. Bazerman argues that a writer's "struggle with 
meaning, a dialectic between the language system and the writer's knowledge, 
experience, ideas, and impressions of his reader, is a deeply creative force, constantly 
remaking our creative world" (20). Disparate topics and thoughts are juxtaposed based on 
whatever connections spontaneously occur to Cavendish, sometimes with enlightening 
results. For example, by visualizing tidal motion, she is better able to define the difficult 
notion of the vacuum, picturing it as existing in the spaces left empty by the constant 
movement of atoms.25 Admittedly, she sometimes selects images with tenuous or limited 
insight, as when consecutive images represent motion as a panderer and a baker in order 
to convey its constant desire "new Formes to get" (P&F 17). However, the conceit of free 
play of imagery and imagination is well-suited to the random, even capricious behavior 
of atoms. Through vivid and varied illustration of the protean, anarchic atomic world, 
Cavendish has found, to paraphrase Rohman, an arrangement that fits her subject to her 
and her to her subject (107). She is able to develop the parallels between fancy, nature 
and society while literally sustaining her objective to "please the Eye" of her readers 
(P&F; "To All Noble, and Worthy Ladies"). 
Yet her exploration of an atomic world is undeniably guided, however much she 
invokes the unruliness of fancy, by images anchored in her own reality. When 
Bowerbank suggests that Cavendish's lack of method "recreates pure nature" (396), she 
recognizes only one part of the equation. As the macrocosm of society at war, nature is 
25
 See P&F 19-21, "Of Vacuum"; "Of the Motion of the Sea"; "Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea"; "Vacuum 
in Atonies"; and "Of Contracting and Dilating, whereby Vacuum must needs follow." 
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itself chaotic; as the constitutive particles of violent mankind, atoms themselves are 
aggressive and volatile. Even Chalmers somewhat understates the situation when she 
suggests that "Cavendish's poetic principles and practice reflect her cherished natural 
philosophy and carry with them resonances which touch on her historical predicament" 
("Flattering Division" 123). More to the point is Stevenson's claim that Cavendish's 
jumbled writing is "a demonstration of the potential for disorder she [sees] in the social 
and natural universe" (541).26 In a similar vein, Rogers argues that Cavendish is driven 
"to marshal images from natural philosophy as an organizational foundation for her 
beliefs about human society" (185). Yet the reverse is as often true: she marshals images 
of human society—initially as it is, and later as it should be—into the foundation of her 
theory of matter and motion.27 
This interconnection of her political and natural vision is well illustrated in the 
changing ways motion is depicted in her first two works. In the atomic poems, Motion is 
one of Nature's powerful generals, independent of, and often in conflict with, Matter. 
Sometimes an ordering force, Motion is also often randomly violent in exerting its power 
over atoms. The results are quite literally earth-shaking: 
When Motion, and all Atomes disagree, 
Thunder in Skies, and sicknesse in Men bee. 
Earthquakes, and Windes which make disorder great, 
Tis when that Motion all the Atomes beate. (P&F 16) 
Stevenson goes on to identify intentionally concealed radical elements in Cavendish's natural 
philosophy. He claims that "her texts deny their own content" (527) and that by presenting her thoughts as 
independent and rebellious agents of her writing, she remains apart from her dangerously radical ideas. 
Rogers makes the point that Cavendish and others employ natural imagery in order to debate social 
conventions like woman's subordination to man: "The battle of the sexes could be waged, discursively, in 
the debates over the physical constitution of the natural world" (185). 
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In contrast to purely mechanical theories, Cavendish's atoms are not lifeless pawns to be 
manipulated by external forces. Like a mob of rebel ruffians, atoms often seem to be in 
command, even electing Motion to be a "Generall in their war" (16). At times Motion 
succumbs to atoms, for "Motions inconstancy oft gives such power / To Atomes, as they 
can Motion devoure" (17). The lawlessness and unpredictability inherent in this vision of 
nature does more than reflect the chaos of her world at the time; it also connotes both 
helplessness and hopelessness over any restoration of order. In Philosophicall Fancies, 
her reworked theory of motion suggests vitality rather than violence, order rather than 
anarchy. Functioning "Like Marrow in the Bones, or Bloud in Veines" (PF 9), motion 
simultaneously lives within matter and gives matter life. Motion may show power, but in 
a benevolent way, as "a God to the weaker." Innate matter, later called animate or self-
moving matter, is like "an Infinite and Eternall Government" in which motions act as 
magistrates, controlling the masses but subject to the rule of the mayor, the king, and 
"some Higher power" (12). 
These illustrations of motion only begin to show the full extent of the pessimism 
that gives way to hope for something more than meaninglessness and disorder. Even the 
imagery of anthropomorphized atoms wreaking havoc that dominates Poems, and 
Fancies is counterbalanced, at least to some degree, by more positive representations. 
However, the opening atomic verses set a bleak tone, implying the aptness of Hobbes' 
description of times of war, in which people live in "continuall feare, and danger of 
violent death," their lives "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short" (Leviathan 186). In 
Cavendish's creation story, Nature is under attack by Fortune, Time and Death, who 
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threaten her monarchy—to Cavendish, the only 'natural' ruling system. Disorder, chaos, 
conflict and dissent prevail. When Nature meets with her generals, Life, Motion, Form, 
and Matter, to debate the rebellion of Death, Life tells Nature, "[Death] cares for none of 
your commands, nor will / Obey your Lawes, but doth what likes him still; / He knowes 
his power far exceedeth ours" (P&F 2). The creation of the world is conceived as a 
military diversion tactic: continuing to build the world keeps Death busy undoing their 
work, rather than undoing Nature herself. There is no sense of fighting towards victory, 
but only of postponing inevitable defeat. The imagery of random violence and war is 
carried through more than twenty poems on fire. Combative, militaristic fire atoms are a 
powerful metaphor for exploring many manifestations of conflict in the world. In flint, 
fire atoms are imprisoned by earth atoms until Motion sets them free as sharp and angry 
sparks which attack other figures and eat away at them like swarming insects. Coals are a 
tightly packed army of fire-atom soldiers who rush out to support their comrades in 
battle. Ashes are likened to the aftermath of an army's rout: their flat atoms, unbound 
from their original forms, are scattered about like bodies on a battlefield. Battlefield 
imagery further illustrates the increase and decrease of fire. Like scavenging crows 
feeding on a dead horse, fire atoms swarm their fuel and the fire increases. When the fuel, 
or carcass, is consumed, the fire-crows fly away and the fire diminishes. Even the 
quenching action of water is presented using the image of opposing armies: as ranks of 
Aside from the obvious allusions to England's civil upheaval, there is a sense of resignation permeating 
this first part that intimates Cavendish's despair in failing to regain her husband's lands and monies. A 
more blatant reference to Fortune as an enemy to her family is made in Blazing World (82-87), where the 
Duchess debates Fortune and is judged the victor, but Fortune "would not hearken to Truth's judgment, but 
went away in a passion" (86). 
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fire atoms attack, brave water atoms disperse the fire-army like cannons shot through a 
regiment on horseback.29 
Other aspects of nature are presented using similarly violent imagery of collision, 
conflict, and struggle for domination. Sound is created by atoms crashing into one 
another, literally giving each other blows. The roaring of the sea is the loud clashing of 
spherical, hollow water atoms. Sickness arises from dissent among atoms in the body. 
Specific illnesses occur if one kind of atom dominates others: dropsy (edema) is an 
overabundance of water atoms; consumption (tuberculosis), an overabundance of dry fire 
atoms; colic an overabundance of air; and palsy or apoplexy an overabundance of earth 
atoms in the brain, which block the passage of blood. Even the fantastic worlds that 
Cavendish imagines are tinged by dissent and war. Her world contained in an earring has 
seas filled with fish, spice-islands, jewel and gold mines, cattle feeding in meadows and 
birds singing in gardens. However, the vision of pastoral beauty gives way to a more 
realistic world, with cities stricken by infection, plague, and battles. The sketch ends with 
annihilation: "A Lover dead, in a faire Ladies Eare," and the end of the world itself when 
the earring breaks, and "Lovers they into Elysium run" (46). 
By representing these imaginary and invisible worlds as microcosms of her world 
at war, Cavendish adds to a natural vision already reflecting little hope for social order 
and stability. Yet the motifs of war, chaos and conflict are not always so bleak or 
29
 Cavendish's references to horses as both carcasses and cavalry recall her husband's interest in equestrian 
training and husbandry. In addition, her brother Charles Lucas was "one of the outstanding cavalry 
officers" of the civil war, and he commanded the cavalry of William Cavendish's army in the North 
(Whitaker 42, 55). 
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pessimistic. Nimble and unruly atoms ricocheting around the brain are positively 
associated with the generative forces of fancy and imagination (P&F 10). Battles and 
demolition are frequently paired with architecture and construction, suggesting eventual 
balance between creation and destruction, life and death, order and chaos. The council of 
war in the opening verses moves quickly from discouraged debate to the practical and 
cooperative action of world-building, Matter providing materials, Motion carving out 
pieces, Figure drafting various forms, and Life organizing these forms appropriately. 
Though chaos may undermine their efforts to establish order, creation nonetheless 
emerges from the disorder and destruction they constantly face. The newly-created world 
is like a well-built house: its foundation is the sphere of earth, the oceans form the 
supporting walls, air pressure provides the mortar to seal everything together, and fire 
forms the roof over the world, "To keepe out raine, or wet, else it would rot" (3). 
Elsewhere, the architectural image is employed to show both that atoms work together to 
build our world and, conversely, that they dissent and undermine its solid construction. 
At times rogue atoms thrust themselves out of an otherwise solid construction and go off 
to create new worlds; more often, atoms form alliances and act peaceably, cooperating 
with one another, holding together solidly within their forms or, if necessary, moving 
about "As severall work-men serve each others turnes" (5). Alliances between atoms 
provide stability, giving the new, mixed figures strength and longevity: fire atoms 
consent among themselves to form the rotating sphere of the Sun; animals contain a mix 
of various closely-packed (and thus closely-allied) atoms; while "in Mankinde, the best 
ofAtomesbee"(12). 
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Envisioned in the atomic poems is a universe whose fundamental units are 
dynamic and independent, but by the same token wholly unpredictable. Motion is at 
times like a shepherd who drives and organizes aimless and mindless atoms, "as Sheep 
and Kine" (12), but also a predatory wolf frightening the atomic herd. Atoms organize 
themselves into all aspects of nature, with or against the forces of Motion; it is merely by 
chance that they sometimes cooperate to do so in an orderly fashion. Though Nature is 
ultimately in command, her interest is in variety over systematic organization. These 
illustrations of the natural world create in Cavendish an understanding of the problematic 
social implications of atomism and begin to crystallize her vitalist vision of the natural 
world. When Cavendish abandons this disorderly world view in Philosophicall Fancies, 
random atoms are replaced by a hierarchy of rational, sensitive and inanimate matter. 
Matter is unified, not divided into discrete atomic particles. Though the different levels of 
matter have different responsibilities, all three are inextricably mixed in all things. She 
uses the idea of nested containers: "all sensitive Spirits live in dull Matter; So rationall 
Spirits live in sensitive Spirits" (PF 42). Despite its complete dismissal among the 
mechanists, she embraces the vitalist movement's concept of self-motion to what Rogers 
calls its "boldest" degree, imagining "the infusion of all material substance with the 
power of reason and self-motion"; "even nonorganic matter ... is thought to contain 
within it the agents of motion and change" (1-2). Cavendish's version of animist 
materialism allows for individual agency without the anarchy inherent in atomic theory, 
since motion requires the voluntary cooperation of the animate parts of matter in "the 
initial exercise of the infinite wisdom and perceptive powers of rational matter, the 
30
 Rogers uses the terms "vitalism" and "animist materialism' interchangeably. For more on the Vitalist 
movement, see especially Rogers 8-16; and Merchant 117-26. 
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demands of this rational matter on the laboring sensitive matter and, finally, the free 
consent of the sensitive matter to obey those demands" (Rogers 192). Self-moving matter 
becomes the fundamental concept in a theory of nature that allows for some individual 
freedom and choice, but which also restores the proper hierarchical order of things. 
With chapters sometimes as short as a single sentence, Philosophicall Fancies 
contains far less figurative language than the atomic poems. Those metaphors and images 
that remain specifically fit Cavendish's re-ordered perception of a world in equilibrium. 
Bazerman suggests that this is a significant part of the process of making meaning: "[in] 
surveying the symbolic options, we find some more apt to our experiences and needs, and 
others less" (21). The imagery of cooperation and construction dominates Cavendish's 
redefinition of matter. The sensitive spirits are gatherers, builders, and destroyers, 
manipulating inert matter into soundly-built natural structures. These spirits are under the 
control of nature's architects, the more refined rational spirits who "choose the 
Materialls" and "direct the sensitive spirits in the management thereof (PF 37). At the 
same time, rational and sensitive spirits are "Fellow-labourers that assist one another" 
(36). Like a man building a house or a cook baking a pie, the sensitive spirits must mold 
matter into various useful figures: thick beams or thin lathes of wood, fine pastry or cake 
batter, or (in the creation of man) bones, sinew, nerves and muscle. Growth and 
development are processes involving increasingly more workmen. Young plants and 
animals are weaker than mature ones because few spirits are at work. As time goes on, 
the spirit-workmen start to gather and bring in nourishment and eliminate waste. If these 
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spirits bring in poor materials, or take away essential ones, the resulting figure is flawed; 
if all goes well, "then the Figure is beautifull and well proportioned" (22). 
Even when construction eventually gives way to destruction, a sense of order and 
purpose is maintained. Physical degeneration is illustrated using the analogy of the 
collapse of a house: the eyes, like old windows, grow dim; nerves and muscles, like old 
floorboards, grow loose and tremble; finally, the 'spring' of blood dries up, and the dust 
and rain of disease settles in. Part of a natural cycle of production and decay, death is 
simply the beginning of a new construction project involving recycled building materials: 
"as that Figure dissolves, the Spirits disperse about, carrying their severall burthens to the 
making of other Figures" (PF 24). Images of warfare still exist, but these are similarly 
presented as phases in the greater cycle of order and disorder. Cavendish envisions 
natural interactions as necessary battles for self-preservation, an ongoing "Naturall, or 
Sensitive War" (14); for example, the drive for food is both constructive (to satisfy an 
appetite and promote growth) and destructive (of the food figure). The constant division 
and reorganization of matter into new figures is a war between Motion and Figure, which 
are in a constant struggle for power. However, "there is not a Confusion in Nature, but an 
orderly Course therein" (10). Since "Eternall Matter is allways One, and the same" (10), 
she is stoic that all will be settled eventually, and there will be "an Equality in Infinite" 
(11). In the end, there is constant struggle in Nature, but ultimately there is also order. 
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Envisioning Knowledge 
Having drawn parallels between the larger physical world and society as its 
microcosm, Cavendish goes on in both works to explore the inner world of the individual 
mind. To describe nature in a way that fully corresponds to her experiences, she must 
look to her mental experiences—thoughts, speculations, conjectures, and fancies. Roberto 
Bertuol suggests that Cavendish, like other post-Baconian thinkers, believed that 
"investigation of the world of things might open up the world of mind. The human body 
was seen as an anatomizable version of nature, and the brain, as the site of the mind-soul, 
was seen as a locally anatomizable version of the mind, even of the universal mind" (30). 
In the final pages of the atomic poems, the illuminating capacity of metaphor and 
imagery is incarnated in verses that specifically explore the mind as the site of meaning-
and knowledge-production. Through a series of speculations about alternate worlds, 
Cavendish arrives at the image of nested boxes that, in a modified form, becomes central 
to her representations of both matter and knowledge in Philosophicall Fancies, and to her 
natural theory in all its future manifestations. A first epistemological contemplation puts 
into question the accuracy of the senses, and especially vision, which has implications for 
our means of procuring knowledge and understanding the world. She shows how sensory 
perception is subject to manipulation by the imagination, which has the power to make us 
perceive what is not there. Hunger can cause the nose to smell nonexistent meat; the sight 
of a thief makes us believe we hear the sound of the break-in; and hearing a tale "lively 
told, / The Braine strait thinks that the Eye the same behold." The verse concludes: 
"Imaginations just like Motions make, / That every Sense doth strike with the Mistake" 
(P&F 39). Comprehensive knowledge is impossible to gain through senses that are 
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nothing but weak or limited instruments. Uncertainty appears to go hand in hand with the 
unpredictability and unlikelihood of order in a random atomic world. 
Reason, however, has more potential to guide us reliably. In "The Motion of 
Thoughts" she shows us a sight that becomes conflated with the site of her mind 
(Sherman 187). She climbs to the crest of a hill and sees a dazzling light, always in 
motion and yet fixed. The bright light is a union of "Knowledge, Power, and Might; / 
Wisdome, Justice, Truth, Providence, all one" (P&F 41). The light is its own center and 
circumference, yet has no outer boundary—it is infinite and eternal. Her rational thoughts 
discover themselves to be the same as the brilliant light, but only a tiny part of it, so that 
they are unable (until this point in time, presumably) to perceive or understand their 
origins. The implications are multiple. First, it points to the extent of human ignorance: 
we are limited in what we can know because we are simply a tiny part of what we seek to 
know. This is extended in later works to strong criticism of mankind's presumption of 
mental superiority. Secondly, it reinforces that the only truth that can ever be trusted 
comes from within our own minds, not from external sensory evidence. Experimental 
philosophy is thus flawed from the outset, a point she makes far more deliberately in 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy. Finally and more optimistically, 
Cavendish's conclusions suggest the infinite potential within the human mind, and her 
mind in particular. This perspective allows her to affirm the likelihood of other worlds. If 
our senses are flawed and our reason is limited by these flaws, then what seems 
impossible may not be so, for "Nature is curious, and such worke may make, / That our 
dull Sense can never finde" (44). Cavendish knows that people are quite willing to 
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believe what they cannot see, for example that loadstone is made up of hooked atoms or 
that incorporeal spirits exist; if so, then tiny, invisible worlds are also possible.31 She 
reasons that since matter is infinite, it cannot be contained in our bounded physical world; 
there must be an infinite number of alternate worlds to accommodate this infinite 
matter.32 She presents the possibility of "severall Worlds ... in an Eare-ring" (45) or 
others "so big, as none can swim [circumscribe], / Had they the life of old Methusalem" 
(46). Having begun with her version of this world's creation, she ends by opening up 
infinite possible creations: infinite worlds, each as knowable and unknowable as our own. 
After many descriptions of fantastical worlds in the atomic poems, Philosophicall 
Fancies presents only one, a long speculation about the various shapes that matter might 
take: she describes a world populated by "Deere of Oake" who shed acorns that become 
fawns, men of iron who need fear no weapons in war, grass made of silver strings that 
resonate in the wind (PF 57). The impetus for these fanciful imaginings is the vitalist 
concept that "Vegetables and Minerals may know, / As Man" (56). All matter has sense 
and reason, and in combination with self-motion, all matter also has some form of 
knowledge. It is an image from the atomic poems that best illustrates the connection, and 
furthermore links motion and knowledge to her tripartite division of matter. "Just like 
unto a Nest of Boxes round" (P&F 44), knowledge "lives in motion, as motion lives in 
matter" (PF 52). Thus quick and agile motion of the sun indicates its "great Knowledge" 
31
 Sandra Sherman explains it somewhat differently: "To the extent that the poet is her own creation, a 
possible world disconnected from discourse—that is, outside the contingent world subject to verdicts of 
'dull Sense'—no one has the standing to judge the legitimacy of her creative acts (authorized by a whole 
universe of corresponding recessiveness)" (190). 
32
 See P&F 30. Her initial discussion of these other worlds suggests a series of disjoint mathematical 
spheres: discrete planets, suspended in air, whose circumferences never cross. 
33
 Foreshadowing Blazing World, Cavendish wishes she could enter these worlds "By Art of Navigation in 
a Ship" (P&F 46). 
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(69). Vegetables and minerals may not have animal knowledge, but they have their own 
sort of knowledge due to the motion of their rational spirits (54-55). Mankind is not alone 
in its rational abilities, but what is more, the individual's capacity to distinguish truth is 
intrinsically limited if animals, plants, and minerals have knowledge that we cannot 
recognize. The vitalism of Philosophicall Fancies does not eradicate Cavendish's 
skepticism; if anything, it reinforces it, but in a way that encourages further search for 
truth. We may not understand most of Nature's secrets, but the variety of Nature is 
neither random nor meaningless; rather, there is sympathy between parts of unified 
matter that is reassuring in its sense of orderliness and harmony. 
The implications are not pursued any further at this time; in fact, the conclusion to 
the work suggests that mankind should trust in God and stop looking so hard for truth. 
Yet the 'certainty of uncertainty' that Cavendish comes to articulate is a force that drives 
her to continue to write about natural philosophy. It provides impetus for all the works 
that follow, just as her unruly imagination provides the initial generation of ideas from 
which her philosophy grows. Her playful manipulation of ideas and images in these two 
early texts is neither simple entertainment nor self-indulgence. Virginia Woolfs 
complaint of Cavendish that "[the] wildest fancies come to her, and she canters away on 
their backs" {Collected Essays 54) does not acknowledge the heuristic value of these 
mental (and textual) jaunts. Following her imagination and building metaphorical 
representations of the natural world provide Cavendish with an "analogical way of 
understanding and structuring reality" (Bertuol 25). In Poems, and Fancies, her initial 
desire to ground political turmoil in an atomist world-view evolves into a search for a 
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natural system that privileges order. Philosophical! Fancies is Cavendish's "discovery 
draft" of such a system. Her next philosophical works explore the "Worlds in the World" 
(P&F 44) more comprehensively, developing her vitalist ideas into a complete vision of 
both external and internal nature. 
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CHAPTER 2: "Writ according to my own Natural Cogitations"1 
Philosophical and Physical Opinions 
On her return to Antwerp, Cavendish continued to advance her literary career, 
initially compiling a number of unpublished essays into The Worlds Olio. This 'spicy 
stew' is like Poems, and Fancies in its imaginative scope, covering literary, social, 
political, historical, moral, natural and medical topics. At the same time, her growing 
interest in science prompted the composition of more focused and much-expanded 
versions of her natural theory. She took on the ambitious project of completing the very 
preliminary work begun in Philosophicall Fancies, writing her first detailed 
philosophical treatise, Philosophical and Physical Opinions, published in 1655. This 
volume opens with the reprinted contents of the earlier text and goes on to expand the 
short pieces on matter and motion into significantly longer chapters; Cavendish 
supplements these with detailed reflections on diseases and remedies, likely inspired by 
her own troubled physical condition.3 Written entirely in prose, the more serious 
publication was also given a title which no longer makes reference to fancy. Eight years 
later, a new edition was published under the same title; in it, Cavendish amends and 
rearranges her ideas substantially, overtly rejects atomism, and further solidifies her 
vitalism. 
1
 PP063 456. 
2
 Whitaker explains that 'olio' refers to a Spanish stew (olla podrida) popular at the time among the 
English aristocracy (163). 
Cavendish was unable to conceive, a cause of great concern in the early years of her marriage. Their 
efforts to treat her barrenness (and William's impotence) were the beginning of Margaret's near-obsession 
with her medical condition; throughout the years she continued to try various painful and possibly 
dangerous treatments, including laudanum cordials, purges, vomits and frequent bloodletting. 
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Together with Philosophical! Fancies, these two quite different working drafts 
offer a unique glimpse into the writing and thinking processes that underlie and shape her 
vitalist philosophy. The 1655 edition presents a wealth of information and imagery 
roughly organized into a natural theory that still draws on some of the ideas of atomism. 
The authorial commentary, textual organization, and scientific content all reflect a 
tentativeness which indicates the ongoing evolution of her natural philosophy through her 
writing. The 1663 edition reflects greater clarity, confidence and focus analogous to the 
return of domestic, social and political stability to her world—by 1663, Cromwell was 
dead, the monarchy was restored, and the Newcastles had returned to their peaceful 
country estates.4 Cavendish is surer of her ideas as well as her ability to communicate 
them effectively and coherently, and by the end of the 1663 Philosophical and Physical 
Opinions, she has sufficiently confirmed and ordered her ideas to move on to the defense 
of her work before an audience of natural philosophers. Through these editions, the 
evolution of the scientific and medical content illustrates Cavendish's growing 
recognition of the complex ways in which structure and language intersect with her 
philosophical ideals. As she continues to explore the possibilities for political, social and 
natural order, the organization, prose style, wording and rhetorical choices in her writing 
develop to account for the essential interdependence and harmony she sees in the world. 
Though the two editions share the same title, the differences between them are 
substantial and significant. In this chapter, Cavendish's editing processes come under 
close scrutiny in order to identify the actual changes and the cognitive, rhetorical or 
These are Welbeck, in Nottinghamshire, and Bolsover Castle, in Derbyshire. Whitaker notes that "[for] 
the rest of their lives, William and Margaret would leave Welbeck only rarely and for short periods" (238). 
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philosophical purposes they serve. The modifications brought to these texts include 
expanding and developing ideas, cutting unsuitable notions, reordering text elements, and 
amending terminology and descriptive language. However, revision is not a transparent, 
one-time process. It does not begin after a first draft is produced, but is "layered and 
organic", an integral and recursive part of composing (Carroll 71). It is an ongoing 
sequence of changes "which are initiated by cues and occur continually throughout the 
writing of a work" (Sommers 380). Consequently, the specific changes brought to a text 
are often only to be inferred. Carroll in fact argues that, faced with a single text, ongoing 
revision "is impossible to identify since it has occurred in the act of composing, itself a 
massed, imagistic, chaotic 'clay' forever undergoing change" (71). Cavendish, however, 
provides us with two versions of the same work, as well as the very preliminary sketch of 
her theory in Philosophicall Fancies. These provide some access to a process of revision 
that extends over a series of drafts. From first edition to second, but also within each one, 
there is a simultaneous evolution of her relationship with her readers, her scientific 
opinions, and her preferred textual structures and elements. In order to separate these 
strands without masking their essential interconnection and reciprocal influence, this 
chapter first examines how Cavendish uses the prefatory material to frame, justify and 
validate her work. This is followed by an exploration of the ways in which her new 
understanding of science is developed, cut or reorganized. These preliminary discussions 
provide necessary background to understand the evolution of complex textual structures 
and the corresponding changes in terminology, diction, and figurative construction. 
On revision as a recursive and ongoing process, see Carroll; Faigley and Witte; Sommers; the works of 
Flower and Hayes; and the works of Murray. 
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Setting the Stage 
Both editions open with numerous and sometimes quite lengthy paratexts which 
provide insight by articulating Cavendish's analysis of how, what and why she has 
written. These are markedly different in the two editions: in 1655, she validates her work 
through a combination of defensiveness and defiance, while the 1663 prefaces more 
systematically set out her purpose and methods. In both editions, her prefatory pieces 
manifest a "tension between self-clarification and normalization" (Carroll 70), and a new 
relationship with her readers is inferred. She no longer writes for diversion, but more 
plainly in aid of knowledge-creation—for herself as well as for others. Yet her 
relationship with her readers begins in controversy. Much to her dismay, from the time 
that Poems, and Fancies was first published, the authorship and originality of her works 
had been questioned. She briefly acknowledges such attacks at the end of Philosophicall 
Fancies, declaring herself not "so vaine-glorious, as to straine to build up a Fame upon 
the ground of another mans Wit" (85). By the time the 1655 edition of Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions was ready to publish, however, Cavendish felt she had to respond 
more fully to her critics.7 In 1655 she does so with a great deal of defensiveness and 
anxiety, while in 1663 she shows more confidence and authority in her authorial 
comments. 
Composed after the completion of the treatise—some, in fact, after it had been 
sent to publication—the sixteen prefaces, epistles and verses in the first edition of 
6
 A more precise term than paratext might be "peritext." Emma Rees uses the latter to refer specifically to 
"prefatory, dedicatory and titular components" {Margaret Cavendish 26). She draws the term from Gerard 
Genette, who divides paratext into the sub-categories of peritext and epitext, the latter including more 
distanced elements of the text such as conversations or private communications (47n9). 
For details of these attacks on her early work, see Whitaker 162-63 and 183-87. 
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Philosophical and Physical Opinions employ techniques which anticipate those in the 
main body of the work, for one, the repetitious accumulation of'evidence' that stands for 
proof of her conjectures. The use of repetition as a rhetorical tool can tend to accord a 
sense of redundancy rather than argumentative weight to her reasoning, but in the 
prefaces it also serves to highlight Cavendish's outrage. In the twelve pieces preceding 
the text and four more addresses to the reader scattered through the text, the tone is even 
more defensive and tentative than in Philosophical! Fancies, and the playfulness of 
Poems, and Fancies is completely lost. Two indignant pieces by her husband are found at 
the very start, the first a dedicatory verse entitled "To the Lady Marquesse of Newcastle, 
On her Book intitled her Philosophicall, and Physicall Opinions" which criticizes learned 
men who "know not that we do know nothing right"; the second is self-explanatory in its 
title: "An Epistle to justifie the Lady Newcastle and Truth against falshood, laying those 
false, and malicious aspersions of her, that she was not Authour of her Books." Here, 
William responds systematically to the accusations that Margaret had 'borrowed' the 
terms of divinity, philosophy, physic, geometry, and astronomy, concluding that "here's 
the crime, a Lady writes them, and to intrench so much upon the male prerogative, is not 
to be forgiven." Margaret, too, answers at some length the objections that she lacked the 
necessary experience and education that her writing seems to imply. Clearly frustrated 
and firmly convinced that "ignorance and present envie will slight my book" {PPOS5 
53), she decries "this ill natured, and unbeleeving age" ("To the Reader"), complaining of 
the "over-weaning conceit men have of themselves" ("To the Two Universities") and 
condemning "the ignorant, and malicious, [who] do strive to disturb, and obstruct all 
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probable opinions, wittie ingenuities, honest industry, vertuous indeavours, harmlesse 
phancies, innocent pleasures, and honourable fames" ("To the Reader"). 
Her outrage is tempered by enough self-doubt to cause her to make and remake 
the same points: reiterations of her originality, apologies for previous errors, and 
justifications of her right to write. She repeatedly asks her readers for patience and open-
mindedness, hoping that her "faint knowledge, and dim understanding" may be 
overlooked {PP055; "An Epistle to my Honourable Readers"), begging "to be pardoned 
by reason somwhat of it was writ in the dawning of my knowledge, and experience, and 
not having a clear light I might chance to stumble in dark ignorance on molehills of 
error" and later entreating her reader "not to condemn me for an ideot" ("To the 
Reader"). Her anxiety is carried through the work in the form of interrupting epistles 
directed "to Condemning Readers" (26) or "Unbeleeving Readers" (51), and in the final 
preface, putatively meant to announce the content to follow, she implies that her work 
may be in fact nothing more than fancy, wondering if she will be thought "not a right 
begotten daughter of nature, but a monster produced by her escapes, or defects" ("The 
Text to my Natural Sermon"). 
In this first edition, Cavendish also uses repetition as a rhetorical means to defend 
and explain her work, continually invoking "natural reason" throughout her modest 
apologies and angry remonstrations. This simple expression has a deceptive complexity. 
In recalling the naturally wild and untutored style of Poems, and Fancies, it implies a 
lack of formal structure. Yet distinctly unlike this earlier work, the reference here is not 
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to fancy, but to more conservative and controlled reason, which is more prone to "walke 
in a beaten path" than "run ... in such strange phantastick waies" (PF; "Reason, and the 
Thoughts"). The two are not diametrically opposed. Natural reason is both free and 
orderly, and is, in fact, the source of natural fancy. Natural reason is also innate, not 
dependent on formal academic training which Cavendish had never received; moreover, 
it is superior to the artificial means of reasoning taught in schools. She uses natural 
reason to define the unquestionably worthy source of her reasoning abilities, justifying 
her lack of formal education by building a glowing picture of herself as a writer 
ultimately indebted to none other than Nature for her gifts.9 Since "natural reason was the 
first educator," it follows that "natural reason is a better tutor then education" (PP055; 
"To the Reader"). Cavendish tells the reader that "natural Reason hath informed me of 
many things," and that "in natural things my natural reason will conceive them without 
being in any wayes instructed" ("To the Reader"). At the end of the first edition, she 
reminds her readers that "I had never any guide to direct me, nor intelligence from any 
Authors, to advertise me, but write according to my own natural cogitations" (171): 
fittingly, it is nature that controls the way she writes about Nature. 
By framing her thoughts as the product of natural reason, Cavendish also draws 
attention to the greater sense of purpose informing her work, and these prefaces employ 
'natural' analogies with significantly different implications than the random, capricious 
motion of thought-atoms. In her earlier work, Cavendish's prefatory acknowledgment of 
Cavendish also raises the connection between reason and fancy in the preface to the reader in Blazing 
World (5-6). 
As Scott-Douglass puts it, Cavendish asserts that she "is the child and heir of a teacher who is preferable 
to William Camden any day of the week: Cavendish's professor is Nature" (38). 
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the unruly and fundamentally irrepressible nature of her thoughts helped to define a 
'naturally' fragmented style; like restless atoms, her wild fancies go where they please. In 
1655's first expansion of her philosophy, natural reason is metaphorically associated with 
both honeybees at the hive and a river's current. The idea of ceaseless motion is retained 
in both of these illustrations of her thinking and writing, but it is motion channeled more 
productively. In the case of the honeybees, the final creation is even quite clearly textual. 
She tells the reader that her head 
is fully populated with divers opinions, and so many fancies are therein, as 
sometimes they lie like a swarm of bees in a round heap, and sometimes 
they flie abroad to gather honey from the sweet flowry rhetoric of my 
Lords discourse, and wax from his wise judgment which they work into a 
comb making chapters therein. (PP055; "To the Reader") 
Elsewhere, a combination of liberty and order is evoked in the image of a flowing stream, 
which she uses to describe both her brain and the discourse it generates. This 
representation continues to convey the atomic poems' sense of the wild freedom of her 
imagination but adds both a sense of direction and spatial delimitation. She had planned 
at one point to turn her atomic poems into prose; however, she found that she could not, 
because "[her] brain would be like a river that is turned from its natural course, which 
will neither run so smooth, swift, easie, nor free, when it is forced from its natural motion 
and course" ("An Epistle to the Reader, for my Book of Philosophy").10 She also suggests 
that her discourse is not the "large river" of the ancient philosophers, which draws "from 
In "Images, Plans, and Prose," Flower and Hayes also mention the image of the stream as a model for 
thought (121). They suggest that images can "give flexibility, richness, and truth-to-experience to thought" 
(142), but, as Cavendish articulates in this passage, that imagistic representations of meaning are often 
difficult to translate into prose (130-33). 
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many several springs"; rather, her writing "onely flows in little Rivulets, from the natural 
spring in [her] own brain" ("An Epistle to my Honourable Reader"). By metaphorically 
containing her thoughts within the banks of a river, Cavendish indicates that the path of 
her thoughts and writing may be meandering and circuitous, but it nonetheless proceeds 
with an aim and an end. 
In 1655, the journey through so many repetitive paratexts foreshadows and 
mirrors the sometimes tortuous character of the opinions that follow. In 1663, the path is 
more direct, much of the content of the revised prefatory material concerned with rules 
and conventions. Half as many prefaces provide substantially more practical information: 
definitions of terminology, corrections of previous errors, explanations of changes from 
the earlier edition, as well as references to her reading of philosophers, both ancient and 
modern. All together, these indicate greater attention to the overall coherence and 
comprehensibility of the work. The more systematic and pragmatic paratextual material 
in this edition predicts the similarly more sustained structure in the opinions that follow. 
In addition, the sense of defensiveness is gone; with seven published works, Cavendish 
no longer needed to justify or defend her writing so vehemently." Her increased 
confidence is made clear even in her ironic acknowledgment of the text's imperfections. 
Cavendish tells her "Noble Readers": 
Although I have Indeavour'd in the Preface to hinder Objections which 
might be made, by Explaining some Terms which I use in this Work, yet I 
am Confident there will be more Senseless Objections made against it, 
By this time, aside from Poems, and Fancies, Philosophical! Fancies, the first edition of Philosophical 
and Physical Opinions, and The Worlds Olio, Cavendish had also published Nature's Pictures in 1656 as 
well as Orations of Divers Sorts and Playes in 1662. 
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than there are real Faults in it, and this cannot be Avoided, for more 
Learned Works than mine have not escaped Censures. As for Terms, it 
cannot be expected but I must sometimes Err in the Proper Expression of 
them, since I have not Scholastical Learning; but although I may Err in 
Words, yet I am Confident, I do not Err in Sense and Reason, and dare 
Avouch to the World, that these my Philosophical Opinions have as much 
Sense and Reason as any that have been Written, as being Built upon the 
Ground of Sense and Reason. (PP063) 
She no longer feels that she stumbles in the dark, and, furthermore, she implies that the 
readers' struggles with the material are their own fault: 
every Several Chapter, like Several Rooms, have as Much and as Clear 
Lights as I can give them, and if any Part should seem Obscure to my 
Readers, I should be Sorry for't, for I can assure you, that all these 
Opinions seem Clear to my Conceptions, as also to my Sense and Reason, 
though I do not know how they will seem to your Understanding. ("An 
Epistle to the Reader") 
She is even openly judgmental of certain "Learned and Studious men, which have been 
accounted the Sages of Former, Present, and it may also be Future times," and she 
proceeds to discount several "very Extravagant Opinions and Phantasms in Natural 
Philosophy" concerning such topics as tides, thunder, or the immaterial soul ("Another 
Epistle to the Reader"). Out of their proper place, these detailed critiques nonetheless 
show how much more confident Cavendish has become in her own thinking: she 
concludes this epistle by disparaging "our Modern Writers in Philosophy" and promoting 
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her method of "Contemplation and Observation" ("Another Epistle to the Reader"). This 
new self-assurance is carried through the main body of the work; it reflects not only the 
conviction that her natural philosophy is valid, but a developing willingness to take on 
anyone who argues otherwise, a stance which is carried into her two subsequent works. 
Notable in the passages quoted above is the repetition of "Sense and Reason," a 
pairing as multifaceted as "natural reason" in the earlier edition. In this new expression, 
Cavendish reworks the framework of her opinions to better suit her hierarchy of matter, 
uniting its two 'living' aspects to emphasize both the animism of her theory and the 
interdependence of sensitive and rational matter. Looking ahead, the addition of "Sense" 
also points to her growing interest in perception and the physical senses, which becomes 
more central and significant in both Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy. More immediately, where in 1655 her claim to innate natural 
reason had served to validate her writing against her critics, the use of Sense and Reason 
allows her instead to join their ranks. Cavendish assumes her membership among serious 
thinkers by presenting Sense and Reason as universals, shared by all and consequently 
beyond doubt. It is a rhetorical maneuver that has its weaknesses. Shapin notes that in the 
seventeenth century, a countervailing suspicion of vulgar errors meant that "nothing was 
deemed so likely to be in error as common opinion" (232). However, Cavendish's 
appeals are directed at an audience whose social status implies intrinsic sense and reason. 
In addition, she links the two terms into a single entity that is defined as the foundation, 
the "Essence," the "Ground or Principle" of her natural philosophy (PP063; "An Epistle 
to the Reader", "To the Reader"). 
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Just as rational animate matter is at the top of the hierarchy of matter, reason is 
understood to be superior to sense, and in affirming this, Cavendish also seeks to identify 
herself with the true philosopher, who "might be distinguished from the vulgar man 
precisely because the latter was a slave to his senses while the former was at liberty to 
disbelieve the immediate impressions of eyes and ears when his rational knowledge of 
the nature of things informed him of sensory error" (Shapin 207). Cavendish implies that, 
with the solid base of Sense and Reason, her theory should be widely accepted and 
recognized, if not as certainty, then at least as greatly probable. At the same time, she 
seems quite sure this will not happen: "I know very well, that my Opinions cannot be 
generally Received and Applauded, for as the Old Proverb says, So many Men so many 
Minds" ("Noble Readers"). However, Cavendish sets up Sense and Reason as more 
reliable judges than individual men; we are led to take for granted her authority to 
represent good common sense and knowledge. 
While Cavendish's appeals to Sense and Reason give weight to her natural theory, 
they also point to a different kind of concern over the reception of her work. In 1655, her 
primary desire was that her work be seen as authentic; now, her concern is that it be 
"Received and Applauded" for its epistemic value. This is further evinced in the subtle 
shift in style that follows on her earlier, more drastic generic move from poetry to prose. 
From Poems, and Fancies to Philosophicall Fancies, she had abandoned the concept of 
exposing her scientific ideas purely in verse. In eliminating any mention of fancy in the 
title, Philosophical and Physical Opinions comes to abandon poetry altogether: though 
the first part of the 1655 edition is a reprint of Philosophicall Fancies, the long verse 
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speculation on alternate worlds is notably absent; in 1663, the text is entirely in prose.12 
When Cavendish chooses to draw inspiration from her reason rather than her fancy, she 
also chooses a new genre, one which requires clear sense to prevail over pleasing sound, 
but which also allows for repetition "to make my Readers to Remember, as also to 
Understand the Truth" (PP063; "An Epistle to the Reader"). Over the many other prose 
forms she had employed in other works—allegory, aphorism, oration, dialogue— 
Cavendish selects the philosophical essay, a form closer to traditional scientific rhetoric. 
In so doing, she recognizes the social significance of genre, how it is "a social construct 
that regularizes communication, interaction, and relations" (Bazerman 62).I3 This treatise 
is still nothing like the systematic philosophy of Hobbes, but there is a concerted effort to 
follow a style and format that will be more readily acceptable to her readers. Immediately 
preceding the first chapter, she includes a lengthy preface under the similarly lengthy yet 
self-explanatory title, "A Preface Concerning the Rules of Art, and Explaning the Nature 
of Infinite, together with some other Terms, for the better Understanding of this 
Philosophical Work." In it, two of the problems of the earlier edition are tackled, if not 
altogether resolved, as she elucidates in some detail the tenets of her theory and the 
terminology to come. At times, her 'clarification' is of little help: for example, she tells 
the reader that "my meaning of Only matter is, the Infinite matter in Nature, as it is 
Matter, that is Considered in it Self, called Only matter, to Exclude all other Matter 
whatsoever" (PP063; "A Preface Concerning the Rules of Art"). Once the punctuation of 
See Appendix B for a detailed comparison of Philosophical! Fancies and the two editions of 
Philosophical and Physical Opinions. 
13
 Bazerman looks more specifically at the genre of the experimental report as it develops from 1665 to 
1800 in the Philosophic Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Even in the early years of the Royal 
Society, the "reportable business of natural philosophers was hardly restricted to experimenting or even 
theorizing" (65). Though Cavendish is not writing anything as precise as an experimental article, her 
scientific observations are of a kind with many of its precursors. 
67 
the sentence is conquered, one is left to wonder what "other Matter" she means to 
exclude; however, the very act of composing this explanatory preface illustrates greater 
attention to detail and method. 
In 1663 she additionally describes the plainness of her writing, alluding to 
stylistic prescriptions popularly advocated for all natural philosophy. Thomas Sprat's is 
one of the best known formulations of these recommendations. In his History of the 
Royal Society, he writes of "a constant Resolution, to reject all the amplifications, 
digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, 
when men deliver'd so many things, almost in an equal number of words ... bringing all 
things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can" (Sprat 113). Though Cavendish 
had little enthusiasm for mathematics, her words echo similar sentiments.14 She describes 
her work as 
like an Unpolish'd Stone or Metall, a meer Rough-cast without any Gloss 
or Splendor ... It is Plain and Vulgarly Express'd, as having not so much 
Learning as to Puzle the Reader with Logistical, Metaphysical, 
Mathematical, or the Like Terms; Wherefore you shall onely find therein 
Plain Sense and Reason, Plainly Declared. (PP063; "An Epistle to the 
Reader") 
Her wish is to express herself fully, even if this requires repetition, while also bringing 
the work closer to the conventions of the New Science. 
14
 Her feelings about mathematics are ambiguous, often negative but sometimes positive. In PPOS5, she 
states that "the Mathematicks brings both profit and pleasure to the life of man" ("An Epistle to the Reader, 
for my Book of Philosophy"). Though Cavendish had no formal training in mathematics, she does employ 
mathematical metaphors and allusions in her work, as discussed by Roberto Bertuol; and Stephen Clucas, 
"Variation, Irregularity and Probabilism." 
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Revisions of Science 
In contrast to the prefatory material, in the first and second editions of 
Philosophical and Physical Opinions the fundamental scientific notions do not change 
substantially. Her opinions are instead subject to the extensive "developing, cutting, and 
reordering" that is brought on by a writer's revision of an existing text. Murray describes 
the process as if the text were a sentient being: "The writing stands apart from the writer, 
and the writer interacts with it, first to find out what the writing has to say, and then to 
help the writing say it clearly and gracefully" ("Writing as Process" 5). The first evidence 
of development is in the greatly expanded length of her philosophical work. Though she 
contends that her writing is simple and plain, Cavendish cannot claim it to be succinct. 
The 1655 edition is almost seven times the length of Philosophicall Fancies, and the 
1663 edition is longer still. Both wordy editions share an almost Burtonian profusion of 
lists of all kinds. Often, modern readings have seen the excessive detail only as a great 
deal of redundancy, what Berthoff calls "the uninstructed writer's only means of 
emphasis" (746). Grant suggests, for example, that her "opinions may often exasperate by 
their silliness or their tedium."15 However, the cataloguing of nature in both editions 
reflects a greater awareness of the intellectual context of her writing. In her efforts to 
write more conventionally about nature, Cavendish borrows from natural philosophy's 
sister-discipline, natural history, drawing on its tradition of classification and 
categorization.16 In addition, the proliferation of lists points to new levels of cognitive 
processing, including experimentation with higher-order synthesis and theory 
15
 Tempering this criticism, Grant follows by saying, "but much can be excused anyone who was 
illuminated by such ardour and capable of expressing it with such instinctive grace" (146). 
16
 Natural history is understood here as "the collecting of true instances of natural things and events 
themselves" (Cook 400). Though his discussion focuses on medicine in the Scientific Revolution, Cook 
briefly examines competing opinions of natural history and natural philosophy in this time. 
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development. These works function at a significantly different level of understanding 
than her earlier natural philosophy. Gathering evidence into lists and catalogues allows 
Cavendish to verify the applicability and validity of self-moving matter; by extension, 
she also tests her skill at building a strong foundation for a cohesive theory of nature. Yet 
while generating these lists helps solidify her thinking about nature, indiscriminate 
accumulation of every plausible example still functions more like brainstorming than 
proof by evidence. This process continues through both editions; there is little editing of 
the lists from one draft to the next, and in fact the 1663 edition has more lists than the 
first. Moving beyond the natural historian's propensity for arbitrary collection will have 
to wait for a later publication. 
The extensive classification of motions, figures, diseases and remedies illustrates 
another of the ways in which scientific understanding evolves through the composition of 
these texts. Cavendish experiments with both inductive and deductive techniques, and she 
also interjects with comments on the very processes she undertakes. According to 
Bloom's taxonomy, an important step in building understanding is the categorization of 
material, either through exemplifying or classifying. Exemplifying is deductive: starting 
with a general concept or principle, specific examples are drawn out. On the other hand, 
classification tends towards induction: by accumulation or conjunction, specific examples 
are recognized as illustrating a particular concept (Anderson 72). Illustrative of both 
inductive and deductive techniques, lists can thus be used to generate an abstract 
principle or to support an established one. In Cavendish's two editions, both processes 
are attempted. The reader can find inventories of fiery, airy, and watery motions; types of 
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liquid and light; forms of heat and cold; varieties of passions and thoughts; and kinds of 
sensory stimuli and perception. In the "physical" opinions, the humors are catalogued, as 
are the elements and motions from which each of the humors is derived; the 'natural 
maladies' of the body are enumerated and defined; many other diseases, including fevers, 
infections, colics, apoplexies and convulsions, are catalogued and explained; and the 
workings of medicines and various cures are explored. These lists at first appear to be 
deductive, their starting point a general statement or assumption about the structure of 
matter or the laws of nature. Figures are pigeonholed according to four fundamental 
shapes, reminiscent of the shapes of her atomic elements: circular, triangular, cubic and 
"Paralels" (PP055 33; 100).17 The three fundamental figures in every particular form are 
illustrated by examples: a man is, first, an animal (the local figure); second, made of flesh 
(not wood or water); and finally, specifically human flesh (not dog or bear flesh). The six 
"ground-motions" (33; 99) allow for the classification of a variety of "grosse exterior 
motions" (34) as well as the figures that these generate. Cavendish envisions a layered 
structure for most natural figures; for example, "first there is the figure of a man in bones 
... then there is the figure of a man in flesh; thirdly there is a figure of the man in the 
skin, then there are many, different figures, belonging to one and the same figure" (44; 
118). She goes on to list some of man's 'sub-figures': 
there is the brain, the pia mater, the dura mater, the soul, the nose, the 
eyes, the fore-head, the ears, the mouth, the lips, the tongue, the chin, yet 
all this is but a head; likewise the head, the neck, the brest, the arms, the 
hands, the back, the hips, the bowels, the thighes, the legs, the feet; 
Page numbers are given first for the 1655 edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions. A second page 
reference after the semi-colon indicates that the same (or nearly the same) wording exists in the 1663 
edition. Note that the capitalization is often different in 1663. 
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besides, the bones, the nerves, the muscles, the veins, the arteries, the 
heart, the liver, the lights, the midrif, the bladder, the kidnies, the guts, the 
stomacke, the brain, the marrow, the blood, the flesh, the skin, yet all these 
different figurative parts make but the figure of one man. (44; 119) 
The lists are not often so concentrated nor so long, but at times entire chapters are set out 
as an enumeration of interconnected items: types of motion and examples of each one; 
elemental figures and their manifestations; types of fevers and examples of their 
symptoms; causes of disease and their treatment.18 
In the end, this sort of organization is neither clearly deductive, nor entirely 
inductive. A reader may infer the relationship between, for instance, different types of 
coughs, but any connection is most often the result of contiguity, not of any summing up 
of the general principle by the author. The systematic and coherent connections that are 
integral to analysis are only partially, even inadvertently, present. At times the lists have 
no logic at all: "gloomy" figures actually include a disparate collection of shining figures 
such as air, bright metals, water, and glossy-coated animals (80; 121). Cavendish is quite 
aware of the weaknesses of this classification project. She forges ahead in a way that 
evokes the process of discovery through writing in which a writer is advised "to assert 
whatever [he or she] can, accepting its partial and conflicting nature; and then to continue 
to formulate successive utterances, no matter how disorganized and rambling their 
sequence is. The result will be that new conceptual relationships (ideas), corresponding to 
the previously obscure area of conflict, will be externally formulated' (Galbraith 52). 
18
 Two illustrative examples are "Of Motions" (32; 97) and "Of Apoplexies" (149; 375). 
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Cavendish even comments on the impossibility of exhaustive catalogues of nature. She 
believes there is too much variety in nature for this to be possible, because of nature's 
"millions of several motions" (131; 319), "infinite variety of motions" (33; 100), and 
"infinite sorts of figures" (40; 110). There is little tension between Cavendish's attempts 
to draw up lists and form categories and her insistence that the task is impossible. The 
contradiction is so unproblematic that it becomes part of the enumeration, as in this list of 
infinite 'low' motions: "Diving, dipping, mowing, reaping, or shearing, rowling, 
creeping, crawling, tumbling, traveling, running, and infinite the like examples may be 
given of the varieties of one and the same kinde of motion" (35). 
Though the classification project may be impossible, the process is of value, 
providing a forum in which Cavendish can test and develop her knowledge. Similarly, 
she builds a better understanding of atomism in the very process of enumerating her 
reasons for rejecting it as a theory of matter. In Poems, and Fancies, atomism was less a 
philosophical conviction than a convenient vehicle for unrestrained speculation and play 
of images. In Philosophicall Fancies, Cavendish had already begun to doubt its validity, 
but had yet to abandon atomism's metaphorical value.1 The 1655 edition of 
Philosophical and Physical Opinions still maintains a vestigial attachment to a particulate 
model, evidenced in her declaration that, at one time, she "would have turned [her] 
Atomes out of verse into prose, and joyned it to this book" (PP055; "An Epistle to the 
Reader, for my Book of Philosophy"). Yet because Cavendish leads into the 
philosophical opinions of the first edition with "A Condemning Treatise of Atomes," the 
1
 Anna Battigelli suggests in fact that although Cavendish "rejected atomism as a theory of matter in 1655, 
she retained it throughout her life as a metaphor for the body politic and for the mind, exploring both as 
troubled atomistic systems" (63). 
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continuing significance of atomism to her vitalist natural philosophy is often 
underestimated. Her apparent rejection of atomism has led many critics to segregate the 
earlier work in a "pre-animist" category, while conflating the 1655 and 1663 editions, 
with the implication that their theory is the same. Sylvia Bowerbank even refers to the 
ideas of the second edition as only "supposedly revised" (396). 
However, the "Condemning Treatise" attempts to be both a selective repudiation 
and a defense of atoms. Cavendish endeavors to rein in the wild particles of the atomic 
verses by a stricter delineation of the conditions under which atomism—and order—are 
possible. She wishes to retain the metaphorical impact of her atomic representations; her 
illustrations of elemental shape and action still make sense to her, and regardless of their 
potential for chaos, the individuality and active capacity of atoms continue to appeal to 
her. She thus maintains her "particular opinions of the figures": 
that the long atoms make air, the round water, the flat square earth; also 
that all the other figures are partly severed from those, also the measure, 
and the weight of atoms, of slime, flame, of burning, of quenching of fire, 
and of the several motions, compositions, and composers in their creating 
and dissolving of figures; also their wars and peace, their sympathies and 
antipathies, and many the like. 
In fact, discussions of Philosophical and Physical Opinions often use only the 1663 edition unless 
making specific reference to the prefatory material. See for example Hutton, "Anne Conway, Margaret 
Cavendish and Seventeenth-Century Scientific Thought"; Grant; James; Sarasohn, "A Science Turned 
Upside Down"; and Stevenson. Blaydes differentiates between the two editions for the purposes of 
historical overview, but says nothing of the differences in philosophical content. In contrast, Moore's 
summary of Cavendish's scientific oeuvre uses the 1655 edition and only briefly mentions that it was 
"handsomely reprinted in 1663" (8). It is to be noted, however, that Cavendish later refers to Grounds of 
Natural Philosophy as the second edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions, which suggests that she 
came to consider the 1655 and 1663 editions to be fundamentally identical. 
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What Cavendish can no longer accept is the mechanical definition of lifeless particles in 
which "infinite matter is onely a body of dust." The "wandring and confused figures" of 
dusty specks "blown about with winde" are socially, politically, and naturally 
problematic, suggesting to her only "infinite and eternal disorder." Inanimate atoms 
"could never produce such infinite effects; such rare compositions, such various figures, 
such several kindes, such constant continuance of each kinde, such exact rules, such 
undissolvable Laws, such fixt decrees, such order, such method, such life, such sense, 
such faculties, such reason, such knowledge, such power." To resolve this problem, she 
speculates that for matter to be made up of atoms, "every atom must be of a living 
substance, that is innate matter" ("A Condemning Treatise of Atomes"). The idea of 
individual living atoms making war on one another of their own volition is more 
acceptable than lifeless particles jostled around with no order or purpose. However, the 
subtlety of the difference undermines any sense that atomism has truly been reprieved, 
and in the end, Cavendish's initial attempt to narrow the scope of atomism lacks 
conviction. 
By 1663 she is able to "give Better Reasons concerning Atoms" and explain more 
fully why her opinions have changed. In this time, has Cavendish come to see how much 
more adaptable vitalist thought is to her perception of the natural, social and political 
world. Her tone is no longer baffled and bewildered; instead, she claims confidently that 
"after I had Reasoned with my Self, I conceived that it was not probable, that the 
Universe and all the Creatures therein could be Created and Disposed by the Dancing and 
Wandering and Dusty motion of Atoms." Nominally based on her observation of natural 
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phenomena, her reasoning is in fact concerned with social order, to a far greater and more 
specific degree than in 1655. Then, she had made clear that senseless atoms could not 
combine by pure chance to form an ordered world. Now she judges that even individual 
animate atoms, each with equal power, life, knowledge, free will and liberty, would be in 
constant conflict: "they would hardly Agree in one Government, and as unlikely as 
Several Kings would Agree in one Kingdom, or rather as Men, if every one should have 
an Equal Power, would make a Good Government; and if it should Rest upon Consent 
and Agreement, like Human Government, there would be as many Alterations and 
Confusions of Worlds, as in Human States and Governments" ("Another Epistle to the 
Reader"). Simply put, atoms can't be dead, because dead things can't create an ordered 
living world; and atoms can't be alive and animate, because they would not cooperate to 
create an ordered living world. 
In this more thorough denunciation of atoms, the recently re-established social 
order is a given that the premises of mechanism and atomism cannot properly account 
for. The laws of nature must first be proved in the subset of society; mechanical and 
atomic explanations are dismissed not because they cannot sufficiently explain natural 
phenomena, but because they no longer account for prevailing social and political 
behavior. Looking elsewhere for scientific models compatible with her social ideal, and 
with the eventual reality of the Restoration, Cavendish continues to elaborate a model 
wherein matter is imbued with harmonious vitality. Though she likes to claim that her 
"old opinions of atoms" have given way to "absolutly new opinions" (PP055; "A 
Condemning Treatise of Atomes"), in their initial form, her vitalism is as much a 
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patchwork of various theories as were her atomic poems. She adopts only the ideas of 
Paracelsian vitalist theory homologous to her personal beliefs, maintaining that motion is 
inherent in matter, that matter is informed with rational and sensitive power, and that 
nature is self-knowing and perceptive, but dismissing the monist belief that matter and 
spirit are one and interconvertible. Like Hobbes, she rejects the idea of the incorporeal 
soul and also envisions thoughts as physical entities, "independent, self-moving beings 
engaged in a struggle, not for truth, but for representational preeminence within the 
kingdom or commonwealth of the brain" (Stevenson 529). The latter aspect is 
significantly different from the vitalists; Cavendish sees matter as often oppositional, 
disputatious, and even power-hungry instead of part of some happy holistic unity. The 
originality of her animist materialism lies in the infusion of vitalism with aspects of 
Hobbesian pessimism that reflect her belief in the cfoharmony necessary in the larger 
harmony of all things. 
With her expanded understanding of the science she explores, Cavendish also 
recognizes the need for clear and consistent terminology, and she begins to excise 
ambiguous or idiosyncratic expressions. With the exception of the material reprinted 
from Philosophicall Fancies, the very word 'atom' is almost entirely absent from the text 
of either edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions. Where atoms are mentioned, 
the word means simply the tiniest, most insignificant specks of matter. For example, in 
arguing for the material nature of motion, Cavendish claims that it can no more be 
annihilated than can a figure, in which "every part and parcel, grain, and atome, remains 
in infinite matter" (PP055 31; 96). She affirms that infinite matter "may be divided in it 
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self by Self-motion into Atoms," but this is only to declare that "in comparison of infinite 
Matter Man is but as an Atom" (PP063 29). A greater obstacle to the coherence of her 
work is Cavendish's use of terms that, as Whitaker points out, are "neologisms whose 
meanings [can] only be extracted from her text with difficulty" (251): "innated" (PP055 
31) is used to describe the animate nature of rational and sensitive matter; "onely Matter" 
(30) appears to mean both 'unified' and 'fundamental' matter, with an implied contrast to 
particulate matter; and "transmigration" appears where either transformation or 
transmutation is meant. Adding to the confusion, certain basic concepts are expressed in 
more than one way. Having made no changes to the material from Philosophicall 
Fancies, Cavendish refers to the vital parts of matter as sensitive and rational "spirits" 
(12) throughout the first section of the 1655 edition, while in the newly-written sections 
thereafter she abandons the term for "matter" (33). Inanimate matter is variously called 
"immoving matter" (8), "grosse matter" (37) "dull matter" (46), or "the dull part of 
matter" (32). In the revised work, she completely omits Philosophicall Fancies, 
appreciably normalizing the terminology, and even allotting over nine pages to definition 
and explanation, "for the better Understanding of this Philosophical Work" (n. pag.). 
These changes point not only to a better understanding of her theory, but to 
Cavendish's growing awareness of how best to convey it in her writing. The organization 
of the two editions further illustrates this awareness. The 1655 edition, while more 
systematically arranged than her early work, is still a jumbled text. Its chaotic 
development evokes the kind of discovery through writing where a writer dives in to the 
21
 A single instance is given for each of the various terms listed here, but all occur repeatedly throughout 
the 1655 edition. 
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composing process directly and allows ideas to evolve naturally (Galbraith 49). Though 
its meandering nature is presaged in the style of Cavendish's prefaces, in the last of the 
multitude of prefaces, "The Text to my Natural Sermon," she appears to set out a 
tentative plan of the work. However, this is presented in the vaguest of terms, declaring 
only that she will begin with matter and end with eternity. Further along the same page, 
she provides a little more detail, employing the visual format of verse for an odd and 
brief four-line statement that tells us only that: 
The first cause is matter. 
The second is Motion. 
The third is figure 
which produceth all natural effects. (PP055) 
Her inability to recognize the organization of her own work, even after its completion, 
indicates quite clearly that Cavendish entered into the composing process without 
formulating any real plan at all. Nor does Cavendish accomplish her plan to end with 
eternity: the last content chapter examines "The knowledge of diseases" (169), while the 
final numbered chapter, in which God is acknowledged as the source of infinite matter, is 
preceded by the comment that "it belongs to another book" (172). 
The absence of a clear framework is partly due to Cavendish grafting new 
chapters onto old without any substantial revision. She uses the sequence of topics in 
Philosophicall Fancies as an initial organizational imperative, but the fragmented earlier 
work is a poor introduction to a theory that had evolved considerably over the two 
intervening years. Moreover, it creates unnecessary repetition and circuitousness: 
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especially in the second section (albeit the first 'new' one) of the 1655 edition, many 
chapters return to expand upon ideas previously presented only in brief form. After the 
two rambling philosophical sections enlarging the discussion of matter and motion, she 
proceeds with two sprawling sections of physical opinions. To link the philosophical and 
physical is not unusual; in this time, "physic" did not have the same meaning as 
"medicine," but implied an interest in nature and natural history. Cavendish had written 
reflections on the body and its afflictions in both the atomic poems and The Worlds Olio, 
but in 1655 the discussion is far more fully-developed. In the end, the work as a whole 
has more structural and logical development than the scientific verses and "fancies," far 
though it may be from a methodical exposition of fact. 
In contrast, in the 1663 Philosophical and Physical Opinions Cavendish literally 
begins anew, with a plan that echoes her theory; the very design of the text draws on its 
central philosophical ideas. The first three sections of the philosophical opinions open up 
like the nest of boxes in her atomic poems, unfolding as layered spheres that correspond 
to Cavendish's triumvirate of matter as well as to the three 'worlds' that most occupy her 
thinking: nature, society, and her own mind. Her intention is to move inward from "the 
Only and Infinite Matter, the Nature, Degrees, Motions, and Figures, and of Creation, or 
Production in general" (PP063 27), to the specifics of man and then finally to the central 
core of the human psyche. The opening section begins at the outer sphere of matter, the 
largest 'box' that forms the base of the hierarchy: the intermixture of inanimate matter 
with its two animate components. Here Cavendish explains unified, infinite and eternal 
matter and motion, its infinite variety, its infinite (and thus unknowable) knowledge, and 
22
 On the seventeenth-century meaning of'physic', see Cook, esp. 398-406. 
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the infinite process of creation and production in nature. In other words, this is a general 
discussion of the entire natural universe. The middle degree of sensitive animate matter is 
quite literally 'characterized' in the second part of the treatise, which moves inwards to 
one particular creation: man. Cavendish's abiding concern for society and polity is 
evoked here. Finally, the third section, on human thought and knowledge, illustrates the 
most refined rational aspect of matter and this shrinks the focus to the paradoxically 
limitless internal world of Cavendish's own mind.23 
At this point, the organizational momentum seems lost as the text meanders 
through various disconnected topics: equality, operation, fortune, chance, perpetual 
motion, time, incorporality, and divisibility. One might argue that the fragmentation here 
recreates the fertile but unsystematic mind that created Poems, and Fancies not so long 
before. However, some of these topics share an undercurrent that is related to human 
knowledge, albeit negatively: there is always infinite potential for confusion and 
misunderstanding. Man "is deceived" by fortune (PP063 72); "Chances" are simply 
"Visible Effects" of causes we cannot comprehend (73); and some theories of division 
are so difficult that "it is beyond [her] Capacity to understand" (87). Cavendish 
reawakens her skepticism, though without engaging in any systematic epistemological 
reflection; as in 1655, her thoughts on this subject are scattered throughout the text. 
Beyond the third section, there appears to be a loss of editorial steam. The rest of the 
23
 Whitaker proposes a very different interpretation of the arrangement of the text. She suggests that 
Cavendish had previously followed "the conventional ordering of Creation, proceeding from its lowest to 
its highest forms" (252), while in 1663, by placing creatures and mankind earlier in the treatise, Cavendish 
rejects the concept of man's supremacy. However, neither reading seems entirely persuasive. In 1655, the 
point is undermined by the inclusion of Philosophical! Fancies at the start of the treatise, in which mankind 
is discussed. Moreover, both editions end with sections on mankind, although these are more specifically 
on human ailments. 
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document is not very different from 1655; the editing process from this point on consists 
far more in revision than in rewriting. The remaining philosophical sections correspond 
more closely to the earlier edition, in concept if not in exact content. Part 4, on motion, is 
largely identical to the second section of the 1655 edition. In the fifth part, Cavendish 
makes substantial changes to the third section of the 1655 edition, but the thrust is still a 
categorization of elements and their motions. The original physical opinions remain 
virtually unchanged in the final two sections, though with considerable expansion and 
added detail. 
The Language of Universal Balance 
The gradual though incomplete development of an organizational superstructure 
is importantly mirrored in the evolution of the central figurative constructions that give 
force and structure to Cavendish's theory. The two editions of Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions primarily explore the symbol of the circle, in its multiple and often 
complex manifestations. As Bertuol explains, the circle is a manageable and beautiful 
abstraction. It is "the superordinate term for all round objects in reality" and its shape 
conveys the sense of the "harmonious whole" (31). It can evoke balance, since all points 
are equidistant from its center; it may suggest equality—even democracy—since no point 
has primacy. There are implications of both contrariety and cooperation: each point is 
diametrically opposed to another on the circumference but this separation incorporates 
the bond of a shared center and radius. Associating motion with the points on the circle 
generates a cycle, an image especially befitting representations of nature. Her process of 
making meaning is demonstrated further by tracing Cavendish's use of the circle image. 
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In 1655, through an accumulation of instances of circularity in nature, she once again 
comes to realize the significance of her rhetorical choices, eventually seeing in the circle 
the simplest manifestation of a more complex and dynamic cyclical metaphor. By 1663, 
she presents a more consistent and sustained vision of matter and motion in which the 
circle is used subtly and pervasively to represent universal balance, unity and harmony. 
In addition, the changing ways that circularity is invoked also reflect a changing 
social perception. Where Poems, and Fancies is dominated by the imagery of war— 
arrows of fire, rebel atoms, watery cannon shot—in Philosophicall Fancies, Cavendish 
had already begun to 'marshal' her rhetorical troops into less bellicose representations 
that fit a reformed world view. The first edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions 
identifies circular motions and forms without making any overt connection to the civil 
war, but with the shift of focus to cyclical harmony, the second edition more clearly 
presents the socio-political vision underlying her natural theory. It is a vision less hopeful 
than might be assumed given the restoration of the monarchy and the repeal of William 
and Margaret's exile. The harmony she finds in the greater natural world does not imply 
ultimate hope for peace and prosperity in the lesser social domain; rather, the inevitability 
of discord and division in society is a sign that disorder lurks in every part of matter, as a 
necessary diametric opposite to order and method. 
Only the seeds of these ideas are present in 1655. Initially, the reader is 
bombarded with natural evidence of circularity, the weight of examples all that is 
provided to prove its importance. Motion is envisioned as acting within a circle: 
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attraction, retention and contraction draw in from the circumference, dilation and 
expulsion move out from the center, and digestion moves both ways. Heat and cold are 
then defined by their 'circular' dilation or contraction. Actions once associated with war 
are reinterpreted: the quenching of fire, illustrated in Poems, and Fancies as occurring 
when "Atomes round the sharp put to rout" (27) is now merely water's spherical form 
blunting and dispersing the fiery points. The circle is the basic form linked with metals as 
well as all things related to water. The latter is discussed at great length. Different forms 
of water are associated, sometimes obscurely, with circular figures: fresh water has a 
simple round form while salt water has a pointed form perhaps meant to evoke the 
angular construction of a (nearly circular) many-sided polygon. Even when externally 
altered, watery figures remain internally circular: hail is a contraction of water's circular 
form to a lump, snow a change to a triangular form, ice a square or cubic form, and frost 
a crackling or "surfling" form (PP055 60). Anything that is "of the nature of water, as 
also oyls, vitrals, strong-waters, all juices from fruits, herbs, or the like, or any thing that 
is liquid and wet" (57) is essentially an alteration on a circular shape. Natural phenomena 
on a larger scale also involve circularity: the planets move in circular orbits due to their 
corresponding form; the circular nature of water "in [her] opinion is the reason of the 
ebbing and flowing of tides" (87); thunder and lightning are the result of circular shapes 
overextended to their breaking point (92); and as in Poems, and Fancies, the roar of wind 
and sea is the striking of hollow spheres of moisture. 
Before the end of 1655's philosophical sections Cavendish tempers her unbridled 
enthusiasm and declares the limitations and internal inconsistencies of the circular model. 
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The unifying potential of the circle, she admits, is not necessarily unique: "as this world 
is of a spherical figure, so other worlds may be of other figures ... so may worlds differ 
for all we know, and if we should guesse by the several changse [sic], and variety in 
nature, it is very probable that it is so" (PP055 97). In the physical opinions, the circle 
image is almost absent, with the exception of references to the arched shape of the skull, 
conducive to motions which amplify sound, clarify vision, or intensify taste and smell; 
and to the circular openings—pores, eyes, ears, nostrils, and mouth—which allow sense 
messages to enter the body. She does not abandon the imagery altogether, but reinterprets 
it to allow for a dynamic element: instead of reiterating examples of circularity, the 
physical opinions concentrate on notions of interaction and interchange that result in the 
physical cycles of health and harmony, illness and chaos. Even in Philosophical] Fancies, 
Cavendish had defined life and knowledge as changes in sensitive and rational motion 
that follow a perpetual cycle of growth and decay, and in 1655, the physical opinions 
reiterate this interaction of rational and sensitive faculties in the body. Numerous 
examples show how actions of the mind affect the body, and vice versa. Prosaically, she 
points out that an upset stomach is often accompanied by headache. Elsewhere, she 
claims that disorderly passions can affect both sense and brain; "the minde feeds as 
greatly on thoughts, as a hungry stomacke doth upon meat" (110). Conversely, the perfect 
interaction of rational and sensitive motions can produce illuminating dreams. The final 
section makes it clear that illness is the imbalance and chaos that is one half of the cycle 
that eventually gives way to restored harmony and health; moreover, "all diseases are 
cured by contrary motions" (162), motions, we recall, which she envisions working 
within a metaphorical circle. 
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The numerous examples of circular form and motion put forth in the first edition 
function heuristically to induce Cavendish's recognition of the common thread of 
balanced and harmonious interconnection. The circle, the natural cycle, and the notions 
of balance and harmony are all present in her first attempt, but it is the later edition that 
develops these ideas in a more comprehensive way. Overall, there is less figurative 
language in the 1663 edition; it is no longer necessary for Cavendish to point out every 
manifestation of the circle or cycle in nature, nor to draw on endless analogies of circular 
form or motion. She moves beyond simple recognition and enumeration of the static 
visual metaphor to the wider use of cyclical patterns in the organization and content of 
the text. The ideas of balance and harmony are introduced openly, from Cavendish's first 
revised definitions of matter. She states that any division in nature is eventually resolved, 
since "the Unity of the nature of Only and Infinite matter, maketh Concord out of 
Discord" (PP063 11). Motion, "the Creator of Figures, doth make Warr," but "the 
Infinite and Eternal matter is Eternally in Peace" (10). Our universe, made of "One only 
Matter" and "One only Motion" (4), contains an infinity of contrasts—life and death, 
creation and dissolution, war and peace, dark and light—yet always finds balance in 
cycling through these contrasts: "one Creature [is] produced from another, so that the 
Dissolving of one or more Creatures or Figures is the way of the Creation of one or more 
Creatures or Figures, and must of necessity be so" (20). In the section on man, Cavendish 
follows the life cycle from gestation through birth, growth, decay and death. Chapters on 
the mind draw a parallel between the life cycle and the growth and decay of knowledge, 
and a link is made between the balanced interaction of body and mind, sense and reason. 
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When Cavendish calls on other images, such as the construction and destruction 
of a house, the ebb and flow of fluids, and the give and take of economic trade, they are 
interpreted in ways that emphasize unity, reciprocal interaction and balance. The analogy 
of construction is central to the initial discussion of animal, and more specifically human, 
creation and development. Though the construction of the body, or "Animal House" 
(PP063 30), mainly involves sensitive matter working on its inanimate 'supplies', 
rational matter is nonetheless involved, "although not in the Building or Labouring, yet in 
the Ordering, Contrivance, and Designing like as Surveyers" (31). In the development of 
the mind, rational and sensitive matter are later described as "Fellow-Labourers that joyn 
in one Work, or as Fellow-Servants in one House" (44). This architectural image is not 
only illustrative and simple, but it also assumes the simultaneous hierarchy and 
cooperation of architect, laborer, and material. In addition, the new analogy of economic 
traffic and trade helps to highlight the interconnection of mind and body. Sense passages 
are highways on which various goods are transported in the interest of "Home-profit, 
which is Nourishment, Health, and Peace" (49). Expulsive motions in the body "[carry] 
out all Unusefull, Unprofitable and Hurtfull matter or substance, which is brought into 
the Figure" (34). Traffic back and forth between sense and reason is ongoing and the 
profit of this mental or bodily industry is reasoning and knowledge, love and desire, 
discovery and discourse, fighting and pain (50). The ebb and flow of blood in our body's 
closed circulation is also used to illustrate the balanced distribution of rational and 
sensitive matter: just as there is not always the same amount of blood in every part of the 
body, so are there not always the same quantities of animate matter in all parts, but any 
disproportion is naturally resolved over time. 
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In the boundless and unwieldy sphere of human thought, which Cavendish 
undertakes to explore in the third part of the 1663 edition, the diction is marked by 
allusions to interconnection and imitation rather than by the concrete imagery used 
elsewhere. She initially describes a fragmentation of human knowledge that appears 
difficult to reconcile with notions of unity, harmony, and balance. However, though she 
claims that "all Knowledge, both Sensitive and Rational is divided into Parts and 
Particles" (PP063 64), Cavendish finds that segregation, independent action, and conflict 
nonetheless add to the complex interdependence of sensitive and rational matter. The 
various sense organs each have their own discrete ways of taking in information, which 
explains how "Sensitive knowledge lies in Parts" (64); similarly, "Rational Knowledge is 
confined in Parts ... for the Rational motions in one Figure are ignorant of the Rational 
motions in an other Figure" (68). As isolated as their knowledge may be, rational and 
sensitive aspects (along with the inanimate) are always linked in every part of matter, and 
there is "a strong Sympathetical Agreement, and Natural Unity between the Rational and 
Sensitive matter and motions in one and the same Figure and Creature" (75). The animate 
parts can act independently of one another, but there is essential similarity; for example, 
though imagination is a product of the rational matter acting alone, "it doth often move its 
Self, and Motion like to the Sensitive Objects" (62). Such imitation is beneficial. Rational 
motions will mimic the sensitive and then improve upon the products, "by which the 
Rational Animate matter and motions discover new Inventions, and when they have 
discovered or made new Inventions, those Motions declare them to the Sensitive motions, 
and the Sensitive motions put them into Arts" (64). Not all interaction is so positive; the 
rational and sensitive may also "intangle each other" and cause disputation (65) or "move 
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mixtly" and cause mistakes (66). In the end, however, the relationship between rational 
and sensitive matter is reciprocal and mutually beneficial: knowledge is created "by the 
assistance of each Part and Party" (77), wherein "the Sense and Reason doth Inform and 
Reform each other" (85). Like natural creatures, knowledge moreover follows a cycle of 
increase and decay; the development of "Strong and Long-lived Opinions, Subtil and 
Ingenious Inventions, Happy and Profitable Effects, and probable Conjectures, and 
Absolute truths" is inevitably accompanied by "obscurity of Particular Knowledges of 
particular Causes, Things, Creatures and Truths" (77). 
Though the remaining philosophical opinions resemble the first edition more 
closely and lack any overriding scheme, the central notions of cycles, balance and 
harmony are a unifying feature, and additionally, the fragmentation of the next two parts 
of the treatise is diminished by virtue of following on the nested structure of the first 
three sections. The classification of motion and the importance of the circle as a 
fundamental shape take on new coherence, chapters on metamorphosis add evidence of 
natural cycles, and new discussions of ascent and descent further illustrate reciprocity. 
The fifth part starts with an assertion of the natural proportion of the elements in our 
world and then reorders the discussion in such a way that the reader knows what to 
expect from the start—or at least knows not to expect too much, since "there is so much 
Variety in every Kind and every Sort, and in one and the same Kind, and one and the 
same Sort, and in one and the same Creature, as it is impossible for any one Creature to 
describe the Infinite Varieties in Nature" (PP063 152). In the final chapters of this 
section, Cavendish reiterates the "Intermixt" nature of all creatures (242) and follows 
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with a description "Of the Temper of the Four Seasons of the Year, as Spring, Summer, 
Autumn, and Winter" (243), ending the philosophical opinions with a final powerful 
image of the infinitely recurring cycles of time and nature. 
By the end of her revised work, through both the language and structure of the 
philosophical opinions, Cavendish comes to convey a fundamental belief in the unity of 
self-moving matter, the complementarity of sympathetic and antipathetic motions, and 
the interdependence of mind and body. Yet she also shows her reader that discord and 
division are perpetual, even necessary: "the Infinite Compositions do Equalize or make 
an Unity with Infinite Divisions, for one Infinite doth Counterpoise an other Infinite, 
which makes Order and Method in Infinite Nature" (PP063 88). It is in the physical 
opinions that we find the greatest emphasis on the negative side of balance and 
harmony—the discord, difficulty and disagreement in matter and motions that are as 
everpresent as cooperation and sympathetic action. This is manifested most clearly in the 
war imagery that continues to characterize the physical opinions. The body, a microcosm 
of society, is described as a war zone in which struggles for absolute power rage at 
almost all times. Sickness frequently afflicts the body in the form of "mutinous and 
rebellious humours, or the foreign enemy, as surfets, and the like"; these rebels and 
attackers must be "beaten out, killed, or taken prisoners" (PP055 128; 308).24 In the 
conflict between disordered animate matter and regular animate matter, "according as 
each party gets the better, the body is better or worse, and according as the siege 
continues, the body is sick, and according as the victory is lost or won, is life or death" 
(140; 338). The battle imagery is pervasive. The irregular motions of madness are an 
24
 In PP063, Cavendish uses "Cast out" instead of "beaten out". 
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army that advances with some troops far ahead of others. Diseases of the head are caused 
in the stomach, which "begins the war, sending up such an army of ill vapors, as many 
times they do not onely disorder the head, but totally ruinate it" (154; 392). Malignant 
infections are like "a foraign enemy, which enters into a peaceable country, which not 
onely disorders it, but makes havock and waste"; when bred in the body, "it is like civil 
war, where uproars are raised, and outrages are done, by inbred corrupt humors" (144; 
346). An epileptic seizure is the body's struggle, like "a loyal people that would defend 
or release their natural and true born king, from being prisoner to a foraign enemy" (151; 
379). The internal discord that can arise in the mind is also envisioned as civil war. When 
the senses rebel, "it is with the Animate Matter and motions as it is with Governours and 
Citizens, or Commons" (PP063 278): the rational government is "so Disordered ... as it 
can neither Direct Prudently, nor Advise Subtilly, nor Order Methodically" (279). 
These examples of the embattled body are followed, in both editions, by the 
methods that reinstate order to the body: purges, drugs, and cordials that "indeavour to 
Compose, Unite, and Strengthen the several Disordered, Dissevered, and Weakened 
Parts" (PP063 426). There is hope for recovery. But just as often, medicines cause other 
problems and "turn from being assisting friends to assaulting enemies" {PPOS5 162; 
425). Moreover, in 1663 Cavendish adds the description of seasonal diseases, which 
imply a cyclical pattern in which illnesses pass only to be replaced by new ones. Good 
health—and social order—require the proper balance and proportion of all things, but 
ultimately, all that is possible is the perpetual and irresolvable coexistence of regular and 
5
 These first appear in The Worlds Olio 184-88. In a similar vein, the stages of ague are compared to the 
seasons: first is winter (cold and dry contracting motions), then spring (shaking, expulsive motions), then 
summer (hot and dry digestive motions), then summer/fall (sweating, dilative motions) (PP063 354-55). 
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irregular motions, of order and chaos, of knowledge and ignorance. Neither a material 
hierarchy of rational, sensitive and inanimate matter, nor a restored political hierarchy 
can guarantee harmony; rather, Cavendish concludes that, as all matter and motion stem 
from God, "an infinite Deity" at the center of infinite moving matter, who "orders and 
disposes of all natures works" (172; 454), mankind needs to "seek no more, but in his 
greatness trust" (173; 455). 
Following such an extensive and complex discussion of many issues, this 
conclusion, unaltered in the eight years between publications, may seem dissatisfying. 
Odder still are the final pages by William Cavendish, expounding in six pages the 
grounds of natural philosophy to which his wife has devoted over four hundred and fifty. 
At first glance, the blithe declaration that he means to "Play at this Philosophical Game" 
(PP063 459) appears to demean her work, almost implying that what she has devoted 
years to completing could be done just as well in a few hours. Yet the image is more 
appropriate than it seems. The chaotic play of ideas and images in her early work is what 
allowed her to formulate her own natural theory. To Cavendish, the search for knowledge 
has always been more of an ongoing game than a purposeful quest. The 'game' can be 
quite practical, since in the search for absolute knowledge mankind gains experience and 
"[makes] use of our acquaintance [learning] to our own benefit" (PPOS5 41; 112). 
Moreover, the outcome can be fortuitous, for even if "many went about to finde that 
which can never be found (as they said natural Philosophy is) yet they might finde in the 
search that they did not expect, which might prove very beneficial to them" (PP055 53). 
Cavendish advises a combination of diffident objectivity and dedicated interest, searching 
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for knowledge without overestimating the value of what we discover. After all, she 
declares, "this Question of the Designs, Causes and Reasons ... Human sense and reason 
may guess at them, and may probably and happily light or chance on the Right and Truth 
of some of them, but Human sense and reason can never attain to a Perfect knowledge" 
(PP063 131). We are nothing but figures of Nature that have a limited knowledge of 
other figures, for "as our knowledge comes slow, and in parts, and pieces, so we know 
but parts and pieces of every particular thing" (67; 192). 
Underpinning her claims of man's intellectual limitations is implicit criticism, and 
in her two subsequent works this develops into a more specific critique of natural 
philosophers. Already in 1663 there is some evidence of this in the prefaces and in 
sporadic comments within the text. However, Cavendish has long been critical of man, 
who "thinks himself to have the Supreme knowledge," yet she also accepts this as 
inevitable: "he can but think so, for he doth not absolutely know it, for thought is not an 
absolute knowledge but a suppositive knowledge" {PP055 40).26 Both editions end 
showing how man's arrogance prevents him from recognizing the essential balance of the 
universe: 
Self love doth make him seek to finde, if he 
Came from, or shall last to eternity; 
But motion being slow, makes knowledge weak, 
And then his thoughts, 'gainst ignorance doth beat, 
As fluid waters 'gainst hard rocks do flow, 
Break their soft streams, & so they backward go: 
26
 There is a similar discussion with quite different phrasing in PP063 (111-12). 
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Just so do thoughts, & then they backward slide, 
Unto the place, where first they did abide; 
And there in gentle murmurs, do complain, 
That all their care and labour is in vain. (173; 455) 
The ebb and flow of knowledge also means to Cavendish that there is no end to the 
process of thinking and writing. In the first edition of Philosophical and Physical 
Opinions, she sets out to justify a theory that is not yet fully developed; in elaborating the 
theory, she comes to see its flaws and modify her course. After editing, explaining, 
rearranging, organizing, and rewording, she tests the theory again. Through the medium 
of increasingly well-sustained analogies and metaphors, the images of harmony and 
balance are more consistently explored and presented, but the 1663 edition of 
Philosophical and Physical Opinions is still a draft version. Cavendish's thoughts flow 
on, though along a slightly different channel. Her next two works, Philosophical Letters 
and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, set her ideas squarely against those of 
other natural philosophers. She moves beyond personal knowledge-making to an active 
search for wider social acceptance for both her ideas and her right to assert them. 
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CHAPTER 3: "my Brain was like an University"1 
Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy 
By 1663 Cavendish had had many years to reflect on her natural theory and, after 
1661, a great deal more time to devote to her writing. She and her husband had chosen to 
live quietly at Welbeck, their country home in Nottingham, where Cavendish was able to 
devote much of her time to her writing. This is borne out by her prolific production in 
these years: Playes and Orations were published in 1662; the edited Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions in 1663; Sociable Letters and Philosophical Letters in 1664; and 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy and Blazing World by the end of 1666. In 
this time, she also embarked upon a course of study in natural philosophy that included 
reading works by Hobbes, Descartes, Henry More, Jean Baptiste Van Helmont, 
Charleton, and Harvey. In addition, by 1666 she had read works by Robert Boyle, Henry 
Power, and Robert Hooke, and Thomas Stanley's The History of Philosophy, which 
summarizes the works of ancient philosophers. This is a radical change of direction for a 
writer who has frequently (and proudly) used her lack of formal education as a badge ot 
honor.3 Cavendish's new interest in reading in this time is a manifestation of her 
increasing willingness to look to outside sources for meaning and understanding. At the 
same time, it points to her growing belief in the epistemic value of her opinions and, 
correspondingly, her conviction that her voice should be heard. She brings no radical 
changes to her vitalist theory of nature in the two philosophical works of this period. 
1
 PP063; "An Epistle to the Reader." 
2
 Her plays were composed while in exile in Antwerp; once back in England, Cavendish made new copies, 
presumably edited and corrected, and only then sent the work to be published (Whitaker 243). 
3
 See for example P&F, "To Naturall Philosophers"; and PP055, "An Epilogue to my Philosophical 
Opinions." For further discussion of Cavendish's claims of ignorance, see Scott-Douglass 38-40. 
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Instead, Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy 
summarize the strengths and weaknesses of established opinions and methods and 
consequently validate her own project. These texts are characterized by their wide-
ranging engagement: the natural philosopher's wrestling with her own ideas and those of 
others; the writer's interaction with her earlier texts and the style of her peers; and the 
more personal communication of the author with her readers, imaginary and real, past 
and present. 
In these two works, the scope of Cavendish's research is vast. She takes on the 
ambitious task of evaluating important thinkers of her generation and the even more 
colossal mission of refuting the experimental methods that still now dominate scientific 
inquiry.4 Her first reaction is to question and reevaluate her ideas and revise her texts, but 
soon she turns to the analysis and critique of others. Both Philosophical Letters and 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy function as reviews of the literature 
pertinent to her natural philosophy: they examine the methodologies and approaches of 
other philosophers, identify controversies and potential problem areas, and thus provide 
an intellectual context for Cavendish's theory of matter. A certain amount of objective 
evaluation is necessary to formulate an understanding of the works she reads and to 
situate her own ideas in the scientific discourse of the day; however, Cavendish combines 
insightful criticism with contentious judgment that threatens to alienate her peers. 
Additionally, these works demonstrate a pervasive self-awareness. To negotiate their 
reception, Cavendish uses linguistic techniques that create a bond with her various 
4
 The latter is perhaps only colossal in retrospect, since experimentalism had yet to become the primary and 
uncontestable scientific philosophy. 
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readers while at the same time establishing a distance that keeps her isolated and quite 
literally eccentric. In Philosophical and Physical Opinions, Cavendish had come to 
identify a coexistence and simultaneity of opposites in the universe. In their purpose, 
structure, content and language, the two texts examined in this chapter further reflect the 
contraries in Nature by encompassing both her desire to be included in the discourse of 
science and her wish to establish herself as an acknowledged authority. 
A great variety of topics are broached in the nearly nine hundred pages of these 
two documents, but Cavendish gives the most attention to the broad subject areas of 
motion, perception, experimentalism, and immaterialism. Philosophical Letters is 
premised on a female correspondent's request for her more learned friend to comment on 
the theories of four famous men and to explain her theory of matter and motion. 
Cavendish's epistles examine and reject the ideas of various natural philosophers, but 
most notably Hobbes, Descartes, Henry More and Van Helmont. The first set of letters 
examines motion and perception as described by Hobbes in Leviathan and Elements of 
Philosophy, and Descartes in Discourse on Motion and Discourse on Method. Their 
works become a base from which to reaffirm self-moving matter and explain her theory 
of perception by patterning. She also responds to questions from her correspondent on 
topics such as rarity, density, breaking hard objects, invisible creatures, artificial life, and 
indivisibility. The second section examines Cambridge Platonist Henry More's Antidote 
against Atheisme and Of the Immortality of the Soul. Cavendish argues in favor of self-
moving matter, which More's work tries to debunk, and against immaterial spirits and all 
they imply. She also briefly examines and rejects More's idea of perception, which, like 
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Hobbes' and Descartes', depends on force or pressure. The third group of letters 
examines three main areas of Van Helmont's esoteric work, Oriatrike or Physick 
Refined: his concept of matter, his concept of the soul, and his medical theory. Van 
Helmont's theories depend on a mix of experimental and supernatural proof, neither of 
which Cavendish believes to be valid. The final section of Philosophical Letters is a 
piecemeal commentary on various philosophers which examines Aristotle and the nature 
of fire; Harvey and concepts of generation; Galileo and circular motion, collision and 
pendulums; Charleton on atoms and the vacuum; Huygens on Rupert's drops; and 
Boyle's ingenious experiments. The range of topics is extraordinary, from inanimate 
matter and minima to the reason why kissing is pleasant; predestination and free will to 
the effect of a basilisk's gaze; types of respiration to the optimal length of a gun barrel. In 
the final letters in this collection, Cavendish responds to questions from her 
correspondent, in the process clarifying topics from her own Philosophical and Physical 
Opinions and reiterating her theories. 
Published two years later, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy is more 
focused. It is in an open and sometimes scathing critique of experimental science that 
targets in particular Robert Hooke's and Henry Power's work in microscopy. Her 
concrete discussion of specific microscopic observations inspires more abstract 
reflections on perception and the epistemic value of experimental philosophy, and she 
also comments on the nature of knowledge in general. The treatise is broken into three 
parts. The first works through the microscopic observations of Hooke and Power and the 
many experiments of Boyle on color, heat, cold, water pumps, and air pumps; she ends 
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with a summary of her own theory of matter and perception. Following this are "Further 
Observations,"5 which include reflections on art, knowledge, the soul, chemistry and 
medicine. The final section contains only six chapters that systematically run through 
opinions of some ancient philosophers: Thales; Plato; Pythagoras; Epicurus; Aristotle; 
and the Sceptics, Heraclitus, Democritus and Protagoras. 
The Review of Literature 
The enormous breadth of information in these texts reflects a new determination 
on Cavendish's part. She had long maintained her compulsion to write; now we see a 
sustained drive to read. To some extent, it is the greater availability of "scientific" texts 
that makes this possible: the 1660 establishment of the Royal Society in London led to an 
increase in philosophical works written in English or translated from the Latin; 
furthermore, with the restoration of the family income, Cavendish had the means to 
purchase many of these. Whitaker suggests in fact that in 1664 the family ordered what 
might well have amounted to two hundred volumes from a bookseller in London (255n7). 
In studying the work of other natural philosophers and intellectuals, Cavendish embarked 
upon a course of information-gathering that was vital in shaping her philosophical writing 
in this period. She became subject to what Murray calls the forces of collecting, "the 
gathering of contradictory and unpredictable information which will force old meanings 
to adapt and new ones to be constructed" ("Writing as Process" 9). Consequently, the 
ambitious reading program initiated a revision process more intricate and complicated 
than that which had made the second edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions 
The full title is "Further Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, Reflecting withal upon some 
Principal Subjects in Contemplative Philosophy" (OEP 195). 
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"more Intelligible for [her] Readers" (PP063; "Another Epistle to the Reader"). She was 
inspired to thoroughly re-evaluate the clarity of her writing and the consistency of her 
views, but also to critically assess the writing and ideas of other philosophers: her reading 
motivated Cavendish to produce a kind of precursor to today's academic literature 
review. 
However, she was also made more aware of her own failings, which rekindled 
some of the authorial anxiety evident in early works such as Philosophical! Fancies and 
the first edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions. Cavendish recognizes her 
ignorance of other texts as a fundamental flaw. In Philosophical Letters, she admits 
having begun to write the details of her philosophical system too early, "so early, that I 
had not liv'd so long as to be able to read many Authors" ("A Preface to the Reader"). 
The point is reiterated at the start of Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy: 
I do ingenuously confess, that both for want of learning and reading 
philosophical authors, I have not expressed myself in my philosophical 
works, especially in my Philosophical and Physical Opinions, so clearly 
and plainly as I might have done, had I the assistance of art, and the 
practice of reading other authors. (11; "To the Reader")6 
Her anxiety is increased by her struggles to decipher the difficult texts she has chosen to 
study. She tells the reader that "when I began to read philosophical works of other 
authors, I was so troubled with their hard words and expressions at first, that had they not 
been explained to me, and had I not found out some of them by the context and 
Though O'Neill's edition of Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy is paginated continuously, I 
will also provide the titles of prefatory material where appropriate. 
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connexion of the sense, I should have been far enough to seek" (11). Elsewhere she 
confesses "that since I have read the works of these learned men, I understand the names 
and terms of Art a little better then I did before; but it is not so much as to make me a 
Scholar" (PL; "A Preface to the Reader"). Yet ultimately her reading did not discourage 
Cavendish. She is confident enough to advise her readers to go back to Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions, "wherein is contained the Ground of my Opinions" (PL; "A Preface 
to the Reader"), and later adds that "I desire you to join my Philosophical Letters, and 
these Observations to them, which will serve as commentaries to explain what may seem 
obscure" (OEP 13; "To the Reader"). 
The intricacies of her analysis and evaluation are illuminated by drawing parallels 
with the modem-day literature review. A literature review accounts for the research and 
scholarship on a particular topic in forms as simple as a briefly-annotated bibliography or 
as complex as an integrated summary, analysis, and evaluation of primary sources. As 
graduate students use it, it is a way of showing an understanding of the significant ideas, 
theories, and controversies in one's field; of determining their application to one's own 
field of interest; of giving an evaluation of their accuracy and pertinence; and eventually, 
of forging a place for one's original research and ideas.7 The essential elements of the 
review of literature—wide but focused reading, synthesis of crucial ideas, and evaluation 
of methods and conclusions—are all present in both Philosophical Letters and 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy. As she sought to absorb her reading, 
Cavendish had not only to discover meaning in the work of others, but integrate this new 
These defining aspects of the literature review can be found in academic writing guides as well as on most 
college and university websites. 
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knowledge with her own and so continue to discover meaning and coherence in her own 
texts. Moreover, this process would have been repeated each time new ideas were 
encountered, each time a new text was engaged. The difficulty of these tasks requires 
higher cognitive skills, and the processes of classifying, categorizing, and exemplifying 
that were so evident in Philosophical and Physical Opinions give way in Philosophical 
Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy to the more complex analytic 
processes of discrimination, integration, and deconstruction, as well as the evaluative 
activities of judgment and critique. 
Darcy Haag Granello draws a direct link between the literature review and 
Bloom's taxonomic levels in ways that resonate strongly with both of Cavendish's texts. 
Seeking to help graduate students improve the cognitive complexity of their writing, 
Granello suggests categorizing literature reviews based on their knowledge content and 
written format. Reviews are situated on a spectrum ranging from a cognitively immature 
list of authors and their ideas (corresponding to the Knowledge category) through the 
more complex thematic study of theories and their specific significance to a project 
(corresponding to Evaluation). Granello's evaluative criteria offer a productive way of 
framing Cavendish's new approach in these works of natural philosophy. Like the 
graduate student, Cavendish uses Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy to show her newfound knowledge of key issues relating to her 
These three are alternate terms (in noun form) for the subcategories of Analyze: Differentiating (4.1), 
Organizing (4.2) and Attributing (4.3). See Appendix A, Table 2. 
9
 Though neither Bloom's categories nor the formal review of literature existed in her day, situating 
Cavendish's work along this spectrum is not entirely anachronistic. In Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy, she compares herself to "a young student, when first he comes to the university" and begins to 
prepare "to be master of arts" (12; "To the Reader"). In PP063, Cavendish also describes her brain as "an 
University, Senate, or Council-Chamber" ("An Epistle to the Reader"). 
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area of interest. Faced with a wide range of philosophical opinions, experimental 
accounts, and speculative treatises, she balances the potential chaos of an indiscriminate 
accumulation of information by reading both critically and selectively. Her central 
concern is the justification of her animist theory and in particular, questions of motion, 
perception, immaterialism and experimentalism. Therefore, she narrows the field of 
study, asserting that she "shall onely pick out the ground Opinions of the aforementioned 
Authors, and those which do directly dissent from [hers]" (PL 3). Arriving for example at 
sections of Hobbes' Leviathan which concern politics or geometry, she simply stops 
reading: "For ... being no Scholar, I shall not trouble myself withal" (47). Similarly, she 
freely admits that from Descartes, "I intend to pick out onely those discourses which 1 
like best" (97). There are practical reasons for this selectivity: she declares that "neither 
the strength of my Body, nor of my understanding, or wit, is able to mark every line, or 
every word of their works, and to argue upon them" (3). Thus, she differentiates relevant 
from irrelevant information and ignores many points outside the scope of her particular 
topic. Similarly, in Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy she states, "I have taken 
upon me in this present work, to make some reflexions also upon some of our modern 
experimental and dioptrical writers"; her plan is to limit the defense of her speculative 
natural philosophy largely to arguments against the growing popularity of 
experimentation (10; "The Preface to the Ensuing Treatise"). Though her work continues 
to cover a great many topics, Cavendish clearly recognizes the need for focus in her 
reading and her responses. 
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Nevertheless, Cavendish has a great deal of new information to process, integrate, 
and articulate in some lucid form. To organize an analytical review of her reading, she 
begins to build systematic and coherent links among often disparate pieces of information 
(Anderson 81). Murray suggests that there is a point in the writing process where "[the] 
volume of material we gather—consciously and subconsciously—becomes so immense 
and is so diverse it demands connecting" ("Writing as Process" 8). Cavendish's 
engagement with so many diverse texts and ideas signals such connecting, a multifaceted 
activity which involves selecting significant information, identifying links to prior 
knowledge, discovering patterns, and consequently building meaning. Connecting can 
also highlight contradictions that need to be resolved and can lead a writer to seek out 
new information, and in this way it rums back onto the reading process that initiates it. 
The reading that is re-initiated need not be of new material; equally important is re-
reading, both of source material and one's own writing. The intertwined processes of 
connecting and re-reading stimulate evaluative revision, again, both of the source 
material and one's own writing. As writers "become more critical, more orderly" 
("Writing as Process" 11), they revise their texts and ideas for clarity; however, in a 
review of literature, judgment is also turned outward in order to formulate "objective 
critiques of the quality of the source information" (Granello 299). Cavendish's work 
includes both objective self-criticism and, at least in intention, unbiased assessments of 
other philosophers. In Philosophical Letters, she is careful to suggest that what appear to 
be attacks on her peers are merely points of friendly debate: "although I dissent from 
their opinions, yet doth not this take off the least of the respect and esteem I have of their 
Merits and Works" ("To His Excellency the Lord Marquis of Newcastle"). Similarly, in 
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Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy she assures the reader that she "[opposes] 
so many eminent and ingenious writers ... not out of a contradicting or wrangling nature, 
but out of an endeavour to find out truth" (9; "The Preface to the Ensuing Treatise"). 
While Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy 
both employ techniques associated with a literature review, neither follows a format that 
Granello associates with the most cognitively complex literature reviews. Philosophical 
Letters is set out as a systematic analysis by author; there are direct and explicit links to 
Cavendish's particular concerns and she limits the parts that she is willing to comment 
upon, but the overarching structure seems to be imposed by the sources Cavendish 
happens to have read and not by her own thematic or topical interests. Under Granello's 
taxonomy, this suggests less complexity than the literature review arranged by theme, for 
"[sequential] organization represents a failure to accomplish synthesis" (298). The end 
result is a series of specific topics each associated with specific authors: Hobbes and 
Descartes on matter, motion and perception; Henry More on spirits and the soul; Van 
Helmont on physic and experiment. The most complex reviews of literature include 
thematic outlining, comparison and contrasting of sources, and evaluative comparisons. 
These are only fleetingly apparent in Philosophical Letters; while the structure of the 
letters suggests comparisons between More and Van Helmont, Hobbes and Descartes, 
ancients and moderns, Cavendish rarely draws specific conclusions from these largely 
implicit comparisons. Moreover, even when the same topic is explored in a different 
philosopher's work, there are few if any references back to her prior opinions of others. 
Instead, the reader is presented with Cavendish's own conception as the standard, the 
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more reasonable alternative. In a letter concerning More's Of the Immortality of the Soul, 
she tells her correspondent, "I have declared, Madam, my opinion concerning Perception 
in my former Letters" {PL 174). The only comparison made is to her own theories. 
Similarly, Van Helmont's views of the soul are not compared to More's, though 
Cavendish does once declare, "I perceive the difference betwixt your Authors opinion, 
and ... [that of) other Philosophers" (339), going on to distinguish Van Helmont's 
differentiation of the mortal and immortal soul of man from the more common belief in a 
rational human soul versus a sensitive animal soul. In the exceptional circumstances 
where she overtly compares philosophers, the purposes are critical of all involved: in her 
objection to Hobbes's differentiation of body and accident, she states that "these 
accidents seem to me to be like Van Helmont's Lights, Gases, Blazes and Ideas; and Dr 
More's Immaterial Substances or Daemons, onely in this Dr More hath the better" (54). 
Despite the nod to More, the implication is that all these concepts are largely 
unreasonable. 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy has a more clearly thematic 
organization, with its central objective made evident in the title, and yet it is still 
constrained by the readings to which it responds. Cavendish's references to other 
philosophers are reasonably systematic, with a long series of chapters quite clearly 
progressing through Hooke's Micrographia, yet references to various other philosophers 
are intermixed as the argument requires, showing a greater overall focus on her strong 
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objections to experimental instruments, techniques, and conclusions.10 This corresponds 
to a format that Granello identifies with the taxonomic level of Synthesis; information 
from source documents is spread throughout the review and applied based on her own 
organizational schema (298). However, the "organizational schema" of Observations 
Upon Experimental Philosophy is still quite tenuous. The first set of observations, largely 
concerned with microscopy, is separate from those chapters "Reflecting withal upon 
some Principal Subjects in Contemplative Philosophy" (OEP 195), yet this division may 
only indicate her more recent reading of Glanvill's work, Scepsis Scientifica, since 
references to this work are nowhere in the first part. These "Further Observations" have 
an internal logic reminiscent of Philosophical and Physical Opinions. The topics progress 
from natural matter and motion through sense and reason, the knowledge of man, the 
body of man, and diseases; however, none of these subjects is discussed 
comprehensively. Finally, the section on the "Opinions of some Ancient Philosophers" is, 
by Cavendish's own admission, a summary of a single source, Thomas Stanley's The 
History of Philosophy. In the end, though there is a central anti-experimental "theme," 
this text is also fundamentally controlled by the texts she has chosen to study. 
Analysis of Science 
In their structure and organization, Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy may resemble the unsophisticated review of literature, yet an 
important element of the advanced review is the identification of "contradictions, gaps, 
and inconsistencies in the literature" (Granello 293), and in both of these treatises, 
10
 Cavendish rarely identifies the philosophers by name, but Eileen O'Neill's edition of Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy provides invaluable references to the various philosophers to whom Cavendish 
refers in her individual chapters. 
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Cavendish identifies problematic aspects which she feels are all too frequent in the 
philosophy of her day. In her earlier works of natural philosophy, her main concern had 
been to formulate a cohesive understanding of the natural world and develop an original 
theory of self-moving matter. Now her focus shifts to understanding the central debates in 
natural philosophy and clarifying, defending and advocating her opinions to others. She 
shows an ability to assimilate and objectively evaluate readings that are often themselves 
widely divergent, and this also allows her to present clearer justifications for her animist 
materialism than in any of her previous works. In addition, her assessments of the flaws 
inherent in various scientific theories or methodologies are often insightful. The 
mechanist world-view from which she dissents alone subsumes a number of conflicting 
perspectives, especially with respect to motion, perception, and the soul, and in 
Philosophical Letters, Cavendish works to make sense of these. Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy raises some of the same issues, though its central focus is the 
many contradictory beliefs and methods that play a part in the early stages of the 
institutionalization of experimentalism. 
Mechanists variously posited an atomic or particulate system, the dualist 
separation of material body and immaterial mind, discrete inanimate matter and animate 
spirit, or a more complete materialism. While her early poems reveal a curiosity about 
both atoms and mechanical systems, Cavendish soon abandoned most of her Epicurean 
atomism and eventually rejected mechanism, recognizing the difficulties in its various 
manifestations, especially with regards to motion. In this she was not alone. Henry 
11
 For more on this, see James, "Philosophical Innovations." In the areas of matter, perception, and change 
(or generation), James suggests that Cavendish had significant insight into the problems of the particulate 
and vitalist theories then in debate. 
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Power, though devoted to mechanism, nonetheless claimed that "the Speculation of 
Motion, and its Origin, [is], as I conceive one of the obscurest things in Nature" (n. pag.; 
"The Preface to the Ingenious Reader"). Though Gassendi posited atoms with internal 
energy, particulate matter was often described as lifeless, inert and moved by an external, 
immaterial agent. Descartes offers an ethereal substance, Power suggests material spirits, 
Charleton a 'faculty motive', while More and the Cambridge Platonists believe an 
immaterial spirit to be the principle of motion. In Hobbes' early materialism, motion 
depended on a fluid ether; later, he suggests the quasi-animist conatus, the impulse 
toward motion. Van Helmont's fully vitalist system also suggests an immaterial dynamic 
principle, the archeus. Cavendish would have none of these. She believed in a unified, 
entirely material natural world. Taking Hobbes' ideas to their limit, the fully-material 
world has motion as an integral part of matter, material in itself. 
Self-moving matter is both an original and more comprehensive alternative. What 
is more, it gives back to Nature the autonomy that is lost in mechanical systems, and to 
Cavendish, the premise that "Nature moveth not by force, but freely" is fundamental and 
inarguable {PL 23). If matter is self-moving, there is no need for external movers or 
internal, immaterial ones. Her justification of self-motion is articulated in the objections 
she directs, first, against Hobbes, whose concept of inertia implies that all motion (or lack 
thereof) is the result of external forces. To Cavendish, this position is untenable when 
applied to perception, memory, understanding, or dreams. Common sense tells us that 
bodies would simply collapse under the repeated strain of Hobbesian pressure, 
compulsion or impulsion: "the pressure of outward objects, pressing the sensitive organs, 
On the various ways motion was described in this period, see Merchant 121-22 and 201-09. 
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and so the Brain or interior parts of the Body ... would cause such dents and holes 
therein, as to make them sore and patched in a short time" (22). Nor can the concussion 
of particles account for the variety of nature. Instead of infinite diversity, the world would 
be made monstrous, since "those pressures would make a strange and horrid confusion of 
Figures, for not any figure would be distinct" (22). Her critique of Cartesian motion 
makes reference to the notion of the watch, an image central to the rhetoric of mechanical 
philosophy.13 She rejects Descartes' definition of motion as "onely a Mode of a thing, 
and not the thing or body it selfe" (97).14 Insisting that motion is material, Cavendish 
declares that "[a] Watch-maker doth not give the watch its motion ... for the motion of 
the watch is the watches own motion, inherent in those parts ever since that matter was" 
(100). Further problems arise with Descartes' suggestion that in the transfer of motion, 
one body gains the motion that the other body loses. If motion is a bodiless abstraction, 
asks Cavendish, "how can motion, being no substance, but onely a mode, quit one body 
and pass into another?" To argue "that neither Motion nor Figure should subsist by 
themselves, and yet be transferrable into other bodies, is very strange, and as much as to 
prove them to be nothing, and yet to say they are something" (98). 
Her arguments concerning matter and motion serve to explain ideas she had 
established in works as early as Philosophical! Fancies, but in Philosophical Letters, 
Cavendish, for the first time, develops an original concept and defends it against potential 
1
 See for example Merchant 220-27 on the clock as the mechanistic symbol of cosmic order. Cavendish 
also briefly refers to the watch in her critique of Hobbes (PL 24). 
14
 Cavendish uses italics to distinguish cited material from her own. Here she quotes from Descartes' 
Principles of Philosophy, pt. 2, art. 25. A modern translation reads, "I want to make it clear that the motion 
of something that moves is, like the lack of motion in a thing which is at rest, a mere mode of that thing and 
not itself a subsistent thing, just as shape is a mere mode of the thing which has shape" (Descartes 233, 
emphasis added). 
110 
opposition. In response to the inadequacy of mechanical explanations, her theory of 
perception depends on a concept of patterning. Just as Hobbesian pressure and force fail 
to describe motion in any reasonable way, Cavendish believes these to be insufficient 
explanations for perception. The onslaught of material sensory stimuli would eventually 
kill us: "the sentient by so many pressures in so many perceptions, would at last be 
pressed to death, besides the organs would take a great deal of hurt, nay totally be 
removed out of their places, so as the eye would in time be prest into the centre of the 
brain" (PL 60). Nature's way is far simpler, and "doth not use such constraint and force" 
(61). Descartes' suggestion that sensory perception reaches the brain by the medium of 
the nerves, as a blind man senses objects by touching them with the end of a stick, has 
equally unreasonable implications: either the motion along the sensory paths is material, 
in which case the object somehow loses some of its substance each time it is observed, or 
the "motion has no body, it is nothing, and how nothing can pass or enter or move some 
body, [she] cannot conceive" (117). Perception has nothing to do with the movement of 
particles or pressure on sense organs. In keeping with the essence of her world-view, it 
depends instead on a harmonious and balanced process: the production by our sensory 
organs of a corresponding or sympathetic copy of an object, followed by a second level 
of 'patterning' in the rational motions. Perceiving one's face reflected in a mirror, for 
example, requires "that the glass in its own substance doth figure out the copy of the face, 
or the like, and from the copy the sensitive motions in the eyes take another copy, and so 
the rational from the sensitive, and in this manner is made both rational and sensitive 
perception, sight and knowledg" (81). Thus perception is not limited to sense organs and 
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the brain, but is spread throughout the sensitive and rational parts. In essence, patterning 
is another kind of auto-kinesis, or self-motion.15 
In Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, she devotes even more attention 
to an extended explanation of all aspects of perception. Three long chapters elaborate a 
more comprehensive statement of her theory of perception, "a full declaration" of her 
opinions concerning "natural knowledge and perception ... [which are] the ground and 
principle, not only of philosophy both speculative and experimental, but of all other arts 
and sciences, nay of all the infinite particular actions of nature" (OEP 137).16 This is the 
synthesized material of Granello's advanced literature review: Cavendish alludes to the 
various mechanists' accounts of sense transmission and perception, the scholastics' view, 
the theories of dioptrical writers, as well as Van Helmont's vitalist opinions; yet she uses 
her own concerns with perception as the "organizational schema to direct the flow of 
information" (Granello 299). Individual points of her own theory are presented in distinct 
numbered articles, much like the structure of works by Hobbes, More, or Charleton.17 
Though all other views are rejected in favor of her own, she tempers her claim "that all 
perception consists in patterning out exterior objects" (OEP 140), allowing for the 
infinite and unknowable variety of nature as well as the possibility of internal "voluntary 
acts of figuring" (170). Granello also suggests that the most advanced literature reviews 
"draw synthesized conclusions logically based on objective evaluations: therefore, 
15
 Though Cavendish does not indicate that she knew of their discussion, More and Descartes had discussed 
something similar in 1649; Hobbes speaks of it in De Corpore, which Cavendish read in its 1656 
translation. 
1
 These three chapters from 35 to 37 (pp. 137-194) almost match the length of the previous thirty-four. 
17
 See for example Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy; More, The Immortality of the Soul; and Charleton, 
Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana. Cavendish uses numbered points (or articles) in chapter 35 
(pp. 137-38) and chapter 37 under "Q. 23" (pp. 191-93). In chapter 35, after twelve brief articles, the 
thirteenth continues without a clear break into over ten pages of more general discussion. 
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readers of these papers can feel secure in the quality of the conclusions reached" (299). 
This portion of Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy shows Cavendish as a 
writer with sufficient understanding of conflicting views to be able to compile and 
explain her own with clarity and conviction. 
The neutral tone and methodical organization are found again in the final section 
of Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, where Cavendish voices her objections 
to the ancient philosophers in brief and systematic chapters broken down into numbered 
points. Many of the ancients, whose ideas she explores through Stanley's overview in 
The History of Philosophy, make reference to immaterial substances. Cavendish rejects 
Thales' idea that God is the soul of the world, since the soul of nature is corporeal. Where 
Plato says the soul is self-moving, she believes natural matter is the same, and she rejects 
that which has no being; that matter has no form; and the immaterial soul of the world 
combined with material body of the world. In addition, she dismisses the Pythagorean 
distinction between body and the incorporeal. She concludes "that most of the ancients 
make a commixture of natural and supernatural; corporeal and incorporeal beings; and of 
animate and inanimate bodies" {OEP 275). Yet she does not wish "to revile or prejudice 
their wit, industry, ingenuity and learning, in the least." Rather she wants to demonstrate 
her originality, clarify her ideas, and "if possible ... find out the truth in natural 
philosophy" (250). 
Cavendish also raises some valid points about the various experimental 
techniques and instruments that natural philosophers employ. Her principal objections 
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come from her belief that the instruments of experimentation are often flawed, the senses 
are not always reliable, the artificiality of experiment does not correspond to what 
happens in nature, and the presumption that experiment is infallible has set natural 
philosophy off in the wrong direction. She includes chemical experimentation in her 
criticism, declaring that "Fire and Furnaces do often delude the Reason, blind the 
Understanding, and make the Judgment stagger" (PL 281). Moreover, experimentation 
carries a high cost: "to become an Artist in Chymistry," means "my time vainly spent, my 
health rashly endangered, and my Noble Lords estate unprofitably wasted, in fruitless 
trials and experiments" (286). She speaks from some experience, for in Antwerp she had 
observed her husband and brother-in-law in the family laboratory, and had even been 
"involved in many of the experiments that most puzzled and fascinated contemporary 
philosophers" (Whitaker 114). In addition, the family owned a number of telescopes, and 
she had her own microscope (Whitaker 99,229). 
Her doubts about optical instruments like the microscope and telescope were not 
unfounded: there were no standards for their construction, lenses often distorted the 
periphery of objects, and lighting issues reduced the clarity of many observations. She 
remarks that "experimental philosophers confess themselves" that "the instrument [is] not 
very exact," and she insightfully predicts that "hereafter there may be many faults 
discovered of our modern microscopes which we are not able to perceive at the present" 
(OEP 60). Telescopes are equally problematic, for "if art be not able to inform us truly of 
the natures of those creatures that are near us; how may it delude us in the search and 
enquiry we make of those things that are so far from us?" (135). From the failure of the 
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instrument, it follows that the accuracy of any microscopic image is suspect. A further 
significant problem is that "there are so many alterations made by several lights, their 
shadows, refractions, reflexions, as also several lines, points, mediums, interposing and 
intermixing parts, forms and positions, as the truth of an object will hardly be known" 
(50). Far from being "the real body of the object" (51), the image is monstrous, 
misshapen, "hermaphroditical" (53)—a mix of natural and artificial, truth and lie. The 
same can be said of any artificial imitation of natural effects; these are as different as 
"chalk and cheese" or "artificial glass, and natural diamonds" (113). In the end, 
Cavendish believes that the best alternative is a return to deductive and speculative 
methods. Careful observation and, more especially, rational thinking will reveal as much 
truth as we can possibly achieve. 
Even if she conceded that a magnified image was true to the external reality of the 
object, it would not follow that these instruments could reveal anything about the internal 
structure or nature of an object. Henry Power's explanation of magnetism by effluvia, for 
example, is unsupportable, since Cavendish "can hardly believe, that any microscope is 
able to show how those flowing atoms enter and issue" (56).18 While it may be intriguing 
to observe the variety of shapes and surfaces of the seeds of corn violets, "it is impossible 
that the exterior shape and structure of bodies can afford us sure and excellent 
instructions to the knowledge of their natures and interior motions, as some do conceive; 
for how shall a feather inform us of the interior nature of a bird?" (70). Consequently, she 
strongly objects to all conclusions drawn about the interior nature of the object based on 
18
 Yet Cavendish had once suggested that magnetic attraction was due to atoms "like to Pincers small" 
shooting out from the North and South Poles (P&F 24). 
115 
external appearances, asserting that the internal self-motion of creatures is not necessarily 
revealed by any external appearance or motion, and "neither is any art able to assist our 
sight with such optic instruments as may give us true information thereof: for what a 
perfect natural eye cannot perceive, surely no glass will be able to present" {OEP 59). 
Cavendish insists that the senses are better than any lifeless, man-made 
instrument, for though the senses are more easily deluded than reason, art is more likely 
to distort than enlighten. In Micrographia, Robert Hooke claims that human error can be 
repaired by "artificial instruments and methods"}9 To Cavendish, this gives unwarranted 
power to a simple object. In Philosophical Letters she even tries to shift responsibility for 
magnification from the lenses of a telescope or microscope to the motions of the eye 
itself, which "double and treble their strength, making the Image of the object 
exceedingly large in the eye" (66). She believes that "much less will dioptrical glasses 
give any true information ... but they rather delude the sight; for art is not only intricate 
and obscure, but a false informer, and rather blinds than informs" {OEP 87). Convinced 
of the "deceitfulness" (135) and "delusion of the glasses" (136), she comes to imply that 
these instruments have some evil will to misrepresent reality: the observation of 
thousands of eyes in the fly is but "a deceit of the optic instrument" (59); and, recounting 
her observation of butterflies emerging from cocoons, she notes that she could not 
distinguish their gender, "except I had some microscope, but a thousand to one I might 
have been also deceived by it" (62). 
Quoted in OEP4%w2\. O'Neill points out that Cavendish alters the beginning of Hooke's quote to read 
simply "By art there may be a reparation made.. ." 
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Microscopes and telescopes may deceive the natural philosopher, but worse to 
Cavendish is the prevalent belief in the supremacy of mankind over all other living 
creatures. In Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, as 
she reiterates her own sense that this is a limiting and deceptive intellectual bias, 
Cavendish illustrates an analytic "process of deconstruction" where "the intentions of the 
author of the presented material" are recognized and evaluated (Anderson 82). Her 
condemnation of these assumptions of man's superiority underpins her interpretation of 
almost every philosopher to whom she responds. When she reads in Leviathan that 
Hobbes believes man is the only creature subject to absurdity, Cavendish observes that 
"the Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the cause of despising other 
Creatures, imagining themselves as petty Gods in Nature" {PL 41). To Henry More's 
claim of the preeminence of Man in Antidote Against Atheisme, Cavendish responds that 
"though he can build a stately House, yet he cannot make a Honey-comb; and though he 
can plant a Slip, yet he cannot make a Tree" (147). Van Helmont is reprimanded for his 
"presumption and arrogancy ... to make Man the chief over all Nature, and to believe 
Nature was onely made for his Sake; when he is but a small finite part of Infinite Nature, 
and almost Nothing in comparison to it" (279). The point is made even more strongly in 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, where Cavendish decries the egotism and 
self-conceit that makes man "[think] himself the chief of all creatures, and that all the 
world is made for his sake; doth also imagine that all other creatures are ignorant, dull, 
stupid, senseless and irrational; and he only wise, knowing and understanding" (219). She 
further associates presumptions of superiority with the self-delusion that leads 
mechanical experimentalists to believe that they can manipulate nature into revealing true 
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causes and effects; she contends that "neither can natural causes nor effects be 
overpowered by man so, as if man was a degree above nature, but they must be as nature 
is pleased to order them; for man is but a small part, and his powers are but particular 
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actions of nature, and therefore he cannot have a supreme and absolute power" (49). 
Critical Evaluation 
Her open censure of the unstated assumptions informing many philosophical 
proposals represents a point at which analysis crosses over into evaluation and judgment, 
and while this indicates her accession to the highest cognitive levels, it also signals 
Cavendish's tendency to function outside the boundaries of civil interaction. In A Social 
History of Truth, Steven Shapin notes that, "[in] general, the practice of opposition was 
recognized as a serious threat to the good order of civil conversation. ... The corrosive 
effects of opposition and obstinancy were not worth the cause of truth for which they 
were allegedly enlisted" (116). In her critiques, Cavendish almost exclusively takes a 
dissenting position. Her analysis of various scientific notions and methods can be 
insightful, and she makes attempts to remain detached and impartial; however, she 
struggles to "present both sides of an argument with a minimum of researcher bias" 
(Granello 299), and the ways in which she engages in her critique repeatedly challenge 
the value-neutrality of her claims. The tone of her appraisals is at various times 
argumentative, belligerent, or cynical, and her attacks often seem to be personal rather 
than intellectual. She tends towards the dangerously uncivil ad hominem style, which, in 
gentlemanly circles, should "at all costs be avoided, for the risk ... of making foes out of 
20
 This recalls Cavendish's declarations about man's presumption of "Supreme knowledge" in both PP055 
(40)andPPO63(lll) . 
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mere dissenters" (Shapin and Schaffer 73). At a time when "[good] manners might be 
recognized as a sign of good intellectual matter" (Shapin 223), her uncivil and 
judgmental tone adds to the already-substantial impediments of her gender and admitted 
educational shortcomings. Though she believed in the value of her opinions and was 
determined to prove their merit, in the eyes of the philosophical community, Cavendish's 
contentious and "ungentlemanly" approach would have significantly undermined her 
evaluative commentary. 
By arranging both texts, at least to some extent, as responses to specific 
individuals, Cavendish sets up a situation where even objective critique might be 
construed as personal attack; still, at times she is quite openly disparaging and 
discourteous. In Philosophical Letters this is most often clear in her discussion of the 
opinions of Henry More and Van Helmont. In The Immortality of the Soul, More claims 
that self-motion grants too much authority to "mere Matter" (65; bk. 1, ch. 12, art. 1); he 
derides ideas of self moving matter like Cavendish's as nothing but 
Absurdities ... so mad and extravagant, that a man would scarce defile his 
pen by recording them, were it not to awaken those that dote so much on 
the power of Matter (as to think of it self sufficient for all Phaenomena in 
the world) into due shame and abhorrence of their foolish Principle. (115; 
bk. 2, ch. 6, art. 6). 
Cavendish chooses to respond by attacking his theories, declaring, 
my opinion of self-corporeal motion and perception, may be as 
demonstrable as that of Immaterial Natural Spirits, which, in my mind, is 
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not demonstrable at all ... For how can that be naturally demonstrable, 
which naturally is nothing? (PL 177) 
Though she shares with More a distaste for mechanical explanations of motion, she 
cannot accept his alternative of an immaterial "active Principle of Motion" (64; bk. 1, ch. 
11, art. 8), and she is unequivocal in her opinions. It is beyond reason and common sense 
to believe that immaterial substances are capable of moving material substances. Finding 
self-moving immaterial spirits as absurd as More finds self-moving matter, Cavendish 
berates More and other philosophers like him who feel they do God a service by 
representing Nature as "stupid, ignorant, foolish and mad" (PL 163) and then see 
themselves as wise though they are part of "foolish" nature. Nature has no need for 
"some Immaterial or Incorporeal substance to move, rule, guide or govern her, but she is 
able enough to do it all her self, by the free Gift of the Omnipotent God" (194). 
According to More, since mankind is capable of far more than matter alone, man must be 
imbued with immaterial spirit, a natural soul which is incorporeal, indivisible, self-
moving, able to penetrate, contract and dilate itself and also to move and alter matter. 
Cavendish is derisive in pointing out the flaws in More's reasoning. It is "absurd and 
ridiculous" to believe that immaterial substances are capable of moving material 
substances (198). Even more absurd is More's concept of the small soul that dilates as the 
body grows; it implies that a person who loses a limb has a diminished soul and "if a 
dwarf, the soul must be a dwarf also" (209). The immaterial is, quite simply, unnatural— 
or supernatural, in which case it is a subject for divinity and not natural philosophy. 
Cavendish, like Hobbes, posits instead a material soul, "not composed of rags and shreds, 
but ... the purest, simplest and subtillest matter in Nature" (180). She acknowledges that 
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"there may be supernatural spiritual beings or substances in Nature, without any 
hinderance to Matter or corporeal Nature" (225), but ideas of immaterial minds are 
nothing but "Hobgoblins to fright Children withal" (187). 
Henry More is not her only target on this topic. Cavendish is equally critical of 
Van Helmont's natural theory, which is undermined by its immaterial foundations; not 
only does Van Helmont draw inspiration from gauzy "Visions, Apparitions, and Dreams" 
(PL 239), but his Ideas, Archeus, Gas, Bias and Ferment are all incorporeal "Non-beings" 
(242). She freely admits that his "obscure, intricate and perplex" (241) principles are 
confusing, but blames him for needless complication: "Nature is easie to be understood, 
and without any difficulty, so as we stand in no need to frame so many strange names, 
able to fright anybody" (238). Cavendish adds to her critique by ridiculing his Ideal 
Entity, comparing it to a mechanical "Jack in a Clock" in its "admirable powers to put off 
and on Corporeality and Incorporeality, and to make it self Something and Nothing as 
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often as it has occasion" (242). In her discussion of his work, she continually returns to 
the fundamental problem of ascribing supernatural (and thus immaterial) causes to 
natural and material phenomena. Van Helmont claims spirits make up more than half the 
world; Cavendish wonders how bodiless spirits which "possess no place at all" can 
occupy half the world (320). Van Helmont suggests that diseases have a material 
existence, but life has no substance; Cavendish replies that "since he names Diseases the 
Thieves of Life, they must needs be poor Thieves, because they steal No-thing" (347). 
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 Especially in the first letters analyzing Van Helmont, Cavendish quotes more extensively from his texts 
than she does with other philosophers. Granello suggests that overreliance on quotation is a sign of a 
fundamentally weak comprehension of a text: "Students are unable to translate the ideas of the source 
authors into their own words and, thus, overuse quotes" (Granello 298). 
The Jack in the Clock, also called Jack o' the clock, clock-jack, or jacquemart, is a mechanical figure 
(automaton) that strikes the hours on the bell of a clock. 
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Van Helmont calls rainbows a divine mystery, thunder and lightning signs from the devil, 
and earthquakes a judgment from God. He includes biblical interpretation in his 
discussion of nature, stating for example that Adam "defloured [Eve] by force" (312), 
and that the consequence was the growth of animalistic facial hair. To Cavendish, these 
explanations ignore natural causes and indicate further the profound presumption on the 
part of philosophers, who are so "conceited with their own perfections and abilities ... as 
to make themselves God's privy Councilors, and his Companions, and partakers of all 
the sacred Mysteries, Designs, and hidden secrets of the Incomprehensible and Infinite 
God" (314). 
Cavendish also makes stinging comments about the methodologies that natural 
philosophers employ in their writing and research. While in both texts her remarks are 
most often directed towards experimentalism, in Philosophical Letters she includes any 
form of philosophy other than deductive reasoning among her targets. She criticizes 
Hobbes for his demonstrations "done most by art'" (PL 95).23 Later, she confesses to be 
baffled by mathematicians who wish to "inchant Nature with Circles ... as if she were ... 
mad," geometricians who measure nature down to the atom, natural philosophers who 
stuff Nature "with dull, dead, senseless minima's," chemists or alchemists who torture 
Nature into nothingness, and "natural Theologers ... for they make such a gallamalfry of 
Philosophy and Divinity, as neither can be distinguished from the other" (491). The 
reader is left to applaud her confessed ignorance of "their Scholastical Arts, as Logick, 
Metaphysick, Mathematicks, and the like" (490). However, her most extensive and 
This may refer to the many geometrical proofs in Elements of Philosophy or, more generally, to his 
rhetorical technique, which in her eyes is an 'artificial' means of argument. 
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concerted attacks are reserved for those philosophers who believe that great truths will be 
revealed by the media of instruments or by setting up artificial situations. At various 
times in Philosophical Letters, she characterizes Van Helmont, "the famous Philosopher 
and Chymist" (234), as rash, presumptuous, and even slightly dim, declaring that he "is 
so taken with Fire, that from thence he imagines a Formal Light ... but certainly, he had, 
in my opinion, not so much light" (281). While Cavendish was intrigued by the work of 
Harvey, Galileo, and Boyle, she nonetheless concludes that experimentalists, "with their 
penetrations, pressings, squeezings, and the like, make such holes in her [Nature], as they 
do almost wound, press and squeeze her to death" (489). True or "Pure" natural 
philosophers need only "natural sense and reason" (281). Despite their various 
instruments, glasses, tubes, engines and stills, experimentalists are merely artists, little 
better than workmen or laborers. 
Practical experimentation, but more specifically experimental philosophers, are 
most powerfully disparaged in Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy. Targeting 
Hooke's Micrographia specifically, Cavendish belittles experimental devices by saying 
that at best, "artificial things are pretty toys to employ idle time" (OEP 105). 
Micrography has "intoxicated so many men's brains" that "all better arts and studies are 
left aside" (51). These men are "as boys that play with watery bubbles or fling dust into 
each other's eyes, or make a hobbyhorse of snow ... worthy of reproof rather than praise, 
for wasting their time with useless sports" (52). Aside from all other considerations, she 
wonders how "a fool [can] order his understanding by art" or how "a wise man [can] trust 
his senses ... if the sense be defective, either through age, sickness, or other accidents" 
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(49). Summarizing her profound suspicion of both experimental philosophers and their 
tools, she declares, 
But I observe, experimental philosophers do first cry up several of their 
artificial instruments, then make doubts of them, and at last disprove them; 
so that there is no trust nor truth in them, to be relied on: For, it is not an 
age since weather glasses were held the only divulgers of heat and cold, or 
change of weather; and now some do doubt, they are not such infallible 
informers of those truths. By which it is evident, that experimental 
philosophy has but a brittle, inconstant, and uncertain ground. And these 
artificial instruments, as microscopes, telescopes, and the like, which are 
now so highly applauded, who knows but they may within a short time 
have the same fate; and upon a better and more rational enquiry, be found 
deluders, rather than true informers. (98) 
In her opinion, the inventors of optical instruments have done the world a great 
disservice. Those experimental philosophers taken with micrography, like Hooke or 
Henry Power, have become "unprofitable subjects to the commonwealth of learning"; 
their work has done nothing "for the better increase of vegetables and brute animals to 
nourish our bodies, or better and commodious contrivances in the art of architecture to 
build us houses, or for advancing of trade and traffic, or ... to make men live in unity, 
peace, and neighbourly friendship" (51). More generally, all experimental philosophy 
leads its followers astray, for after drawing faulty conclusions from "artificial trials," 
learned men too frequently "judge that all natural actions are made the same way" as that 
trial seemingly reveals (100). Cavendish suggests, in fact, that Nature has such a love of 
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variety that she will playfully misrepresent herself in artifice. There is no surety to be 
drawn from experimental results, since through Nature's whims these could be 
completely different one day to the next: 
Wherefore those that employ their time in artificial experiments, consider 
only nature's sporting or playing actions; but those that view her wise 
government, in ordering all her parts, and consider her changes, 
alterations, and tempers in particulars, and their causes, spend their time 
more usefully and profitable: and truly, to what purpose should a man beat 
his brains, and weary his body with labours about that wherein he shall 
lose more time, than gain knowledge? (OEP 105). 
Ironically, she suggests that experiment is better suited to women, who have time on their 
hands and no responsibility to improve society's lot; "and then would men have reason to 
employ their time in more profitable studies, than in useless experiments" (105). The 
experimental "or mode philosophy" (99) has come to prevail in large part because men 
are unwilling to accept the limitations of their finite understanding of infinite nature; 
however, an understanding of nature's wise government is only accessible if the variety 
of nature's actions is acknowledged and if the pairing of sense and art is rejected in favor 
of sense and reason. 
Dis/Engaging the Audience 
In Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, as 
Cavendish develops her own version of the literature review, she moves between testing 
her opinions against other philosophies and judging other ideas, sometimes quite harshly, 
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in light of her own. The persistent consciousness of her audience with which she carries 
out her analysis is often ambiguous. Though her extensive reading drives her to look 
inwards in self-criticism, it also serves to renew and even increase her confidence in her 
own writing and the value of her ideas. She wishes to express her opinions "as other 
Philosophers do" {PL; "A Preface to the Reader") and she sets out to justify for herself a 
position within the realm of "eminent and ingenious writers" (OEP 9; "The Preface to the 
Ensuing Treatise"). Where her earlier concern was to present the natural world in a way 
that corresponded to her social reality—both civil war and restored political order—now 
the social reality that interests her is that of the intellectual community. Yet at the same 
time she presents her opinion as the external standard by which other theories are 
evaluated. In these texts, hers is a voice of authority, independent of any discourse or 
civil exchange of opinions. 
These two works present Cavendish simultaneously reaching out to her audience 
while keeping her distance, forging a place for herself alongside her peers while risking 
their alienation. In order to manage her status within the written 'conversation' that she 
composes, Cavendish presents her work with profuse apologies, but also with forceful 
defenses of her right to dissent. She uses rhetorical techniques that reach out differently 
to both her philosophical audience and her common readership, all the while using 
diction and syntax that appear to disengage her from the opinions she propounds. She 
forges a sense of unity with her readers and yet also establishes for herself a removed 
position of authority. Finally, there is an ambiguity to Cavendish's engagement with the 
very opinions she elaborates: these are represented both as original products of her 
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unique mind and as the authoritative precepts of a universal reasoning power. This 
tension between her desire for engagement and her tendency to retreat into seclusion, 
between objective and contentious analysis, reveals the complexity of negotiating the 
waters of scientific discourse. 
Realizing that her work often appears to be needlessly argumentative and 
anticipating the potential outrage of her readers, Cavendish apologizes in advance, but at 
the same time she makes clear her conviction that her methods are justified and her work 
is worthwhile. In Philosophical Letters, the spectre of the civil war still haunts her 
prefaces, in which dissent in philosophical discourse is associated with political rebellion. 
Her anxiety about causing offense is obvious when she writes to her husband, "I was 
afraid that your Lordship would be angry with me for Writing and Publishing this Book, 
by Reason it is a Book of Controversies, of which I have heard your Lordship say, That 
Controversies and Disputations make Enemies of Friends" ("To His Excellency The Lord 
Marquis of Newcastle"). However, she then tells her readers that "Contradictions are 
better in general Books, then in particular Families, and in Schools better then in Publick 
States" ("A Preface to the Reader"). In the opening epistle, she likens her fear of taking 
on so many illustrious philosophers to being "commanded ... to get upon a high Rock, 
and fling myself into the Sea, where neither Ship, nor Plank, nor any kind of help was 
near to rescue me" (1). Yet these thoughts give way to some hope: "on the other side I 
considered first, that those Worthy Authours, were they my censurers, would not deny me 
the same liberty they take themselves; which is, that I may dissent from their Opinions, as 
well as they dissent from others, and from amongst themselves" (2). In so asserting her 
127 
right to dissent, Cavendish finds justification for the argumentative approach of her 
letters. Furthermore, she points out the value of juxtaposing contrasting views: her 
philosophical opinions become all the more "perspicuous and intelligible by the 
Opposition of other Opinions, since two opposite things placed near each other, are the 
better discerned" (2). Her intention is not to ridicule other ideas to elevate her own, but 
rather to present opposing views in peaceful coexistence. It is to the ultimate profit of all 
that dissenting opinions be heard, "[for] as Lawyers are not Enemies to each other, but 
great Friends, all agreeing from the Barr, although not at the Barr: so it is with 
Philosophers, who make their Opinions as their Clients, not for Wealth, but for Fame, and 
therefore have no reason to become Enemies to each other, by being Industrious in their 
Profession" ("To His Excellency The Lord Marquis of Newcastle"). 
In Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, Cavendish appears both more 
confident in her own ideas and more resigned to their dismissal. She justifies her 
"controversies" more assertively, claiming "[it] may be, the world will judge it a fault in 
me, that I oppose so many eminent and ingenious writers: but I do it not out of a 
contradicting and wrangling nature, but out of an endeavour to find out truth, or at least 
the probability of truth" (9; "The Preface to the Ensuing Treatise"). Ironically, given her 
own tendency to pick and choose, her reader is not so much requested as told to read her 
earlier works: "if you'll give an impartial judgment of my philosophy, read it all, or else 
spare your censures" (13; "To the Reader"). With both foresight and anxiety, she 
attempts to "hinder and obstruct as many objections as could be made against the ground 
of [her] opinions"; however, she realizes that it is impossible to anticipate the "endless 
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objections" that confront her (13). Her experiences have led her to believe that there is a 
great deal of folly and malice in the world, and now she merely hopes that her 
philosophy, though "slighted now and buried in silence ... may perhaps rise more 
gloriously hereafter ... [and] meet with an age where she will be more regarded" (12). 
There is a melancholic overtone in such declarations, yet Cavendish concludes that this is 
simply more evidence of the "poised and balanced" actions of nature (13). At its core, 
this justification is similar to what she offers in Philosophical Letters; Cavendish still 
believes in the productive tension arising from the coexistence of opposites, but 
acknowledges that balance may only occur across time. 
However, more often in Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy her defense 
of her work amounts to an attack on the folly of other writers. After admitting how 
difficult she found her readings in natural philosophy, Cavendish turns and attacks the 
obtuseness of philosophical language, and by extension, its writers: "their hard words did 
more obstruct, than instruct me. The truth is, if anyone intends to write philosophy, either 
in English, or any other language, he ought to consider the propriety of the language, as 
much as the subject he writes of; or else what purpose would it be to write?" {OEP 11; 
"To the Reader"). The natural philosophers of her time, she complains, do nothing but 
"confuse truth and falsehood," and borrow so much from the ancients that they "are like 
those unconscionable men in civil wars, which endeavour to pull down the hereditary 
mansions of noblemen, to build a cottage of their own" (8). Moreover, their motives are 
suspect: "they will rather maintain absurdities and errors ... for, they would fain be above 
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nature, and petty gods" (112). Her concern with "gentlemanly" discourse is noticeably 
diminished. 
This also proves to be true in Cavendish's use of the language of probability. On 
the surface, the frequent references to probability in Philosophical Letters appear to add a 
degree of civility to her arguments by associating her with the new institutionalization of 
natural philosophy, just as her claim to plain style had done in Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions. In both cases, she shows her awareness of the ways in which her 
writing is part of a social interaction. Employing the idea of probability in her texts 
indicates Cavendish's acknowledgement that there is "a way of formulating responses in 
certain circumstances" and also provides her reader with "a way of recognizing the kind 
of message being transmitted" (Bazerman 62). Shapin notes that in the seventeenth 
century, the meaning of "probable" shifted from its earlier sense of "opinion warranted 
by authoritative and respected sources" to "a quality of uncertain knowledge apportioned 
to the evidence available" (198). According to the gentlemanly code of the time, 
theoretical matters should be debated in terms of probability because "[it] was not to be 
expected that men could attain that certainty about theories that they could about facts" 
(Shapin 125). "Probable" was a term that allowed for dissent within the restrictions of 
civil interaction; as such, it was recommended by the Royal Society that natural 
philosophy be couched in terms of probability rather than certainty. 
Yet Cavendish's particular use of the idea of probability, or more often, 
/^probability, is to dismiss the ideas of other philosophers, and this adds to the conflict 
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between engagement and disengagement in her writing. She tells her correspondent that 
Hobbes's idea of vital motions "appears improbable if not impossible to me" {PL 45); 
More's suggestion that man can conceive of God is similarly "not probable" (141); Van 
Helmont's claim of the powers of the moon are "said without any probability of Truth" 
(266), and his concept of propagation "seems improbable to my reason" (329). 
Ultimately, Cavendish does not strengthen her link to her philosophical peers. In fact, she 
turns the notion of probability back on them, by using the very language of probability to 
criticize those who assume it increases the validity and credibility of their ideas. By 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, references to probability are fewer. 
Cavendish appears to have abandoned hope of acceptance, for far more striking is her 
dismissal of scientific propositions as simply unbelievable. Forgoing the polite notion of 
probability to soften her dissent, Cavendish instead emphasizes that she "can hardly 
believe," "cannot approve," or "cannot admire" the ideas of others.24 In so doing, 
Cavendish establishes an impassable chasm between herself and her philosophical peers; 
not only does she all but accuse them of lies, but in her negative diction she also seems to 
discount any possibility of compromise or assent. 
In a similarly contradictory way, Cavendish reaches out to her general readership 
with appeals to their shared capacities and yet also distances herself by implying her 
intellectual superiority. By its epistolary nature, Philosophical Letters implies an 
intimacy between writer and correspondent. The parity between Cavendish and her reader 
is emphasized when, from the very beginning, she asks her correspondent for "the help 
and assistance of your Favour, that according to that real and intire Affection you bear to 
While these expressions are used repeatedly, see for example OEP 56, 57, 90. 
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me, you would be pleased to tell me unfeignedly, if I should chance to err or contradict 
but the least probability of truth in any thing" (4). In Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy, Cavendish invites the approbation of her "Courteous Reader" (13; "To the 
Reader"), and expresses her confidence that "the ingenuous reader" will be able to 
interpret "the true meaning" of her work (14). Additionally, in Philosophical Letters, as 
in the second edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions, Cavendish repeatedly 
invokes a universal "humane sense and reason" (PL 11) to indicate that her judgments 
reflect a capacity shared by all readers.25 In fact, she asserts that "if any one can bring 
more Sense and Reason to disprove these my opinions, I shall not repine or grieve" (PL; 
"A Preface to the Reader"). In Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, the 
expression is used less frequently, but to similar effect: for example, Cavendish calls 
upon her reader to agree that "human sense and reason perceives, that the parts of the 
earth do undergo perpetual alterations" (OEP 132), or that "our sense and reason can 
perceive" that nature is a mix of animate and inanimate matter (157). These aspects of her 
texts invoke the readers' sense of their own intellectual potential and capacity to fairly 
judge the ideas before them. However, just as often, Cavendish situates herself as the 
authority who can enlighten less knowledgeable readers. Philosophical Letters is set up 
as a series of answers to questions from her correspondent; furthermore, within the 
letters, Cavendish frequently develops her discussion through a series of hypothetical 
questions to which she responds. Even the style suggests her superior reasoning abilities 
and thus her intellectual distance from the reader. She presents her correspondent's 
As noted in chapter 2 of this thesis, claims of common sense could be problematic, but Cavendish's 
gentle audience would be assumed to be generally immune to vulgar errors. In Philosophical Letters, 
examples of "sense and reason" alone are too numerous to list; however, for the modifiers "humane" or 
"common" sense and reason, see also 152, 160, 162, 165, 166,230,245,317,416,417,420,434,465,481, 
482,488, 514, and 515. 
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misapprehensions by writing, "y°u maY say..." and then authoritatively declares, "I 
answer..." before elucidating her opinions. This same style is used in Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy, and though the tone is friendly and the situation appears 
casually conversational, she creates doubt about whether the reader's 'common sense' is 
really of the same worth as her own. 
Perhaps most nebulous is Cavendish's affiliation with her own ideas. At times she 
vehemently claims ownership of her opinions, while at other times she defers to reason, 
embodied as a figure of authority. Both cases, moreover, can either link her to her readers 
or set her apart. In Philosophical Letters, when it is not common sense and reason that are 
invoked, it is often the authorial voice that qualifies the pair: "my sense and reason."27 
This has the effect of distinguishing her thinking from her audience's even as it invokes 
its agreement. In Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, the frequency and 
forcefulness of the first-person pronoun asserts Cavendish's ownership of her ideas; 
expressions such as "I cannot approve the opinion," "I answer," "I grant," "I will add," 
and "I mean" abound.28 Yet there is a double message behind this self-assured "I": it sets 
her out as an authority, but it also overtly declares opinions so personal and unique that 
they cannot be offensive to any reader, as they allow for the coexistence of an infinite 
variety of alternate opinions. At the same time, reason (or sense and reason) is also often 
represented as a commanding figure that Cavendish has judiciously chosen to consult; 
26
 Question and answer styles are found in PL, Section 1, letters 26, 27, 31, 32; Section 2, letters 2, 9,13; 
Section 4, letters 2,4, 11, 15, 17, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 44. In OEP, this style occurs in chapter 
37 of the first part (pp. 155-94); chapter 20 of "Further Observations" (pp. 232-241); and sporadically 
throughout "Observations on the Ancients." 
27
 PL 241, emphasis added. See also PL 227, 237, 280, 412, 419,477, etc. On 237 alone, the possessive 
adjective is repeated four times. 
28
 OEP 57; 87; 147; 155; 159; and many more instances. 
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this situates her alongside her readers by implying that, through their reading of her work, 
they are together seeking the wisdom of the same expert. When she "is not altogether 
capable to understand your Authors opinions in Natural Philosophy" {PL 275), or when 
she "cannot conceive" the logic of what she is studying, she claims that "my reason 
perswadeth me" (38). Her readers benefit together with her: she also declares that "if we 
observe well," then "sense and reason inform us" (147, 133; emphasis added). Reason is 
a figure that Cavendish sometimes identifies with, but sometimes simply channels. She 
makes claims "according to my reason" while dismissing others that "human sense and 
reason will contradict" (62, 166). In Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy she 
voices Reason's authority most openly: "I only endeavour to deliver my judgment as 
reason directs me" (136). Thus Cavendish does not claim her opinions alone; she is 
assisted by a greater authority, and so is exempt from ultimate responsibility for veracity. 
In her natural philosophy, Cavendish has always acknowledged her readership, 
most obviously in extensive prefatory material. What distinguishes these two works 
under discussion is a complex engagement that goes far beyond prefaces and epistles to 
the reader. These two volumes reach out in sustained and significant ways, in their genre, 
structure, language, and content. The epistolary genre of Philosophical Letters connects 
her to outside readers through the intermediary of the imaginary correspondent; the 
rhetoric of debate in Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy similarly gives the 
reader a sense of an ongoing discussion with the author. Both texts are organized by a 
reasonably systematic interaction with various ideas, theories and methods, and 
consequently, the scientific content shows her far broader knowledge of her peers and 
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predecessors. In both works, Cavendish chooses a direct, plain style over the extended 
analogical constructions of earlier works; this brings her writing closer to the conventions 
of academic or philosophical writing. 
In many ways, the final preface to Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy 
epitomizes everything she wishes to accomplish in both works; in fact, Cavendish gives it 
the subtitle, "Concerning some principal subjects in natural philosophy; necessary for the 
better understanding, not only of this, but all other philosophical works, hitherto written 
by the authoress" (23; "An Argumental Discourse"). It is a review, analysis, and 
assessment of philosophical ideas, all presented as a contentious discourse between 
different factions in her brain. In this "war in [her] mind," her "former conceptions" (23) 
generally triumph over the newly-formed "latter thoughts" (24), which indicates that, 
while she has reflected on contemporary arguments, Cavendish remains convinced of her 
established earlier opinions on self-moving matter, perception, immaterialism, and other 
topics. Moreover, the former thoughts have sufficient weight and value to sway their 
opponents in debate, just as Cavendish believes that her opinions can stand and even 
prevail against those of her philosophical peers. However, before this occurs in the 
"Argumental Discourse," the debate becomes sufficiently heated to require the assistance 
of an unbiased authority. Peace is restored when "some rational thoughts, which were not 
concerned in the dispute" (41) step in, yet rather than settle matters themselves, these 
thoughts propound "that the sensitive parts should publicly declare their differences and 
controversies, and refer them to the arbitration of the judicious and impartial reader" (42). 
This is an intriguing depiction of how Cavendish justifies her contentious texts and 
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negotiates their reception. Social order does not depend on quelling dissenting voices, but 
on allowing them a fair hearing. In addition, the burden of assessment is neither on her 
nor the philosophers she critiques; it is on the audience, who are implored to "be 
impartial in your judgment" and to "let regular sense and reason be your only rule, that 
you may be accounted just judges" (42). 
At the same time, and as both Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy have so frequently demonstrated, engagement and interaction 
always subsume some measure of disengagement and isolation. Though Cavendish 
envisions herself taking part in intellectual dialogue, by illustrating a discourse that takes 
place within her mind, she highlights her exclusion. Outside some correspondence with 
Huygens, Charleton, and Glanvill, her philosophical conversations are primarily internal. 
In the atomic poems, Cavendish had also represented herself withdrawing into the world 
of her thoughts, but "An Argumental Discourse" foreshadows the more thorough retreats 
apparent in her final two works of natural philosophy, Blazing World and Grounds of 
Natural Philosophy. Insofar as "An Argumental Discourse" stands in for Philosophical 
Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, it comes to show that 
Cavendish may have been able to navigate a course through the seas of scientific 
discourse; however, after testing the waters in these two works, she goes in search of 
other shores. 
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CHAPTER 4: "For in her self so many Creatures be"1 
Blazing World and Grounds of Natural Philosophy 
One of the most frequently recounted events in Margaret Cavendish's life is her 
1667 visit to the Royal Society. The Duchess was a figure of London gossip at the time, 
for her masculine pretensions to authorship, her outrageous dress, and her defiance of 
social conventions. She had recently appeared at a public playhouse in a costume which 
bared her breasts, suggesting "the heroic women of antiquity and heroic romances," and 
she had presented herself to the visiting Queen of Sweden accompanied by a female 
train-bearer, violating court etiquette which "allowed only the woman of highest status in 
a company to have a female train-bearer" (Whitaker 294, 296). In his diaries, Samuel 
Pepys, intrigued by her reputation, reports her behavior and appearance on numerous 
occasions, including some detail of the unprecedented visit to the recently-established 
Royal Society by such a notorious woman.2 Cavendish's visit was unusual for reasons 
beyond gender or social infamy.3 Her most recent publication openly criticized the 
Society's, and more pointedly, Hooke's, experimental techniques and results. Not only 
had she explicitly attacked the value of the microscope and other instruments, but Blazing 
World, the companion piece to Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, included 
further mockery of the Royal Society's beliefs, aspirations and methods. Though some 
members of the Royal Society were hesitant to invite her, Walter Charleton and others 
1SL 10. 
2
 Both Samuel Pepys (246) and John Evelyn (482-83) recorded their impressions of the day in their diaries. 
Samuel Mintz gives the most detailed modern account of Cavendish's visit to the Royal Society. See also 
Whitaker 299-300; Battigelli 110-13; and Jones 162-63. 
3
 Cavendish's visit is especially unusual because women were excluded from the Royal Society for nearly 
three hundred years. In 1902, Hertha Marks Ayrton was the first woman to be nominated for membership, 
but she could not be elected on die grounds that she was married. The Royal Society did not admit women 
as members until 1945, when Kathleen Lonsdale and microbiologist Marjory Stephenson were elected. 
137 
spoke up in her defence, and the extraordinary visit took place. Cavendish viewed 
demonstrations of the cohesive forces between polished marble plates, of magnetic 
forces, and of the effects of acids; she saw how the air-pump could assist in measuring 
the weight of air; she was shown a louse under the microscope and various spectacular 
chemical reactions. At the end of it all, she declared only "that she was full of admiration, 
all admiration" (Pepys 246). 
Her very public appearances at court and at the Royal Society seem to be 
fulfillments of her long-held desire for interaction and recognition, among her scientific 
peers as well as society as a whole, and it is tempting to regard this as a seminal event for 
Cavendish as a natural philosopher, a turning point that may have either entrenched or 
altered her views on experimentation. Yet on the day, as Pepys notes with great 
disappointment, Cavendish was essentially a silent observer. Moreover, her subsequent 
and final piece of natural philosophy, Grounds of Natural Philosophy, is without 
comment on the experience. Instead, this visit illustrates another of the diverse ways that 
she ambiguously combines engagement and display with exile and retreat It also marks a 
period in which multiplicity is more completely synthesized in her writing and ideas. In 
their content, structure, and language, Blazing World and Grounds of Natural Philosophy 
demonstrate that the essence of her natural theory is multiplicity and variety. These two 
works manifest this through variations of synthesis, a term which implies the 
development of complexity and the simplification of form, the coalescence of prior 
constituents and the creation of new products. These texts are Cavendish's final works 
concerning natural philosophy, yet both suggest infinite possibility for more. 
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The Description of a New Blazing World, best known as Blazing World, and 
Grounds of Natural Philosophy, are possibly the two most dissimilar of Cavendish's 
texts. Initially published in 1666 as a companion piece to Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy, Blazing World has drawn more critical attention from 
Cavendish scholars than any of her other texts.4 Cavendish describes it as "a work of 
fancy," paired with her serious natural philosophy in order to divert and delight both her 
readers and herself (BW 5; "To the reader").5 It tells the story of a young lady kidnapped 
and taken to the ends of the earth, only to pass through to a parallel world in which she 
becomes Empress and eventually is able to return to protect the country of her youth. The 
story is not merely one of romance and adventure, however: set within the central 
narrative are several sub-plots in which scientific and philosophical notions figure 
importantly.6 The first is a lengthy discussion between the newly-named Empress and her 
natural philosophers, astronomers, experimentalists, chemists, physicians, and 
mathematicians, framed as the Empress's verification of the progress made by "her new-
found societies of the virtuosos" (21). The Empress embarks on a similarly elaborate 
conference with immaterial spirits on the topics of mysticism, divinity, self-motion, 
knowledge, and the soul, culminating in her decision to make a Cabbala. For this 
4
 Critics whose work focuses specifically on Blazing World include Carrie Hintz, Sarah Hutton, "Science 
and Satire," Claire Jowitt, Rosemary Kegl, Lee Cullen Khanna, Marina Leslie, Kate Lilley, Nicole Pohl, 
Bronwen Price, "Journeys Beyond Frontiers," Elizabeth Spiller, Rachel Trubowitz, and Geraldine Wagner. 
Their discussions range through explorations of feminist allusions, Utopian themes, innovations of genre, 
political subtext, rhetorical sources, and desire for fame. Others who examine Blazing World alongside 
other Cavendish texts include Sylvia Bowerbank, "The Spider's Delight"; Eve Keller, "Producing Petty 
Gods"; Linda R. Payne; Lisa T. Sarasohn, "A Science Turned Upside Down" and "Leviathan and the 
Lady"; and Sandra Sherman. 
5
 Though Susan James's edition of Blazing World is paginated continuously, I will also provide the title of 
any paratexrual material where appropriate. 
There are also significant political allusions; these are noted especially in James's edition of Blazing 
World, which also includes Orations of Divers Sorts. 
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purpose, she engages the soul of the Duchess of Newcastle herself as scribe.7 The two 
women become great friends, "platonic lovers" in fact (70), and discuss the failings of 
various ancient and modern philosophers as well as exploring the possibility of alternate 
worlds. 
In 1668, not long after her visit to the Royal Society, came Grounds of Natural 
Philosophy, Cavendish's only new volume of natural philosophy in the five years 
remaining before her death.8 In stark contrast to the fantasy of Blazing World, this is a 
terse, summarized account of her earlier theories, far less polemical than her letters and 
comments on experimentation. She refers to Grounds of Natural Philosophy as the 
second edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions, but though there are many topics 
in common, the altered title establishes a new solidity and permanence: these are 
fundamental concepts, basic truths, indisputable facts. The main text is divided into 
thirteen parts, progressing quickly through matter, creatures, productions, man, the mind, 
irregularities (both physical and mental), knowledge, elements, minerals and metals. This 
is followed by a lengthy appendix, divided into five parts, which examines immaterial 
spirits, and invisible, regular and irregular worlds. The final section of this appendix is 
organized somewhat differently: subdivided into fifteen parts, it is a discussion within her 
mind about the possibility of restoring-beds which allow for a rebirth of natural matter 
into a new form. 
In the subsequent discussion of Blazing World, I will refer to the character of Margaret Cavendish, 
Duchess of Newcastle as "the Duchess," while the author herself is simply denoted as "Cavendish." 
8
 In the same year, she had reprinted slightly amended versions of both Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy and Blazing World. 
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Synthesis and Creation 
Though the appendix digresses from Cavendish's study of natural phenomena, the 
major part of Grounds of Natural Philosophy constitutes a synthesis of fifteen years of 
reflection on science. In it, she combines the theory of matter elaborated in Philosophical 
and Physical Opinions with the ideas she has read and evaluated through the years. 
Where Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy detail the 
specific texts and philosophers under her scrutiny, Grounds of Natural Philosophy 
succinctly sums them up. Cavendish's analysis and evaluation of her sources is 
assimilated within the explication of her theory; the organizational principle of her text 
comes from her theory and not from external influences. This is the sort of integration of 
ideas that Granello associates with cognitively advanced writing (300-01) and that is 
widely recommended in academic writing guides.9 In Anderson's Taxonomy, synthesis is 
presented as the culmination of all other stages; its product is "a coherent and functional 
whole" which assembles previous learning experiences into an organized presentation 
that is nonetheless greater than the sum of its parts (84). The product of synthesis may be 
both ingenious and imaginative, and in fact, when verbs replaced the noun forms of the 
original Taxonomy, the category of Synthesis was renamed Create. The result of the 
creative combination of prior knowledge into a new and original whole is what Anderson 
at one point calls "a novel structure" (85). Cavendish produces just such a structure in 
Blazing World, a work she refers to as a variation on the romance, the term which in 
French evolves into the roman, what we call the novel. Blazing World incorporates her 
scientific notions into a unique narrative that functions as more than any one of her 
individual earlier ventures in natural philosophy: it entertains, presents theories and 
See for example Ilona Leki; and York University's Academic Writing Guide website. 
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opinions, assesses and comments, and at the same time contributes to the emerging genre 
of Utopian science fiction.10 
Some form of synthesis had indeed occurred at every stage of Cavendish's 
writing; however, Blazing World and Grounds of Natural Philosophy stand on the 
shoulders of all her previous texts, encompassing their diversity by containing, 
compressing or alluding to all that came before. This involves processes both revisionary 
and transformative; it entails looking back and going beyond, following and subverting 
convention. Blazing World alludes to various works of romance and fantasy, but 
Cavendish makes significant changes to the models available to her. Grounds of Natural 
Philosophy is designated quite specifically as an edited version of Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions, but Cavendish amends her earlier work in more fundamental ways 
than she had done between 1655 and 1663. In both cases, the result is a text that reveals 
its sources while differentiating itself from them absolutely. 
Blazing World explicitly amalgamates different styles of writing, drawing on 
Cavendish's earlier philosophical texts as well as on other works, "romancical" or 
"fantastical" (6; "To the Reader"). Though she initially indicates that Blazing World is 
pure entertainment meant to "divert [her] studious thoughts" and "delight the reader with 
variety" (6), it quickly becomes clear that the narrative emerges not only from its 
companion piece, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, but from Cavendish's 
earlier works of natural philosophy. Like Poems, and Fancies, it is a sustained work of 
10
 Khanna, for example, suggests that Blazing World prefigures twentieth-century feminist Utopian fiction. 
On other aspects of Utopian science fiction, see also Leslie; Lilley; Trubowitz; and Salzman. 
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fancy with scientific overtones; however, this new piece of fiction replaces the central 
atomism of the poems by the hierarchical model of self-moving matter systematically 
developed through both editions of Philosophical and Physical Opinions. In addition, 
Blazing World continues to articulate the judgment of her peers Cavendish expresses in 
Philosophical Letters, and the philosophical digressions that form a lengthy portion of the 
tale often correspond directly to issues she addresses in Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy. 
Cavendish also draws on external sources in Blazing World. The first part of the 
narrative appears to follow "the typical romance plot of disaster, exile and restoration" 
(Leslie 12): a young lady is stolen away from her home, her virtue is threatened, she 
comes near death in a raging storm, but she survives and is rewarded with great power 
and riches, both in the Blazing World and, later in the story, back in her homeland. 
Marina Leslie suggests that there are strong similarities with Shakespeare's The Tempest, 
a play that "had an obvious appeal for Restoration audiences with its story of the exile 
and return of lawful authority" (15).11 Cavendish's "description of a new world" (BW 6; 
"To the Reader") also calls to mind similarly fantastical tales such as Joseph Hall's The 
Discovery of a New World, Ben Jonson's masque "News from a New World discovered 
in the Moon," John Wilkin's The Discovery of a New World in the Moon, Francis 
Bacon's New Atlantis, and Thomas More's Utopia. In the preface to the reader, 
Cavendish also explicitly mentions the work of Lucian and "the French-man's world in 
11
 Around this same time, John Dryden produced a version of The Tempest, as did John Fletcher and Philip 
Massinger in their play The Sea Voyage (Leslie 15). On the romance elements in Blazing World, see Leslie 
12-16; Pohl 60-61; Trubowitz 233 and 243nl7; and Wagner, who examines the romance elements 
extensively and also explores the links between Blazing World and The Tempest. 
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the moon" (6), a reference to Cyrano de Bergerac's Histoire comique contenant les Etats 
et Empires de la lune {Comical Story about the Empire of the Moon), though she wishes 
to differentiate her work from these two.12 
Consciously and deliberately, she designs a tale like no other in order to describe 
a world like no other, "a world of [her] own creating" (BW6; "To the Reader"). Its mixed 
form embodies multiplicity but also hinders a clear understanding of the text's purposes. 
Insofar as genre functions as "a maker of meaning", the generic ambiguity of Blazing 
World prevents readers from knowing how to respond appropriately to the text (Devitt 
580).B Cavendish resolves this problem somewhat by spelling out her intentions: she 
claims that since works of fancy help "to recreate the mind and withdraw it from its more 
serious contemplations," her imaginative combination of philosophy, romance and 
fantasy provides unique assistance in the difficult task of "rational search and enquiry 
into the causes of natural effects" (BW6). Blazing World is not merely a mishmash. The 
modifications she brings to the genres from which she draws inspiration suggest purposes 
more complex than simple recreation, in particular, her desire to participate in intellectual 
discourse and be recognized as a valid (and valuable) contributor. The conventional 
romance plot is reworked in such a way that the female protagonist is both victim and 
hero. As Leslie points out, pursuing the parallels with Shakespeare's play suggests that 
the Empress also plays the powerful role of goddess or mage (15): like the magical 
12
 For a brief discussion of Hall's tale, published in 1605, seeBWlnl; and Leslie 9-10 and 22n7. On 
Jonson's masque, see BWlvH. Whitaker mentions the work by Wilkins, published in 1638 (282). 
Connections with Utopia and New Atlantis are examined in Hutton, "Science and Satire" 165-70. On 
Lucian, see BW 6r\3 and Hutton, "Science and Satire" 170-75. Susan James suggests that the reference to 
"the French-man" may be to Pierre Borel's 1657 work, Discours nouveauxprouvant lapluralite des 
mondes (New Discourse proving the plurality of worlds) (BW 6n3). 
13
 See also Devitt 578 and Bazerman 62-63. 
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Prospero, she instructs and guides her subjects, consults with and commands spirits, and 
inspires religious awe by appearing before her congregation "like an angel" preaching 
"sermons of terror to the wicked" and "sermons of comfort to those who repented" (BW 
50-51).14 Cavendish gives her character the agency and authority she desires for herself. 
Blazing World also re-envisions the Utopian fantasy by allowing for the active 
involvement of a stranger—a woman—in a new land. This is a female utopia, but 
presented without the satire of works such as Hall's The Discovery of a New World, 
where the capital city of a land ruled by women is called Gospingoa (BW 7n7).15 In 
addition, as James notes, "Cavendish departs from the standard device of describing an 
ideal world through the eyes of a visitor" (15n21). The Lady-made-Empress does far 
more than observe the Blazing World; she is a dynamic participant who, moreover, 
determines all civil order. She succeeds both in keeping the peace and in making war 
when it is necessary, ruling over her new land with "an absolute power" (15) and 
defeating the forces threatening her native country of EFSI.16 Trubowitz suggests that 
Cavendish's revision of the Utopian genre "creates a new generic space" where she can 
inscribe herself "as an autonomous and self-governing woman despite the cultural 
constraints thwarting her worldly ambitions" (237, 238). The character of the Duchess of 
Newcastle also has uncharacteristic authority in the worlds she visits. The Empress 
"willingly [follows] her advice" to dissolve the learned societies, "for 'tis better to be 
without their intelligences, than to have an unquiet and disorderly government" (88), and 
14
 See also Wagner, par. 20. 
15
 Other place names include Tattlingen, Scoldonna, and Blubbertck (BWlnl). 
16
 EFSI refers to Charles II's full title: King of England, France, Scotland and Ireland {BW 1 OOnl 80). 
Before she returns to the Blazing World, the Empress magnanimously makes the king of EFSI "the 
absolute monarch of all the world" (100). 
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in the battle for EFSI, the Duchess convinces the Empress "to abate her passion" during 
the war-council (95). The Duchess is, of course, Cavendish herself, and her active 
advisory role in the narrative points to the desire for engagement made so clear in the first 
half of the volume. To enable this engagement, Cavendish shatters the framework of 
fiction, allowing her characters to travel freely between real and imaginary worlds. The 
Empress and Duchess move between the Blazing World, the land of EFSI, and even 
England's court and the real domain of the Duchess in Nottinghamshire (Khanna 25). 
Leslie argues that Cavendish does not so much change as enact Utopia as she "[writes] 
herself in" to the fundamentally male intellectual canons of literature and philosophy 
(9). The critique in Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy was intended to 
provoke conversation; in Blazing World, she imposes herself as a full participant in all 
discourses. 
In Grounds of Natural Philosophy, Cavendish principally draws on her own work; 
however, other sources are also implied, and, as in Blazing World, she amends or re-
interprets all her source material to integrate it into the final, comprehensive statement of 
her natural theory. As such, Grounds of Natural Philosophy completes the task begun in 
Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy of reviewing the 
literature pertinent to her natural philosophy. The relationship between Grounds of 
Natural Philosophy and Cavendish's earlier work is straightforward; not only does she 
acknowledge Philosophical and Physical Opinions as the "First Edition" of the present 
treatise (GNP; "To all the Universities in Europe"), but she also invokes her readers' 
Leslie notes, with a certain irony, that "insofar as it is the custom of Utopian narratives to reject or 
transform their literary precursors, Cavendish is nowhere more orthodox a Utopian than in her revisions of 
others' Utopian models" (7). 
146 
knowledge of all her other philosophical works. She presents Grounds of Natural 
Philosophy as a final installment of her larger oeuvre of "Philosophical, Poetical, and 
Oratorical Works," which she leaves, "All ... and this especially," to the much extended 
audience of "all the Universities in Europe." This final treatise is significantly shorter 
than any of her full explorations of natural philosophy. Though Cavendish declares she 
has corrected her earlier work with "many Alterations and Additions" ("To all the 
Universities in Europe"), Grounds of Natural Philosophy, excluding the Appendix, is 
little more than half the length of the 1663 edition. In Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy, she admits to have "chosen rather to be guilty of prolixity and repetitions, 
1 ft 
than to be obscure by too much brevity" (155); yet by 1668, she distills her theory to an 
essential core of ideas presented with concision, simple phrasing and little rhetorical 
flourish. In essence, her final treatise is the tip of the iceberg, the wealth of writing and 
knowledge lurking below the surface. 
Comparing Grounds of Natural Philosophy to the two editions of Philosophical 
and Physical Opinions it claims as its drafts reveals Cavendish's efforts to write plainly 
and lucidly without all the while overlooking the potential complexity of her notions. She 
attempts to adhere to the rhetorical ideals of perspicuitas, identified with both 
truthfulness and clarity of expression, and brevitas, or "linguistic economy" (Nate, 
"Rhetoric" 222-23); "making" sense no longer requires elaboration, but abbreviation.19 In 
Grounds of Natural Philosophy, Cavendish edits drastically, yet the process is not merely 
18
 This recalls Boyle's intentional prolixity in his reports of experiment, which were highly detailed in order 
to create the sense of virtual witnessing (Shapin and Schaffer 62). 
While he suggests that her work lacks "conventional" brevity and perspicuity, Nate never refers 
specifically to Grounds of Natural Philosophy. See also Nate's more specific examination of Cavendish's 
rhetorical style, '"Plain and Vulgarly Express'd.'" 
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reductive. She also makes major changes to the philosophical content, reordering and 
rearticulating her ideas, as well as improving the overall organizational scheme in ways 
that will be examined later in this chapter. A few examples suffice to illustrate 
Cavendish's technique, the first concerning her explanation of the fundamental figure of 
the circle, the second involving her description of physical weakness, and the third 
regarding her theory of perception. The example of the circle demonstrates how slashing 
away large chunks of text can actually make meaning far clearer. For example, the 
following lengthy and confusing paragraph from the 1663 edition of Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions is reduced to its central idea in Grounds of Natural Philosophy; 
Cavendish writes: 
The Nature of Extensions and Dilatations strives or indeavours to get 
Space, Ground, or Compass, as also to Smooth, Plain, or Level, the 
Substance or Matter those Motions work on, and with, but the Nature of 
Contracting motions indeavours or labours to cast or thrust out Space, 
Place, Ground or Compass, labouring to draw and croud Substance Matter 
or Parts close together, and this is the reason that Circle-lines or Figures 
may be Contracted many several Ways, Forms or Figures, because 
Contraction flings out the Compass, and onely makes use of the Line or 
Circumferent circle, drawing and laying the Line into millions of several 
Works or Figures, without breaking or dividing the Exterior form, which 
is the Circle; and this is the reason, that when the Contractions are over-
powered by Dilations, and that the Circle extends the full Compass, it 
returns to its Original form, which is a Round circle, without any 
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alteration; and thus may a Circle-figure or Line Exteriously alter several 
ways by Contraction several times, and yet keep the Interior form, figure 
or nature; also Circle-Lines or figures may be Exteriously altered by Mixt 
Exterior motions, as for Example, when a Circle-line should be wound 
about a Round staff, or such like thing, the winding about the Pole or Staff 
is the Motion of Contraction, at least one way, as when the Compass is 
turned Inward, as towards the Centre, yet by winding one Line above 
another is Extenuation, and millions the like Examples may be given. 
(147) 
In Grounds of Natural Philosophy only the central idea that a circle may be contracted or 
expanded without altering its fundamental nature is asserted. In addition, she extends 
this notion to apply to "all such sorts of Figures that are (like Circular Lines) of one 
piece" (179), which further clarifies the earlier editions' vague reference to "all those 
Figures that are by Nature made of one Piece, without Distinct Parts and Several 
Tempered Substances" (PP055 59; PP063 149). 
Concise statements are common in Grounds of Natural Philosophy, but 
Cavendish must often alter her original opinions more substantially to achieve clarity, as 
we see in the discussion of weakness. In the 1655 and 1663 editions of Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions, chapters entitled "Of Weakness" are identical with minor differences 
in spelling, capitalization and paragraphing. Despite the title, the chapters begin by 
defining "Swooning," only later specifying that "Weakness is caused by a too much 
20
 Cavendish's discussion of the circle is found in PP055 56; ch. 88; and 58; ch. 91; PP063 146-49; pt. 4, 
ch. 33-34; and GNP 178-79; pt. 11, ch. 14. A full comparison of the 1663 and 1668 versions of the circle 
discussion is provided in Appendix C. 
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relaxing of sinews" (133; 322). This is followed by the analogy of sinews with the lathes 
of a house and an alternative explanation that weakness may be the result of "the sinews 
... boyl'd too tender, as too much towards a jelly" (133; 323). In Grounds of Natural 
Philosophy, in a chapter half the length, Cavendish keeps to the topic announced in the 
title, foregoes the imagery of the house and omits any reference to boiled sinews. Her 
topic sentence supplies a summarized explanation of weakness much closer to what we 
might expect: "some Weakness proceeds from Age; others, through want of Food; others 
are occasioned by Oppression; others, by Disorders and Irregularities" (GNP 120). 
Cavendish also adjusts her original theory of matter to include a more fully-
evolved concept of perception. Neither edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions 
had examined perception in great detail; it is in Philosophical Letters and Observations 
Upon Experimental Philosophy that she describes her notion of patterning, developed as 
an alternative to mechanical accounts of sense perception by pressure and force. 
However, in Grounds of Natural Philosophy perception truly functions as a "ground and 
principle" (OEP 137). Perception is mentioned in fifteen separate chapter titles alone, yet 
none of the discussions goes into the detail of the earlier works. Instead, the concept of 
patterning underpins other topics; it has been absorbed into Cavendish's overall theory, 
where it can be called on in a variety of situations. In the end, trimming, rewriting and 
redistributing the content of her earlier philosophical works helps to make the final text 
more concise, more comprehensible and more comprehensive. 
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The inclusiveness of Grounds of Natural Philosophy extends to an understated 
use of outside sources, indicating that her analysis and critique of other ideas is now fully 
subsumed in her own project. For the most part, the notions she had grappled with 
elsewhere—Cartesian dualism, Hobbesian motion, More's immaterialism, Van 
Helmont's "chymistry"—are resolved in her increasingly cohesive theory. Though she 
makes allusions that can be traced to specific thinkers, the text is stripped of references to 
named philosophers, who are lumped together into an undifferentiated mass of "some 
men" whose ideas clash with Cavendish's opinions (GNP 76).21 This also indicates an 
increasing compliance with rhetorical prescriptions or expectations concerning 
philosophical discourse. Boyle declares that it is "accounted a more genteel and masterly 
way of writing, to cite others but seldom, and then to ... mention what they say in the 
words of him that cites, not theirs, that are cited" (qtd. in Shapin 117n223); similarly, 
"[disputes] should be about findings and not about persons" (Shapin and Schaffer 73). 
Nonetheless, at times her targets are reasonably evident. Her dismissal of the belief that 
witches may transform themselves into other creatures, for example, is clearly aimed at 
Henry More and Joseph Glanvill.22 Glanvill, with whom she had been corresponding 
since 1667, had sent her at least one of his publications and while she never mentions 
either its title or the author explicitly, the Appendix is framed as a response to "the 
theological questions" raised in their debate (Whitaker 319). In addition, her 
correspondence with Glanvill may have influenced Cavendish's shift to a more restrained 
plain style. In 1665, when he republished Vanity of Dogmatizing under the new title 
Scepsis Scientifica, Glanvill included a disclaimer of the work's style, too full of "the 
1
 At best, she refers to other philosophers as "the Learned" (GNP 35); more often, she writes "some may 
say" (99, 174, 179, 193), "some may ask" (99, 100, 192) or even "some may object" (143). 
22
 See GNP 175-76. On Cavendish, More, and GlanvilPs discussions of witchcraft, see Whitaker 317-19. 
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musick and Curiosity of fine Metaphors and dancing periods''' to suit his "present relish 
and Genius" and he subsequently revised and shortened the work substantially. At the 
least, both writers "demonstrate how strong the drift towards a stylistic standardization 
had become in the 1660s." By Grounds of Natural Philosophy, not only are Cavendish's 
judgments of others integrated seamlessly in her work; she has also assimilated the 
"rhetorical norms of the New Science" required for her voice to be heard (Nate, '"Plain 
and Vulgarly Express'd'" 417). 
The Structure of Variety 
Cavendish's final texts reveal and re-create their multiple sources, but they are 
also framed to reflect her sense of social order, her epistemology, and especially a 
dynamic natural philosophy of infinite, ongoing, cyclical change. Both illustrate what 
Chalmers calls a "formal and thematic commitment to variety ... inextricably connected 
to the natural philosophy that constitutes a central preoccupation in the text" ("Flattering 
Division" 126). While Chalmers is referring to earlier work, her words apply well to 
these two final works. As the fragmented Poems, and Fancies reflects the anarchy of 
atomism, and the nested spheres of the second Philosophical and Physical Opinions 
mirror her hierarchy of matter, so do the structures of Blazing World and Grounds of 
Natural Philosophy echo their content. Blazing World is arranged to reflect the 
narrative's movement across shifting borders between different worlds, while Grounds of 
23
 Qtd. in Vickers 18. Vanity of Dogmatizing was originally published in 1661. Glanvill's final revisions 
were made in 1676, and Vickers notes that while Glanvill "evidently felt that the old style could no longer 
pass," the drastic cuts he made were at least in part made to reduce "a book to the length of an essay" (19). 
Scepsis Scientifica is not the text that Glanvill sent to Cavendish, but she had read it, for she refers to it in 
OEP. More probably he sent Philosophical Considerations Concerning the Existence of Sorcerers and 
Sorcery (1666), since in a letter dated April 22, 1667, Glanvill writes, "I am bold to beg Favour and 
acceptance for a Trifle of mine that was designed for your Grace" {LP 136; emphasis added). On July 8 he 
responds to "the particular's of your Grace's Letter" (137), and all the points made refer to witchcraft. 
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Natural Philosophy is organized in ways that suggest both the movement across the body 
and through the cycle of life. Both additionally invoke the image of nested worlds from 
Poems, and Fancies, reinforcing Sandra Sherman's claim that throughout her oeuvre, 
Cavendish is "always aware of and promoting an aesthetic of englobement" (188). 
Of these two last works, Blazing World more openly acknowledges and pursues 
the affinity of its structure and ideas. Cavendish does not simply append it to 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy; the pair of philosophical and fanciful texts 
are joined "as two worlds at the end of their poles" {BW6; "To the reader"). By this, she 
suggests a more than tangential link between two spheres; each one is, in fact, a 
passageway to the other. This intimates an essential link between philosophy and fiction, 
and though Cavendish is careful to point out that the "noble study" of natural philosophy 
is not merely "a fiction of the mind" (5), she goes on to show that fiction is in no way 
diametrically opposed to reason. Fiction proceeds from fancy, which, she asserts, is as 
much an action "of the rational parts of matter" as is reason; by extension, if fancy is a 
rational action, then fiction is but a variant of "serious philosophical contemplations" (5). 
The narrative itself then moves between romance, fantasy and philosophy, further 
indicating the essential likenesses and links between various genres. In addition, 
Cavendish further affirms that a comprehensive understanding of her natural philosophy 
is not complete without Blazing World. In the preface to Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy, her readers are forewarned of the interconnected nature of her 
writing when Cavendish dissuades them from reading "by parcels, here a little, and there 
a little"; she states that, "I have found it by myself, that when I read not a book 
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thoroughly from beginning to end, I cannot well understand the author's design, but may 
easily mistake his meaning; I mean, such books as treat of philosophy, history, etc. where 
all parts depend upon each other" (OEP 13; "To the Reader"). Readers may find the 
inter- and intra-texrual generic transitions disorienting, but they are also compelled to 
recognize both the similarity and diversity of the many realms. 
While readers may struggle with Cavendish's multiple spheres and styles, the 
characters of Blazing World move back and forth with ease. In the narrative, physical as 
well as spiritual entities cross boundaries: the young Lady who becomes Empress travels 
from her nation into the Blazing World and back again with an army of fantastic 
creatures; her spiritual servants move between her world and ours; and her soul also 
journeys with the Duchess's into all three. Yet Blazing World represents movement 
between worlds that are not only contiguous, but "englobed" in one another. Geraldine 
Wagner suggests that this text is another illustration of the nesting boxes of worlds within 
worlds (par. 9), where the outer limit is Cavendish's imagination, in which the whole 
document, containing the narrative, philosophical and fantastic sub-texts, is created.24 
The Empress and the Duchess are "sub-versions" of Cavendish herself, and both contain 
infinite imaginative universes in themselves. 
Each world has a role to play, both in the creation of knowledge and of social 
order. Creatures of each land or world exercise their influence in another, suggesting that 
no one place is ideal. The Duchess's England, the lady's native nation and the Empress's 
Wagner describes the inner boxes as divided between parts of the narrative; however, it is not a simple 
split between Cavendish's first and second parts, but between the parts that explore "Utopian aspirations" 
and the part that explores "self/self relations" (pars. 10-12). 
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dominion come to represent various possibilities, intellectual, social, and political. 
Moreover, when the Duchess and the Empress begin "making and dissolving several 
worlds" in their imaginations (BW 75), they increase the realms of choice infinitely. 
Nicole Pohl has suggested that Cavendish's "poetic creation of a 'heterocosmos' is not 
the simplistic blue-print of an alternative better world, but presents a range of speculative 
prospects" (52). The Blazing World is not simply a perfect Utopian realm on which to 
model our own. This is represented quite plainly by the dissenting academic societies that 
the Empress must eventually dissolve for the sake of civil order. She had hoped to learn 
something from all of them, but eventually tires of their inability to comprehend that "no 
particular knowledge can be perfect, by reason knowledge is dividable, as well as 
composable" (BW4S). Also "composable" is nature itself, as Cavendish proclaims in the 
voice of the Empress: "by the virtue of its self-motion, [nature] is divided into infinite 
parts, which parts being restless undergo perpetual changes and transmutations by their 
infinite compositions and divisions" (40). The pairing of philosophical and fictional 
works, the internal generic mix of the narrative, and the creation of infinite alternate 
worlds all combine to represent the infinite variety of nature that Cavendish has long 
maintained in her theory of matter. 
Grounds of Natural Philosophy, for its part, is largely silent on the subject of its 
own structure, yet it is without question the most strictly arranged of Cavendish's 
philosophical treatises. It presents another representation, or more literally an 
Pohl identifies a different structural model in Blazing World, based on the "triangular discourse" of male, 
female and individual (54). However, she similarly argues that the text's design is a conscious choice 
reflecting Cavendish's "overall scientific and philosophical methodology and ... epistemology" (56). 
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embodiment, of interconnected variety: the text as anatomy.26 In its most simple 
manifestation, an anatomized text is topically subdivided into component chapters or 
sections, and Grounds of Natural Philosophy is arranged into thirteen parts, almost 
double the seven of the 1663 edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions. The notion 
of anatomy also suggests the surgical dissection that allows a subject to be examined 
from multiple perspectives, a kind of revelatory fragmentation. Dissection further implies 
the progressive movement through superimposed layers to arrive at a central truth, and 
this invokes the idea of nested boxes and spheres yet again. Like the 1663 edition of 
Philosophical and Physical Opinions, the arrangement of topics in the first half of 
Grounds of Natural Philosophy follows a progression of increasing specificity that also 
strongly suggests increasing importance, a movement towards an essential core. 
Cavendish begins with general definitions of nature, matter and motion; the focus is 
narrowed to creatures, corporeal motions, animals, and then man. In the sixth part she 
arrives at the core of the human mind, while the seventh, the arithmetic centre of the text, 
is concerned with the unconscious knowledge associated with sleep, dreams, and death. 
By narrowing the scope of each section, Cavendish presents the human mind as the 
ultimate point of convergence. Moreover, in death all disorder and strife are resolved: "in 
the last act of Human Life, all the Motions do generally agree in one Action" (GNP 99). 
Though the first seven sections seem to encompass diminishing spheres, at the 
same time it is made clear that the compass of each topic is infinitely broad and varied, 
and the second half of Grounds of Natural Philosophy examines just some of these 
26
 Chalmers also uses the notion of anatomy to describe how the material in Poems, and Fancies and The 
Worlds Olio is divided and subdivided in order to explore different aspects of a topic or to appeal to 
different tastes ("Flattering Division" 124). 
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variations. Three sections on the diseases of the body and mind are followed by a section 
on diversities of knowledge, motion, and change. The final two parts include a rather 
abrupt treatment of the remaining components of nature, which Cavendish justifies by 
claiming that "[to] treat of the Productions of Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements, is not 
so easie a Task, as to treat Animals" (179).27 In any case, her purpose is not an exhaustive 
account; she is well aware of the inherent impossibility of anatomizing the infinitely 
varied body of nature. 
While the principle of anatomy is evoked in the document's structure, it is 
brought to the forefront more directly in allusions to the human body and its life cycle. In 
her prefatory letter addressed "To all the Universities in Europe," Cavendish presents her 
work as the "beloved Child of my Brain." Extended to encompass the usual apologies for 
intellectual shortcomings, the metaphor is strikingly female: "I may be forgiven for 
spoiling This, in never putting it to suck at the Breast of some Learned Nurse ... but [I] 
would, obstinately, suckle it my self, and bring it up alone, without the help of any 
Scholar." The text-as-child also suggests variety in its implication of endless cycles of 
birth, death and resurrection. Though Cavendish fears this "beloved Child" will be 
"buried in the hard and Rocky Grave" of disapproval, she nonetheless hopes "for its 
everlasting Life" (GNP; "To all the Universities in Europe"). The first half of Grounds of 
Most natural philosophers would feel that minerals and vegetables were easier to examine objectively, 
because rational thought would not be an issue; however, for Cavendish, all matter has rational thought. 
The reason animals are 'easier' is because we are animals and so we have self-knowledge that we cannot 
access in elements, minerals and vegetables. 
As indicated in chapter 1 of this thesis, in her writing, Cavendish frequently employs metaphors relating 
to typical female activities. In "Flattering Division," Chalmers points out that throughout Poems, and 
Fancies, many of these are specifically employed to symbolize diversity: the sumptuous banquet, the spicy 
stew or "olio," the harmonies of music, the mixed colors of fine needlework. Scott-Douglass notes, 
however, that Cavendish rarely uses the analogy of her books as children (30,44n6). 
157 
Natural Philosophy goes on to illustrate the human life cycle: universal self-moving 
matter is transformed and quickens into the embryonic child who is born, grows to 
physical and rational maturity, and then dies. However, death is not the end; the 
penultimate chapter of the seventh part examines "Whether a Creature may be new 
formed after a general dissolution" (100). Cavendish's response is that creatures "can be 
repeated, and rechanged" (100), though the parts are likely to be reassembled differently. 
The topic is picked up again in the final part of the Appendix, "Concerning Restoring-
Beds, or Wombs" (291). These two alternate names not only allude to restored political 
order, but very clearly unite the notions of birth, death and re-birth: the endless reiteration 
of the cycle of life. Nearly twenty pages are devoted to an internal discourse between 
parts of her mind over the existence, composition, function and location of such re-
generators. Mirroring the earlier nested structure, her mind presents its conclusions with 
an increasingly narrow spatial focus: 
the Parts of my Mind did conceive, That the Center of the whole Universe, 
was the Sea; and in the Center of the Sea, was a small Island; and in the 
Center of the Island, was a Creature, like (in outward Form) to a great and 
high Rock ... compounded of Parts of all the principal Kinds and Sorts of 
the Creatures of this World, viz. Of Elemental, Animal, Mineral, and 
Vegetable kinds: and, being of such a nature, did produce, out of it self, all 
kinds and sorts of Restoring-Beds. (308) 
The physical description of the rocky island, in retrospect, causes some wonder at 
Cavendish's fear for the untimely death of her textual offspring. The "Rocky Grave of 
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Displeasure" might well imply the transformation, renewal and renascence that are far 
preferable to "the soft and easie Bed of Oblivion" ("To all the Universities in Europe"). 
In positing not one but a multiplicity of these restoring wombs, Cavendish further 
underlines her belief in the central yet divided nature of reason and knowledge. A parallel 
is drawn between the variety of nature (re-)produced infinitely in restoring-beds at the 
center of the world and the infinitely productive capacity of the human mind, located at 
the core of all human parts. Grounds of Natural Philosophy reiterates once more the 
belief that "All Parts of Nature have Life and Knowledg" (6), and more specifically, "all 
Creatures ... must have a Sensitive and Rational Knowledg and Perception" (18). Self-
moving matter is unified in its rational and perceptive capacities, but neither knowledge 
nor perception is limited to humankind. However, by extension, neither are they limited 
to physical organs such as the brain or the eye; these capacities are distributed among all 
human organs. As a result, "a Human Creature ... can have but a parted Knowledg, and a 
partial perception of himself: for, every different composed part of his Body, have 
different sorts of Self-Knowledg, as also different sorts of Perceptions" (55). In the end, 
the anatomical principles and metaphors in Grounds of Natural Philosophy reveal the 
inevitability of infinitely fragmented perspectives on truth and knowledge. 
Multiplying Perspective 
Blazing World and Grounds of Natural Philosophy add to the notion of 
fragmented perceptions on yet another level, in their deployment of multiple points of 
view which serve a range of discursive, didactic, persuasive, and epistemological 
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purposes. Many of Cavendish's texts have presented various standpoints or employed 
different voices. This is clear in her plays and hybrid works such as Poems, and Fancies 
and The Worlds Olio. Orations of Divers Sorts includes points of view multiplied far 
beyond the standard rhetorical practice of writing speech pairs defending opposing views 
on a topic; James explains that Cavendish "turns her verbal contests into many-sided 
debates as speakers answer one another back and forth" {Political Writings xxii). In 
Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, the scientific 
texts in which Cavendish seeks most actively to engage in open discourse, she offers the 
perspectives of other philosophers in tandem with her own, though views that differ from 
hers are not always presented objectively. Blazing World builds on this aspect of its 
companion piece, exploding the intellectual dialogue into the multifaceted conversation 
that is an integral part of the narrative. The dialogue presents in turn the perspectives of 
its protagonist the Empress, the virtuosi, immaterial spirits, the character of the Duchess 
of Newcastle, and Cavendish as narrator. Each has a distinct contribution to make to the 
ongoing intellectual discourse, yet in the end the discourse turns in on itself and the range 
of points of view collapses into one. In Grounds of Natural Philosophy, the diversity of 
perspectives is more subtle. As her writing becomes more didactic than heuristic, 
dialogue becomes monologue; there is essentially only the voice of the author, 
communicating to a silent audience through a mix of statements of personal opinion, 
dispassionate declarations of fact, rebuttals of unspoken objections, and debates between 
parts of her own mind. The tension between singularity and multiplicity in these final 
James suggests that this introduces "the thought that there are sometimes more than two sides to a 
question" (xxii), which echoes Cavendish's belief that human knowledge can only ever be partial. 
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works continues to reveal Cavendish's ambiguous, even paradoxical relationship with her 
audience. 
Animated debate is a central plot element of Blazing World, and in the multiple 
conversations and interchanges, the voice of authority constantly shifts between 
characters in ways that put into question the locus of ultimate knowledge. At times, the 
conversational relationships are patently hierarchical: when the Empress convokes her 
virtuosi, they answer her summons "with all the obedience and faithfulness befitting their 
duty" (BW 21). The Socratic question and answer tone of the Empress's interviews with 
her virtuosi, in which the Empress articulates Cavendish's natural philosophy, recalls the 
interaction in Philosophical Letters between Cavendish and her imaginary correspondent. 
However, in Blazing World, the discussion of natural philosophy is not an exchange 
between equals; the virtuosi are reverential before the Empress, a "goddess" who 
deserves "all the veneration and worship due to a deity" (15). Hers is the voice of cool 
reason and judgment that quells the incessant and ungentlemanly bickering of the 
virtuosi; they defer to her "great and able judgment in natural philosophy" (41). No 
matter how benevolent she is, the Empress is unquestionably the ultimate authority. 
Nonetheless, a second kind of exchange in the story inverts the social hierarchy and gives 
authority to the Empress's inferiors. In certain instances, Cavendish's theories and beliefs 
are presented through voices other than the Empress's: immaterial spirits, the soul of the 
Duchess of Newcastle, and at times even the much-maligned virtuosi. The bird-men, for 
example, explain the different appearances of the sun and moon using Cavendish's 
concept of patterning (23), and the worm-men hold Cavendish's view that color is an 
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intrinsic property of matter (36-37). When the immaterial spirits assert that "we spirits, 
being incorporeal, have no motion" (55), they defend Cavendish's belief that motion is 
inseparable from matter. The distribution of her opinions among many different 
individuals has the effect of granting her ideas greater probability; here, dispersed 
philosophical authority means greater authority. 
In the discourse between the Empress and the Duchess, a balance is struck. The 
Duchess is unquestionably the Empress's subordinate, interacting with her by imperial 
command, and she refers to her friend at all times as "your Majesty" (BW 68). Yet like 
the virtuosi, the Duchess is called upon because of her specific expertise; she is "plain 
and rational writer" (68) and this imparts her voice with the authority of reason. Though 
she is summoned to be the Empress's scribe in her composition of a Cabbala, the 
Duchess quickly assumes a more significant advisory role; moreover, in their dialogue, 
the Duchess often takes the superior position of teacher and guide. She dissuades the 
Empress from embarking on religious, philosophical, moral, or political projects that 
would serve no practical advantage, or, worse, "would breed a confusion" and instead 
directs her friend "to make a poetical or romancical Cabbala" (69). Later, when the 
Empress becomes puzzled by the complexities of imagining a new world, the Duchess 
"[invites] the Empress's soul to observe the frame, order and government" of her own 
creation: an imaginary world "composed of sensitive and rational self-moving matter" 
(75). Her curiosity piqued, the Empress then asks to know more about her friend's native 
world. The Duchess leads her through England's cities and countryside, educating the 
Empress on social structure, government, religion, poetry and theatre-craft. 
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Despite the multiplicity of authoritative voices in the narrative, all these 
exchanges serve to relocate intellectual and philosophical authority in Cavendish the 
author, transparently represented by the Empress in her conversations with the virtuosi, 
and by the Duchess in her conversations with the Empress. Through them, Cavendish can 
express her opinions about social order and her judgments of knowledge communities. 
As in Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, a cynicism about society in general 
and intellectual communities in particular becomes increasingly obvious. She illustrates 
her long-standing disapproval of certain kinds of scholars by associating them with 
emblematic animal species.30 The logicians are represented as "magpie, parrot and 
jackdaw-men" (BW46), and they incur the Empress's most violent condemnation; though 
she does not immediately dissolve their society, she banishes them from her presence, 
declaring, "I shall never take delight in hearing you any more" (48). The experimental 
philosophers annoy the Empress with their dependence on "false informers" like 
telescopes and microscopes (27), but Cavendish further mocks experimentalists by 
having them declare that they "take more delight in artificial delusions, than in natural 
truths" (28). Wagner suggests that by representing the experimental philosophers as bear-
men, Cavendish is calling on the seventeenth-century belief in bears as "among the most 
ferocious but least intelligent of animals" (n23). When the Empress permits them to 
continue their pointless work, it is on the condition "that their disputes and quarrels 
should remain within their schools and cause no factions or disturbance in state or 
government" (BW 28). The Duchess later draws an even more direct association between 
political chaos and learned societies: 
The virtuosi are amalgamations of man and beast who follow "such a profession as [is] most proper for 
the nature of their species" (BW 18). Other examples include bird-men astronomers, fly-, worm- and fish-
men natural philosophers, ape-men chemists, goat-men physicians, and spider-men mathematicians. 
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'The truth is,' said [the Duchess], 'wheresoever learning is, there is most 
commonly also controversy and quarreling, for there be always some that 
will know more and be wiser than others. Some think their arguments 
come nearer to truth and are more rational than others; some are so 
wedded to their own opinions that they'll never yield to reason, and others, 
though they find their opinions not firmly grounded upon reason, yet for 
fear of receiving some disgrace by altering them, will nevertheless 
maintain them against all sense and reason, which must needs breed 
factions in their schools, which at last break out into open wars and draw 
sometimes an utter ruin upon a state or government.' (88) 
The disorder imminent in knowledge communities is simply a reflection of the sad state 
of society. 
Cavendish's own world—the Duchess's native world—is presented as a troubled 
and difficult place. The Duchess's comments hearken back to the civil war that so 
powerfully shaped Cavendish's life, and they also reflect the Restoration sensibility that 
"all free debate bred civil strife" (Shapin and Schaffer 290). When she visits England, the 
Empress finds society to be "ambitious, proud, self-conceited, vain, prodigal, deceitful, 
envious, malicious, unjust, revengeful, irreligious, factious, etc." (BW 76). Cavendish 
again shows her world as a place with little hope of peace, truth, or reason when the 
Duchess asks her friend the Empress to intervene in the long-standing disagreement 
between her husband and Fortune. Despite the best efforts of the two female souls, they 
cannot prevail upon Fortune to "hearken to Truth's judgment" (86). Soon after, the 
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Duchess advises the Empress to restore her realm to its former state: "one sovereign, one 
religion, one law, and one language" (87). In terms that powerfully presents Cavendish's 
dismay over the state of her own world, the Duchess presages dire consequences 
otherwise: the Blazing World will 
prove as unhappy, nay, as miserable a world as that is from which [the 
Duchess] came, wherein are more sovereigns than worlds and more 
pretended governors than government; more religions than gods and more 
opinions in those religions than truths; more laws than rights and more 
bribes than justices; more policies than necessities and more fears than 
dangers; more covetousness than riches; more ambitions than merits; more 
services than rewards; more languages than wit; more controversy than 
knowledge; more reports than noble actions and more gifts by partiality 
than according to merit. (87) 
This reveals not only Cavendish's pessimism, but a potentially disastrous consequence of 
multiplicity. 
Ultimately, the only authority Cavendish has is over her own creations, the only 
opinions permitted to coexist are those voiced by fictional self-representations, and the 
only 'conversation' that takes place is internal, within the fantastic world created in her 
imagination. However, the natural principle of variety is not renounced; Cavendish 
indicates rather that she has abandoned hope of participating in a discourse where such a 
perspective is acceptable. Resigned to the impossibility of achieving intellectual 
distinction anywhere but in her mind, she withdraws from 'real' debate and discourse and 
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retreats to a realm where multiplicity can be explored. Moreover, in all her various 
manifestations—as Duchess, Empress, and author—she forsakes any existent world 
where merit and fame might be achieved. Ambitious to become an empress herself, the 
Duchess is convinced by the immaterial spirits to forego the conquest of some material 
world and create a world within her own mind. This world is composed outside reality 
and discourse; it is "so curious and full of variety, so well ordered and wisely governed, 
that it cannot possibly be expressed by words" (75). Though she eventually returns to her 
actual world, she does so in the knowledge that she can, at any time, create infinite such 
places. The Empress also briefly returns to her native land but retires to her true home, 
the Blazing World, a location emblematic of knowledge and clear reason. The blazing 
stars which give this world its name produce "as much light in the sun's absence as in its 
presence." The Empress's residence is a place "always clear and never subject to any 
storms, tempests, fogs or mists." She not only has all the power and fame she could 
desire, but she can indulge in her "chief delight and pastime," which is "to discourse ... 
with the most learned persons of that world" (107). Finally, in the epilogue to the reader, 
the author herself states openly that her "ambition is not only to be Empress but authoress 
of a whole world." She no longer desires to debate scientific or philosophical notions 
with others; in fact, she declares that "concerning the philosophical world, I am Empress 
of it myself." The choice of "philosophical" to describe her imaginative dominion is 
telling: her need for approval, recognition, and interaction has clearly diminished. 
Readers are invited to join her world, but if they "cannot endure to be [her] subjects, they 
may create worlds of their own and govern themselves as they please" (109); she prefers 
her own company and conversation. 
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Cavendish's withdrawal from social and philosophical interaction by the end of 
the narrative is what ends the volume containing both Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy and Blazing World, and this signals her rejection of intellectual discourse in 
favor of an absolute entrenchment of her opinions. The consequence in Grounds of 
Natural Philosophy is a treatise in which discourse loses the implication of conversation 
and gains a sense of the professorial exposition of an academic lecture (Bazerman 86). 
The tone is didactic, the diction is impersonal and the syntax is passive. In the first 
thirteen sections, only a few chapters are organized as a dialogue. Some of these are 
internal debates which preclude any external voice,31 while in the Appendix, all but the 
first part is structured as a debate between parts of her mind. The spiritual and religious 
topics in the Appendix are ones that she has long avoided as outside the purview of 
natural philosophy. Articulating these new reflections through dialogue as she had done 
in Philosophical Letters allows her to test her opinions. Yet by framing the debate 
entirely internally, Cavendish implies that the time has passed for the sort of engaged 
critique seen in this earlier work: the refinement of her "philosophico-religious" opinions 
will be done in her own mind (Whitaker 319). Elsewhere, the question-and-answer 
construction so prevalent in Philosophical Letters is modified into a less personal form: 
Cavendish writes, "Some may ask" or "the question is" rather than the more intimate 
"you may ask me" (PL 90). The conversational nature of the discussion is lost, and 
while even in Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy the 
informality often simply masks Cavendish's desire to demonstrate her superior reasoning 
skills, in Grounds of Natural Philosophy, all pretense is dropped. 
31
 See GNP 13-15, 94-95, 102-03, and 231. 
32
 For question-and-answer syntax in GNP, see 21-22, 25, 76, 95-96, 99, 100-02, 105, 116, 120-21, 143, 
160,174,179, 192-93,218, 233, and 235. 
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Instead, Cavendish addresses her readers in ways that imply both a disinterested 
commitment to educate and an unquestionable expertise. She takes on a didactic stance 
that has similarities to the position of the Empress in relation to her virtuosi, but 
Cavendish is more than impartial judge and less than deity. She becomes the teacher 
"introducing students into a coherent and comprehensive understanding of a subject," and 
in the hierarchy of learning, the teacher is in a position of preeminence; as Bazerman 
explains, "[the] authoritative voice of the professor ... leaves little room for serious 
challenge" (86). Certain phrases are used repeatedly to remind her reader of notions 
already discussed: she writes "as I have declared," "as I have said," or "as I formerly 
proved"; these expressions occur over fifty times in this short volume.33 These simple 
syntactical constructions achieve two goals: the argument is easier to follow, and 
Cavendish's authority is reiterated time and time again. In addition, by instructing her 
reader to review what she has previously declared, often simply a matter of going back to 
the beginning of a chapter, she also implies that the reader should look back to her other 
texts and thus subtly confirms the value of her entire body of work. 
Where the phrase "as I have said" prompts a glance back, the phrase "it is to be 
noted" has different didactic overtones.34 Though constructed as a directive, the passive 
voice removes any personal link between Cavendish and her audience and gives the 
author the disembodied voice of objectivity and truth. From this elevated position, 
Cavendish calls for her knowledge to be inscribed, literally and metaphorically 'noted,' 
just as students both reflect upon and write down new information during a classroom 
33
 For example, see GNP 18, 26, and 235; other instances are too numerous to list. 
34
 For examples of the passive "it is to be noted" see GNP 126, 164, and 191; other instances are too 
numerous to list. 
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lecture. Assuming that this prescription to register her opinions is followed, Cavendish's 
ideas are given additional permanence and solidity. Moreover, Grounds of Natural 
Philosophy is delivered to a wide, if nameless audience; where she had previously sent 
her work to Cambridge or Oxford only, this treatise is directed to all the universities in 
Europe. To urge so many more readers to note her ideas, especially students of natural 
philosophy, also implies that these have value for everyone. 
Cavendish's professorial stance is not without ambiguities, however. Her passive 
syntax exists side by side with a personal, active voice that both emphasizes and 
undermines her authority. The union is problematic, as evidenced in her various reports 
of the act of observing. The expressions "it is to be observed" and "I observe" are used 
seemingly interchangeably, and while the former conveys objective factuality, the latter, 
contradictorily, communicates both potential idiosyncrasy and insightful 
perceptiveness.35 Shapin and Schaffer argue that to the seventeenth century scientist, the 
testimony of a single witness to an event was open to doubt, while "[the] multiplication 
of witness was an indication that testimony referred to a true state of affairs in nature" 
(57).36 Claiming that a phenomenon is to be observed implies this multiplication: all 
individuals will observe the same phenomenon as Cavendish. On the other hand, personal 
observations do not necessarily lack credibility. In fact, Shapin notes that, as a counter-
maxim to the multiplicity of testimony, "truth itself was apt to be more solitary than 
sociable" and "the truth-speaker was always as likely to be recognized by the fact that a 
There are numerous examples of each expression. For a few examples of the passive expression "it is to 
be observed," see GNP 150, 182, 194; for the active "I observe," see 131, 151, 208. 
36
 See also Shapin 213-15. 
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confederacy of dunces was leagued against him" (233).37 However, the validity of 
Cavendish's observations comes into question with her frequent declarations that she 
presents only personal opinion: she claims that it is "in my opinion" that man's voice is 
more melodious than other animals (GNP 49), that perception functions by patterning 
(55), and that metals have circular motions (221). The ambiguity of her authority is 
heightened by the fact that these statements of opinion are sometimes parenthetical.38 
Brackets both draw attention to their content and mark it as removable, superfluous, or 
unimportant. Cavendish may wish to proclaim her ideas as true or probable, but she 
cannot help but admit that their plausibility may depend entirely on perspective. 
There is a temptation to see synthesis as an end; more so when we consider that 
these two texts come so near the end of Cavendish's writing career. Yet had she not died 
so suddenly at the age of fifty, she may well have continued to write; there is evidence 
that she was working on various other projects, including a study of magnetism and a 
new book of poetry.39 The publication of a text inevitably brings the process of writing to 
some kind of end: the document ceases to be edited, expanded, or rearranged and comes 
to exist in a finite and concrete form. As Donald Murray remarks, "[at] the end of the 
composing process there is a piece of writing which has detached itself from the writer" 
("Writing as Process" 3). However, in Cavendish's collected philosophical works, 
severance is never complete. Previous texts are never far from her mind, and 
consequently never far from the next piece of writing. In this sense, synthesis also signals 
37
 Additionally, claiming actively to observe suggests what Shapin and Schaffer call Boyle's "literary 
technology of virtual witnessing" (61). See also 55-79. Unlike Boyle, Cavendish is not meticulously 
recreating experimental procedures within her text, but her language hints at her awareness of Boyle's 
rhetoric and of its significance in scientific circles. 
38
 For parenthetical use of "in my opinion" see GNP 49, 55, 65, 146,163, 170, and 186. 
39
 See Whitaker 338. 
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a beginning, as new lines of thinking develop and new approaches suggest themselves. 
We have seen this in each text: the capricious atomic verses of Poems, and Fancies 
inspire Cavendish to examine natural philosophy more closely in Philosophical! Fancies; 
its brief chapters grow into an extensive exploration of vitalism in Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions; and the relatively brief discussion of perception in the latter leads to 
greater investigation of the topic in both Philosophical Letters and Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy. 
Both literally and figuratively, Blazing World marks an end: it completes the 
document that begins with Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy and it is also the 
end of Cavendish's overt critique of her peers. At the same time, it shows a renewed 
interest in fictional forms, one which prompted Cavendish to reexamine Nature's 
Pictures and World's Olio before her death. Perhaps more than any other text, it calls on 
the idea of ends as beginnings. In the narrative, the young lady passes through the 
geographical end of her own world to reach a new one, where she is reborn as Empress. 
Both the fictional Duchess and Cavendish as author are given new life in their imaginary 
realms, wherein both reinvent themselves as supreme rulers. In addition, the frequent 
speculative passages in the text—reflections on scientific phenomena, discussions of 
divine and supernatural forces, and, most obviously, the imaginative construction of 
various alternate universes—lead us to see Cavendish's thought processes as ongoing and 
ever-expanding. Grounds of Natural Philosophy is also significantly framed by images of 
birth and rebirth. Cavendish describes her writing as the child of her brain; its gestation 
and birth are the beginning of a life. As the volume closes with the discussion of restoring 
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beds which allow for a rebirth of natural matter into a new form, the reader is left with 
the sense of infinite possibility. 
Epilogue 
As Cavendish's natural philosophy evolved over this fifteen year span, fragments 
of ideas recur in new structures, figurations, and allusions. It is only when the full body 
of her scientific writing is read that these traces are recognizable, yet they provide a 
coherence that is absent in any single, discrete text. Mapping the internal and external 
influences on her thinking and writing gives insight into works often overlooked within 
her larger corpus. An interdisciplinary study is more than helpful in this; it is necessary. 
Cavendish's experiences of the English civil war, her exile to a country where eminent 
philosophical thinkers were gathered, her return to a native land in which order was 
restored yet no longer taken for granted, all fed her thinking about the greater world in 
which she lived. The debates occurring around her concerning civil order, intellectual 
practice and scientific method further affected her conceptions. Finally, the various ways 
in which she articulated, revised, and framed her thoughts and opinions over the years 
point to her progressively more complex understanding of these political, social, and 
philosophical influences. In the end, a complete sense of her development as a thinker 
and writer would require the inclusion of her plays, poems, letters, orations, biography 
and autobiography, as well as a fuller exploration of gender issues, psychology, rhetoric, 
and epistemology. The prospect is overwhelming, yet suitable for a writer as 
interdisciplinary as the Duchess of Newcastle, not so mad after all. 
172 
WORKS CITED AND CONSULTED 
Primary Sources 
Bacon, Francis. Selected Writings of Francis Bacon. New York: Random House, 1955. 
—. Advancement of Learning and Novum Organon. New York: P. F. Collier, 1900. 
Cavendish, Margaret (Duchess of Newcastle). The Blazing World and Other Writings. 
Ed. Kate Lilley. London: Pickering & Chatto, 1992. 
—. The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World. 1668. Political Writings. 
Ed. Susan James. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. 
—. Grounds of Natural Philosophy. 1668. Ed. Colette V. Michael. West Cornwall, CT: 
Locust Hill Press, 1996. 
—. Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. Ed. Eileen O'Neill. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2001. 
—. Orations of Divers Sorts, Accomodated to Divers Places. 1662. Political Writings. 
Ed. Susan James. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. 
—. Sociable Letters. Ed. James Fitzmaurice. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1997. 
—. Paper Bodies: A Margaret Cavendish Reader. Ed. Sylvia Bowerbank and Sara 
Mendelson. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000. 
—. Philosophical and Physical Opinions. London, 1655. 
—. Philosophical and Physical Opinions. 2n ed. London, 1663. 
—. Philosophicall Fancies. London, 1653. 
—. Philosophical Letters. London, 1664. 
—. Poems, And Fancies. London. 1653. 
—. A True Relation of My Birth, Breeding, and Life. 1656. The Life of William 
Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle. Ed. C. H. Firth. London: George Routledge & 
Sons Ltd., 1886. 155-178. 
—. The Worlds Olio. London. 1655. 
173 
Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Trans. John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoof and Dugald Murdoch. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985. 
Donne, John. The Complete English Poems. Ed. A. J. Smith. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1996. 
Evelyn, John. The Diary of John Evelyn. Ed. E. S. de Beer. Vol. 3. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1955. 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 1651. London: Penguin Books, 1985. 
Letters and Poems in Honour of the Incomparable Princess, Margaret, Dutchess of 
Newcastle. London, 1676. 
More, Henry. The Immortality of the Soul. 1662. Ed. A. Jacob. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers-Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1987. 
Pepys, Samuel. The Diary of Samuel Pepys, F. R. S. Vol. 2. London & Toronto: J. M. 
Dent and Sons Ltd., 1927. 
Power, Henry. Experimental Philosophy. 1664. Introd. Marie Boas Hall. The Sources of 
Science. 21. New York and London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966. 
Sprat, Thomas. History of the Royal Society. 1667. Ed. Jackson I. Cope and Harold 
Whitmore Jones. St. Louis: Washington UP, 1958. 
Temple, Dorothy. The Letters of Dorothy Osborne to William Temple. Ed. G. C. Moore 
Smith. London: Oxford UP, 1928. 
174 
Secondary Sources 
Academic Writing Guide. York University. 15 May 2008 <http://www.library.yorku.ca/ 
ccm/rg/academi c- wri ting-guide, en .> 
Anderson, Lorin W., et al. A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A 
Revision of Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. Abr. ed. New York: 
Longman, 2001. 
Applebee, Arthur N. "Writing and Reasoning." Review of Educational Research 54.4 
(1984): 577-596. 
Battigelli, Anna. Margaret Cavendish and the Exiles of the Mind. Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1998. 
Bazerman, Charles. Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the 
Experimental Artcile in Science. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1988. 
Berthoff, Ann E. "Is Teaching Still Possible? Writing, Meaning, and Higher Order 
Reasoning." College English 46.8 (1984): 743-55. 
Blau, Sheridan. "Invisible Writing: Investigating Cognitive Processes in 
Communication." Composing Processes: Assessments of Recent Research, New 
Research, Applications in the Classroom. Spec, issue of College Composition and 
Communication 34.3 (1983): 297-312. 
Blaydes, Sophia B. "Nature is a Woman: The Duchess of Newcastle and 17th Century 
Philosophy." Man, God, and Nature in the Enlightenment. Ed. Donald C. Mell Jr., 
Theodore E. D. Braun, and Lucia M. Palmer. East Lansing: Colleagues Press, 
1988.51-64. 
Bloom, Benjamin, M. D. Engelhart, E. J. Furst, W. H. Hill, and D. R. Krathwohl. 
Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: Handbook I: Cognitive Domain. New 
York: David McKay, 1956. 
Bowerbank, Sylvia. "The Spider's Delight: Margaret Cavendish and the Female 
Imagination." English Literary Renaissance 14.3 (1984): 392-408. 
Brown, Sylvia. "Margaret Cavendish: Strategies Rhetorical and Philosophical Against the 
Charge of Wantonness, Or Her Excuses for Writing So Much." Critical Matrix: 
Princeton Working Papers in Women's Studies 6.1 (1991): 20-45. 
Bump, Jerome. "Metaphor, Creativity, and Technical Writing." College Composition and 
Communication 36.4 (1985): 444-453. 
175 
Carroll, Jeffrey. "Disabling Fictions: Institutionalized Delimitations of Revision." 
Rhetoric Review 18.1 (1989): 62-72. 
Chalmers, Hero. "Dismantling the Myth of'Mad Madge': the cultural context of 
Margaret Cavendish's authorial self-presentation." Women's Writing4.3 (1997): 
323-340. 
—. "'Flattering Division': Margaret Cavendish's Poetics of Variety." Cottegnies and 
Weitz 123-144. 
—. Margaret Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003. 
Clucas, Stephen. "The Atomism of the Cavendish Circle: A Reappraisal." The 
Seventeenth Century 92 (1994): 247-273. 
—, ed. A Princely Brave Woman: Essays on Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle. 
London: Ashgate, 2003. 
—. "Variation, Irregularity and Probabilism: Margaret Cavendish and Natural Philosophy 
as Rhetoric." Clucas. 199-209. 
Cook, Harold J. "The New Philosophy and Medicine in Seventeenth-Century England." 
Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution. Ed. David C. Lindberg and Robert S. 
Westman. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990. 397-436. 
Cottegnies, Line, and Nancy Weitz, eds. Authorial Conquests: Essays on Genre in the 
Writings of Margaret Cavendish. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 
2003. 
Dear, Peter. Discipline & Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
—. "Narratives, Anecdotes, and Experiments: Turning Experience into Science in the 
Seventeenth Century." The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument. Ed. Peter 
Dear. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. 135-163. 
De Biasi, Pierre-Marc. "What is a Literary Draft? Toward a Functional Typology of 
Genetic Documentation." Trans. Ingrid Wassenaar. Drafts. Spec, issue of Yale 
French Studies 89 (1996): 26-58. 
Devitt, Amy J. "Generalizing about Genre: New Conceptions of an Old Concept." 
College Composition and Communication 44.4 (1993): 573-586. 
Dias, Patrick. "Social Constructionism." Kennedy 285-293. 
176 
Dowst, Kenneth. "The Epistemic Approach: Writing, Knowing, Learning." Eight 
Approaches to Composition. Ed. Timothy R. Donovan and Ben W. McClelland. 
Urbana, 111.: National Council of Teachers of English, 1980. 65-85. 
Emig, Janet. "Writing as a Mode of Learning." College Composition and Communication 
28.2(1977): 122-128. 
Faigley, Lester, and Stephen Witte. "Analyzing Revision." College Composition and 
Communication 32.4 (1981): 400-414. 
Fitzmaurice, James. "Fancy and Family: Self-Characterizations of Margaret Cavendish." 
The Huntington Library Quarterly 53 (1990): 198-209. 
—. "Front Matter and the Physical Make-up of Nature's Pictures." Women's Writing 4.3 
(1997): 353-367. 
—. "Margaret Cavendish on Her Own Writing: Evidence from Revision and Handmade 
Correction," Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 85:53 (1991): 297-
39. 
Flower, Linda, and John R. Hayes. "The Cognition of Discovery: Defining a Rhetorical 
Problem." College Composition and Communication 31.1 (1980): 21-32. 
—. "A Cognitive Process Theory of Writing." College Composition and Communication 
32.4 (1981): 365-387. 
--. "Identifying the Organization of Writing Processes" Cognitive Processes in Writing. 
Ed. Lee W. Gregg and Erwin R. Steinberg. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Publishers, 1980. 1-30. 
—. "Images, Plans, and Prose: The Representations of Meaning in Writing." Written 
Communication 1.1 (1984): 120-160. 
Galbraith, David. "Conditions for Discovery through Writing." Instructional Science 21 
(1992): 45-72. 
Granello, Darcy Haag. "Promoting Cognitive Complexity in Graduate Written Work: 
Using Bloom's Taxonomy as a Pedagogical Tool to Improve Literature Reviews." 
Counselor Education & Supervision 40 (2001): 292-307. 
Grant, Douglas. Margaret the First: A Biography of Margaret Cavendish Duchess of 
Newcastle 1623-1673. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957. 
Hintz, Carrie. '"But One Opinion': Fear of Dissent in Cavendish's New Blazing World.'" 
Utopian Studies 7.1 (1996):25-37. 
177 
Hutton, Sarah. "Anne Conway, Margaret Cavendish and Seventeenth-Century Scientific 
Thought." Women, Science and Medicine J500-1700. Ed. Lynette Hunter & Sarah 
Hutton. Sutton Publishing Limited, 1997. 218-234. 
—. "In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes: Margaret Cavendish's natural philosophy." 
Women's Writing 4.3(1997): 421 -432. 
—. "Science and Satire: The Lucianic Voice of Margaret Cavendish's Description of a 
New World Called the Blazing World." Cottegnies and Weitz 161-178. 
James, Susan. "The Philosophical Innovations of Margaret Cavendish." British Journal 
for the History of Philosophy 7.2 (1999): 219-244. 
—. Introduction. Political Writings. By Margaret Cavendish. 1662. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2003. ix-xxix. 
Jones, Kathleen. A Glorious Fame: The Life of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of 
Newcastle 1623-1673. London: Bloomsbury, 1988. 
Jowitt, Claire. "Imperial Dreams? Margaret Cavendish and the Cult of Elizabeth." 
Women's Writing A3 (1997): 383-399. 
Judy, Stephen. "The Experiential Approach: Inner Worlds to Outer Worlds." Eight 
Approaches to Composition. Ed. Timothy R. Donovan and Ben W. McClelland. 
Urbana, 111.: National Council of Teachers of English, 1980. 37-51. 
Kargon, Robert Hugh. Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton. Oxford: Clarendon, 
1966. 
—. "Walter Charleton, Robert Boyle, and the Acceptance of Epicurean Atomism in 
England." Isis 55.2 (1964): 184-192. 
Kegl, Rosemary. "The World I Have Made': Margaret Cavendish, Feminism, and the 
Blazing World." Feminist Readings of Early Modern Culture. Ed. Valerie Traub, 
Lindsay Kaplan, and Dympna Callaghan. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. 119-141. 
Keller, Eve. "Producing Petty Gods: Margaret Cavendish's Critique of Experimental 
Science." ELH 64 (1997): 447-471. 
Kennedy, Mary Lynch, ed. Theorizing Composition: A Critical Sourcebook of Theory and 
Scholarship in Contemporary Composition Studies. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press, 1998. 
178 
Khanna, Lee Cullen. "The Subject of Utopia: Margaret Cavendish and Her Blazing 
World." Utopian and Science Fiction by Women. Ed. Jane L. Donawerth and 
Carol A. Kolmerten. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994. 15-34. 
Kucer, Stephen L. "The Making of Meaning: Reading and Writing as Parallel Processes." 
Written Communication 2.3 (1985): 317-336. 
Leki, Ilona. Academic Writing: Techniques and Tasks. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1989. 
Leslie, Marina. "Gender, Genre and the Utopian Body in Margaret Cavendish's Blazing 
World." Utopian Studies 7.1 (1996): 6-24. 
Lilley, Kate. "Blazing Worlds: 17th Century Women's Utopian Writing." Women, Texts 
and Histories 1575-1760. Ed. Claire Brant & Diane Purkiss, 1992. 102-133. 
Lunsford, Andrea A. "Cognitive Development and the Basic Writer." College English 
41.1 (1979): 38-46. 
Markley, Robert. "Objectivity as Ideology: Boyle, Newton, and the Languages of 
Science." Genre 16 (1983): 355-372. 
Meinel, Chritopher. "Early Seventeenth-Century Atomism: Theory, Epistemology, and 
the Insufficiency of Experiment." Isis 79 (1988): 68-103. 
Merchant, Carolyn. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution. 
San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980. 
Merrens, Rebecca. "A Nature of'Infinite Sense and Reason'" Margaret Cavendish's 
Natural Philosophy and the 'Noise' of a Feminized Nature." Women's Studies 25 
(1996): 421-438. 
Mintz, Samuel I. "The Duchess of Newcastle's Visit to the Royal Society." Journal of 
English and Germanic Philology 51 (1952): 168-76. 
Moore, Judith. "Twentieth-Century Feminism and Seventeenth-Century Science: 
Margaret Cavendish in Opposing Contexts." Restoration 26.1 (2002): 1-14. 
Moreman, Sarah E. "Learning Their Language: Cavendish's Construction of an 
Empowering Vitalistic Atomism." Explorations in Renaissance Culture 23 
(1997): 129-144. 
Murray, Donald M. "Write Before Writing." College Composition and Communication 
29.4(1978): 375-381. 
179 
—. "Writing as Process: How Writing Finds Its Own Meaning." Eight Approaches to 
Composition. Ed. Timothy R. Donovan and Ben W. McClelland. Urbana, 111.: 
National Council of Teachers of English, 1980. 3-20. 
Nate, Richard. "'Plain and Vulgarly Express'd': Margaret Cavendish and the Discourse 
of the New Science." Rhetorica 19.4 (2001): 403-417. 
—. "Rhetoric in the Early Royal Society." Rhetorica Movet: Studies in Historical and 
Modern Rhetoric in Honour ofHeinrich F. Plett. Ed. Peter L. Oesterreich and 
Thomas O. Sloane. Leiden: Brill, 1999. 215-231. 
Nystrand, Martin, Stuart Green, and Jeffrey Wiemelt. "Where Did Composition Studies 
Come From? An Intellectual History." Written Communication 10.3 (1993): 267-
333. 
Odell, Lee. "The Process of Writing and the Process of Learning." College Composition 
and Communication 31.1(1980): 42-50. 
Payne, Darin. "Effacing Difference in the Royal Society: The Homogenizing Nature of 
Disciplinary Dialogue." Rhetoric Review 20 (2001): 94-112. 
Payne, Linda R. "Dramatic Dreamscape: Women's Dreams and Utopian Vision in the 
Works of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle." Curtain Calls: British 
and American Women and the Theatre, 1660-1820. Ed. Schofield, Mary Anne and 
Cecilia Macheski. Athens GA: Ohio University Press, 1991. 
Phillips, Patricia. The Scientific Lady: A Social History of Women's Scientific Interests 
1520-1918, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson Ltd, 1990. 
Pohl, Nicole. "'Of Mixt Natures': Questions of Genre in Margaret Cavendish's The 
Blazing World." Clucas, A Princely Brave Woman 51-68. 
Price, Bronwen. "Feminine Modes of Knowing: Margaret Cavendish's Poetry as Case 
Study." Women and Literature in Britain, 1500-1700. Ed. Helen Wilcox. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 117-139. 
—. "Journeys Beyond Frontiers: Knowledge, Subjectivity and Outer Space in Margaret 
Cavendish's The Blazing World." Literature & History 7.2 (1998): 21-50. 
Rees, Emma L. ^Heavens Library and Nature's Pictures: Platonic paradigms and trial by 
genre." Women's Writing4.3 (1997): 369-381. 
—. Margaret Cavendish: Gender, Genre, Exile. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003. 
—. "Triply Bound: Genre and the Exilic Self." Cottegnies and Weitz 23-39. 
180 
—. "A Well-Spun Yarn: Margaret Cavendish, and Homer's Penelope." Clucas, A 
Princely Brave Woman 171-181. 
Rogers, John. The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of 
Milton. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996. 
Rohman, D. Gordon. "Pre-Writing: The Stage of Discovery in the Writing Process." 
College Composition and Communication 16.2 (1965): 106-112. 
Salzman, Paul. "Two Voyagers: Margaret Cavendish and John Dunton" in his English 
Prose Fiction 1558-1700. 292-299. 
Sarasohn, Lisa T. "Leviathan and the Lady: Cavendish's Critique of Hobbes in the 
Philosophical Letters." Cottegnies and Weitz 40-58. 
—. "Motion and Morality: Pierre Gassendi, Thomas Hobbes and the Mechanical World-
View." Journal of the History of Ideas 46.3 (1985): 363-379. 
—. "A Science Turned Upside Down: Feminism and the Natural Philosophy of Margaret 
Cavendish." Huntington Library Quarterly 47 (1984): 289-307. 
Scott-Douglass, Amy. "Self-Crowned Laureatess: Toward a Critical Revaluation of 
Margaret Cavendish's Prefaces." Pretexts: Literary and Cultural Studies 9.1 
(2000): 27-49. 
Shapin, Steven. A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century 
England. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
Shapin, Steven, and Simon Schaffer. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and 
the Experimental Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 
Sheehan, Richard Johnson, and Denise Tillery. "Margaret Cavendish, Natural 
Philosopher: Negotiating between Metaphors of the Old and New Sciences." 
Eighteenth-Century Women 1 (2000): 1-18. 
Sherman, Sandra. "Trembling Texts: Margaret Cavendish and the Dialectic of 
Authorship." English Literary Renaissance 24.1 (1994): 184-210. 
Siegfried, Brandie R. "Anecdotal and Cabbalistic Forms in Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy. " Cottegnies and Weitz 59-79. 
Sommers, Nancy. "Revision Strategies of Student Writers and Experienced Adult 
Writers." College Composition and Communication 31.4 (1980): 378-88. 
181 
Spiller, Elizabeth A. "Reading through Galileo's Telescope: Margaret Cavendish and the 
Experience of Reading." Renaissance Quarterly 53 (2000): 192-221. 
Stevenson, Jay. "The Mechanist-Vitalist Soul of Margaret Cavendish." Studies In English 
Literature 1500-1900 36.3 (1996): 527-543. 
Trubowitz, Rachel. "The Reenchantment of Utopia and the Female Monarchical Self: 
Margaret Cavendish's Blazing World." Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature 11 
(1992): 229-46. 
Vickers, Brian. "The Royal Society and English Prose Style: A Reassessment." Rhetoric 
and the Pursuit of Truth: Language Change in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. 3-76. 
Wagner, Geraldine. "Romancing Multiplicity: Female Subjecticity and the Body Divisble 
in Margaret Cavendish's Blazing World." EMLS 9.1 (2003): 1.1 -59. 3 June 2003 
<http://purl.oclc.org/emls/09-1 Avagnblaz.htm>. 
Walker, Elaine. "Longing for Ambrosia: Margaret Cavendish and the torment of a restless 
mind in Poems, and Fancies (1653)." Women's Writing 4.3 (1997): 341-351. 
Wallwork, Jo. "Margaret Cavendish's Response to Robert Hooke's Micrographia.'" 
Meridian 18.1 (2001): 191-200. 
Walters, Lisa. "Gender Subversion in the Science of Margaret Cavendish." Essays from 
the Fifth Biennial Margaret Cavendish Conference. Ed. Lisa Hopkins, Emma 
Rees and Gweno Williams. Early Modern Literary Studies Spec, issue 14 (May 
2004): 13.1-34. 7 May 2007 <http://purl.oclc.org/emls/si-14/wallgend.html>. 
Whitaker, Katie. Mad Madge: The Extraordinary Life of Margaret Cavendish, Duchess 
of Newcastle, the First Woman to Live by Her Pen. New York: Basic Books-
Perseus Books Group, 2002. 
Witte. Stephen P. "Pre-Text and Composing." College Composition and Communication 
38.4 (1987): 397-425. 
Woolf, Virginia. Collected Essays. Vol. 3. London: The Hogarth Press, 1967. 
—. A Room of One's Own. London: Grafton Books, 1977. 





Taxonomies of Educational Objectives 












Knowledge of specifics 
1.1.1. Knowledge of terminology 
1.1.2. Knowledge of specific facts 
Knowledge of ways and means of dealing with specifics. 
1.2.1. Knowledge of conventions 
1.2.2. Knowledge of trends and sequences 
1.2.3. Knowledge of classification and categories 
1.2.4. Knowledge of criteria 
1.2.5. Knowledge of methodology. 
Knowledge of the universals and abstractions in a field. 
1.3.1. Knowledge of principles and generalizations. 













Analysis of elements. 
Analysis of relationships. 





Production of a unique communication 
Production of a plan, or proposed set of operations 




Judgments in terms of internal evidence. 
Judgments in terms of external criteria. 
1
 Taken from Anderson 271-77. 
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Table 2: Cognitive Process Categories in the Revised Taxonomy (2001)2 
Categories and Cognitive Processes 
1. Remember: Retrieve knowledge from long-term memory. 
1.1. Recognizing (Identifying) 
1.2. Recalling (Retrieving) 
2. Understand: Construct meaning from oral, written, and graphic communication. 
2.1. Interpreting (Clarifying, paraphrasing, representing, translating) 
2.2. Exemplifying (Illustrating, instantiating) 
2.3. Classifying (Categorizing, subsuming) 
2.4. Summarizing (Abstracting, generalizing) 
2.5. Inferring (Concluding, extrapolating, interpolating, predicting) 
2.6. Comparing (Contrasting, mapping, matching) 
2.7. Explaining (Constructing models) 
3. Apply: Carry out or use a procedure in a given situation. 
3.1. Executing (Carrying out) 
3.2. Implementing (Using) 
4. Analyze: Break materiel into constituent parts and determine relations (part-to-part, 
part-to-whole). 
4.1. Differentiating (Discriminating, distinguishing, focusing, selecting) 
4.2. Organizing (Finding coherence, integrating, outlining, parsing, structuring) 
4.3. Attributing (Deconstructing) 
5. Evaluate: Make judgments based on criteria & standards. 
5.1. Checking (coordinating, detecting, monitoring, testing) 
5.2. Critiquing (Judging) 
6. Create: Put elements together to form a coherent or functional whole; reorganize 
elements into a new structure or pattern. 
6.1. Generating (Hypothesizing) 
6.2. Planning (Designing) 
6.3. Producing (Constructing) 
2
 Taken from Anderson 67-68. 
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APPENDIX B 
Cross-Referenced Content of Philosophicall Fancies and Two Editions of 
Philosophical and Physical Opinions 
The first set of charts compares the 1655 edition of Philosophical and Physical 
Opinions to both Philosophicall Fancies and the revised 1663 edition. Chapter titles 

























































































Of Matter and Motion 
Of the Form and the Minde 
Eternal Matter 
Of Infinite matter 
No proportion in Nature 
Of one Kinde of Matter 
Of Infinite knowledge 




There is no Vacuity 
Of Thin, and Thick Matter 
Of Vacuum 
The Unity of Nature 
Of Division 
The Order of Nature 
Of War, and no absolute Power 
Of Power 
Similizing the spirits, or Innate Matter 
Of Operation 




Of Youth, or Growth 
In Philosophicall Fancies, 'chapters' are not numbered. I have provided page numbers, as well as 





































































































Of Dead, and Death 
Of Local Shapes 
The Visible Motions in Animals, Vegetables, and Minerals 
Of the Working of several Motions of Nature 
OftheMinde 
Of their several Dances, or Figures 
The Sympathy, and Antipathy of Spirits 
The Sympathy of Sensitive, and Rational spirits in one Figure 
The Sympathy of the Rational and Sensitive Spirits, to the Figure 
they make, and inhabit 
Pleasure, and Pain 
OftheMinde 
Of Thinking, or the Minde, and Thoughts 
Of the Motions of the Spirits 
Of the Creation of the Animal Figure 
The gathering of Spirits 
The moving of Innate Matter 
Of Matter, Motion, and Knowledge, or Understanding (similar to 
1663, pt. l,ch. 15) 
Of the Animal Figure (similar to 1663, pt. 1, ch. 17) 
What an Animal is 
Of the dispersing of the Rational Spirits 
Of the Senses 
Of Motion that makes Light 
Opticks 
Of Motion, and Matter 
Of the Brain 
OfDarknesse 
Of the Sun 
Of the Clouds 
Of the Motion of the Planets 
Of the Motion of the Sea 
2
 Note that the verses entitled "Of the Sense and Reason exercised in their different shapes" (pp. 56-63) 
are omitted in 1655. 
















































































Of Time and Nature 
Of Matter, Motion, and Figure 
Of Causes, and effects 
Whether motion is a thing, or nothing, or can be Annihilated 
OfMotions 
Many motions go to the producing of one thing, or to one end 
Of the six principal motions 
Of Exterior Motions produced from the six principal Motions 
Of double motions at one and the same time, on the same matter 
Of the several strengths 
The creation of Figures, and difference of Motions 
The Agilenesse of innated Matter 
Of external, and internal figures and Motions 
Of repeating one and the same work, and of varieties 
Of creation, and dissolving of Nature 
Of Gold 
Of Sympathies, and Anitpathies, which is to agree, or disagree, to 
joyn, or to crosse (some variations in phrasing) 
Of different knowledge in different figures 
The advantages of some figures, some degrees of matter, and 
motions, over others 
Of the figurative figures 
Of the gloomy figures, and figures of parts, and of one piece 
Of the dull and innated matter 
An answer to an old question, what becomes of the shape, or figures, 
or outwards forms of the old figure, when the nature takes a new 
form 
Of Transmigrations (1663 title: "Of Transmutations") 
Of metamorphosing of Animals and Vegetables 





























































































Earth Metamorphosed into water, water Metamorphosed to vapor, 
Aire and fire, at least into heat 
Of wetnesse (only some parts are used in 1663) 
Of Circles (similar but not identical) 
Of Softnesse (only some parts are used in 1663) 
Of Liquors (only some parts are used in 1663) 
The extention and contraction of circles (similar but not identical) 
Of congealed water (middle section of 1655 chapter only) 
Motion changing the figure from water to fire 
Of Oyl (similar but not identical) 
Of Metals (similar but not identical) 
Of the Load-stone 
Of the needle 
Of stone 
Of burning 
Of different burning 
Fires transformation 
Of such sorts of heating Motions, as cause burning, melting, boiling, 
Evaporating and ratifying (only some elements are the same) 
Of quenching of fire (similar but not identical) 
Of the quenching of fire, and evaporated water 
Of a bright-shining hot, glowing, fire 
Of the drinesse of hot, burning, bright, shining fire 
Of moist colds, and moist heats, of dry colds, and dry heats & c. 
(longer in 1655) 
Of the motions of cold, and heat, droutii, and Moisture (longer in 
1655) 
Of dry heats, and cold, and of moist heats and cold 
Of shining figures 
The motions that make natural air, and day light 
Of light 
The reflections of light 
Of light, and reflections (similar in one part only) 
Of some opinions of light, darknesse, and Death 
Of darknesse (much longer in 1655) 
The motions that make Darknesse 
Of Shadows (only first sentence is the same) 
Of shadows and airie figures 
Of a more probable opinion to me of light making several colours 
Of Colours (paragraph 2 similar to 1663 chapter) 
Of airy figures 
Of external figures, and internal forms (summarized in 1663) 













































The motions of the Sun, and Planets 
Of the motions and figures of the four natural Elements 
The reason of the ebbing and the flowing of the sea thus 
Describing the tides 
Of double tides (same title, but different reasoning than in 1663) 
Of spring tides (different phrasing) 
The tide and stream flowing against each other (slightly longer in 
1655) 
The difference of salt water and fresh water 
Ofwinde 
Of the noise of Tempest and storms 
Of thunder and lightning 
Of the alterations of motions 
Of different motions 
Of the local motions of water, air, and fire 
Explanations of onely Matter 
The differences and alterations of figures 



















































































The Motion of the Bodie 
The frame of mans body 
Of natural self-tyrannie 
The two grand motions amongst the rational innate matter 
The two chief parts belonging to man, is the head, and the heart, 
wherein resides the rational spirits 
Whether the passions are made in the head or heart? 
Of different passions in one and the same part 
The affinity betwixt imaginations and passions 
Of the Brain 
Of the multitude of figures amongst the rational matter in the brain 
and heart 
Of thoughts 
Of thinking, or thoughts 
Of sleep and dreams 
Dreaming of living, and dead figures 
Of Local Dreames 
Of the senses, and the objects that pass through the senses 
Of figure presented to the senses, and figures together (different 
phrasing) 
Of objects, and the senses, something differing from the other 
Chapter 
Of the figure of the head 
Of Sight (1663 title: "Of the Several Senses") 
Of Light and Colours 
OfBlindnesse 
Of hearing 
Of Articular sounds, or sounds without distinction (same topic with 
different analysis in 1663) 
Of taste, touch, and smell 
Of Touch 







































































































The Natural Wars in Animal Figures 
Of the four natural Humours of the Body, and those that are inbred 
The five natural Maladies of the body (1663 title: "The Four Natural 
Maladies of the Body, and Two Unnatural Maladies, one in the 
Mind, the other in the Body") 
I will treat first of the motions that make sicknesse (1663 title: "Of 
the Motions that make Sicknesse") 
Of the motions which cause pains 
Of swimming or dissiness in the head 
Where the brain turns round, or not in the head 
Of the sound or noise in the head 
Of Weakness 
Of numb and dead palsies 
Of that we call a sleepy numbness 
Of the head feeling numb 
The manner of motion, or disorder in madness 
Of madness in the body and minde 
Madness is not always about the head 
Musick may cure mad folks (1663 title: "Muscik may Cure those that 
are Mad in Mind") 
Of the fundamental diseases, first of fevours (1663 title: Of the 
Fundamental Diseases") 
Of the infections of animals, Vegetables, and elements 
Of burning fevors 
The remedies of Malignant Diseases 
Diseases caused by conceit, or cured (similar, but with different 
terminology in 1663) 
Of the expelling malignity to the outward parts of the body 





Of Epilepses, which is called falling-sicknesse 
Of shaking Palsies 
Of Convulsions, and Cramps 
OfCollicks 
Of the diseases in the head, and vapors to the head 
Of catching cold 
The 1655 edition has two consecutive chapters numbered 167 (pp. 125, 127). 
5
 There is no chapter 184 in the 1655 edition. 

































Of the several motions in an animal body 
Of the several tempers of the body 
The nature of purging medicines 
The motion of Medicines 
Agreeing, and disagreeing of humours, senses, and passions 
Of outward objects disagreeing with the natural motions, and 
humours in the body 
Of the inward sense, and outward sense, as the interior and exterior 
parts 
The sympathies and antipathies of sound to the minde and actions 
The knowledge of diseases 
To my just readers 
The diatical Centers 
192 
This second set of charts compares the revised 1663 edition of Philosophical and 
Physical Opinions to the 1655 edition. Chapter titles refer to the 1663 edition; 









































Of Only Matter (minor similarities and references to 1655 ed.) 
Of the several Degrees of Only Matter 
Of the Degrees of that Part of Matter as is Animate 
Of the Intermixing of every Degree of Infinite and Only Matter 
Of Motion 
Of Vacuum 
Infinite Matter cannot have an Exact figure or form 
Of the Degrees, Changes, Parts, Divisions and Compositions in 
Infinite Matter 
Of the Grounds or Principles of Only Matter 
Of Varieties 
Of the Equality of several Degrees and Changes of Infinite Matter 
and Motion 
Motion causeth Disturbance, but the Nature of Only Matter keepeth 
Peace 
Of the Knowledge and Power of Infinite Matter 
There is not a Judge in Infinite Matter (similar only) 
Of Life, Knowledge, and Matter (similar only) 
Of Life and Knowledge 
Of the Sensitive and Rational Animate Matter 
Of Creations 
Of Productions 
Of the Producer, and the Produced 
That the Produced partakes of the Producer 
Of the several Creating Motions and Matter 
The Sensitive Animate Matter causeth the Inanimate Matter to help 
in Creations 




























Of Creation, or Production 
Of the Quantity of Animate Matter, and Inanimate matter, in 
Creations of Men or Animal Kind 
Of Infancy, Youth, and Full Growth 
Of Decay or Age 
Of Death 
Of Local Motions and Shapes, as also of several Shapes amongst 
Animals 
Of the External Animal motions 
Of Man's particular Shape 
Of the Mind 
Of the Mind and Body of Man 
Of the Communication or Information between the Mind and Body, 
as between the Sense and Reason 
The Imitations between the Sensitive motions of the Body, and the 
Rational motions in the Mind 
Of the Various motions in the several Parts of Man 
Of the Coherence of several Motions in several Parts of a Man's 
Body 
Of the Ebbing and Flowing of Animate matter 
Of the Motions in the Head, and other Parts of a Man's Body 
The Rational Figures, as Thoughts, made in the Head 
Of the Rational motions in the Heart, or such Lower Parts 






































Of Imagination or Conception 
Of Conjectures and Probabilities, Inventions, Arts, and Sciences 
What makes Arguing and Disputing, both with a Man's Self, or 
Others, or with the Sense and Reason 
The different Degrees of Man's Knowledge 
Of Rational Knowledge in Parts 
Of Unities or Equalities (1655 version is in verse) 
Of Influence 
Of Operation 
Of the Procreation of Thoughts, and of Faith 
Of Fortune 
Of Chance 
The Restlessness of Creatures 
Of Time and Nature 
A Sympathetical Agreement and Indeavour between the Rational and 
Sensitive motions in one Creature, for Safety and Defence 
Of the Increase and Decay of Knowledge 
Objections against some Opinions of Incorporality 
Objects: Sense doth not Judge 
Of one Object working Different Effects upon the several Senses 
All Thoughts and Senses and Objects are Substances 
Of Divisible or Dividings 
Of Notions 
Of the Notions or Thoughts, of Deafness, Dumbness, Blindness, 
























































































Of Matter, Motion, and Figure 
Of Causes and Effects 
Whether Motion be a Thing or Nothing, or can be Annihilated 
Of Motions 
Many Motions go to the Producing of one Thing, or to one End 
Of the Six Principal Motions 
Of Double motions at one and the same Time, on the same Matter 
Of several Strengths 
The Agility of Animate matter 
Of Repeating one and the same Work, and of Varieties 
Of Creation and Dissolving of Nature 
Of Sympathy, and Anitpathy, which is to Agree or Disagree, Joyn or 
to Cross (some changes in phrasing) 
There's no Supreme Knowledge (some changes in phrasing) 
Of Different Knowledge in Different Figures 
The Advantages of some Figures, and some Degrees of Matter and 
Motions over others 
Of Figures in Figures 
Of the Gloomy Figures, and Figures of Parts, and one Piece 
Of Round and Square Figures, and their Motions 
Of Heavy and Light Bodies 
Of Bodies, that are apt to Ascend or Descend 
Why Heavy bodies Descend more easily and freely than Light bodies 
Ascend 
The Observations of Human sense and reason 
Of Change 
Of the Variety of one and the same Sort of Shapes and Motions 
The Different Degrees of one and the same Kind or Sort of Degrees 
of Matter, and Changes of Motions 
Of Transmutation (1655 title: "Of Transmigrations") 
Of Metamorphosing of Animals and Vegetables 
The Metamorphosing of the Exterior Form of some Figures 
Of Fixed and Loose Elements 
Of Loose Humors and Elements 
The Change of Motions 
Of Lines 
Of Circles (similar but not identical content) 
Of the Extension and Contraction of Circle-Figures or Circle-Lines 










































































Of the four Worlds, of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth 
Of different Motions and Creatures 
Of Moist colds and Moist heats, of Dry colds and Dry heats, and of 
Hot and Cold motions in general (shorter in 1663 edition) 




Of the Wetness of Water, and other Sorts of Liquors (combines 
elements of all three chapters from 1655) 
Of the Interior Figure and Motions of Bright-shining Hot-burning 
Fire 
Of the Interior and Exterior motions of Bright-shining Hot-burning 
Fire 
Of the Exterior motions of several Sorts of Fire (some elements only) 
Of the Sort of Fire that is named a Dead fire, and the Difference 
betwixt that, and Bright fire 
Fire produced by Exterior motions 
Of Hot and Burning motions and of Burning figures 
Of the Nature, Motions, and Figure of Oyl (similar but not identical) 
Of the Division of several Liquors 
Of the Interior Figures and Motions of Metal (very similar but not 
identical) 
Of the Exterior Motions of Heat and Fire (similar opening only) 
Of the Power of Water on Fire, as the Quenching out Fire (similar 
but not identical) 
Of the Dissolving of Water (middle section is rephrasing of 1655 
chapter) 
Of the Motions that make natural Air and Natural Light (similar in 
one part only) 
Of the Motions that make Darkness (longer in 1655) 
Of Shadows (only first sentence the same) 
Of Shadows and Aery Figures 
Of Stone 
Of Transparent Stones 
Of the Load-stone 
Of the needle (chapter 97 is incorrectly numbered in 1655) 
Of the Different Motions and Figures in the Tides, as Flowing and 
Ebbing of the Waters (1663 introduction is different) 
































































Of Double Tides (chapter 129 is incorrectly numbered in 1655; 
though the titles are the same, the reasoning is quite different) 
Of Spring-tides, (different phrasing in 1655) 
Of Tides and Streams Flowing against each other (1655 version is 
slightly longer) 
Whether the Sea run thorow the Veins of the Earth 
OfNilus 
Of the Divided parts of Water, and several External motions 
Of Rain 
Of External Figures and Internal Forms (longer in 1655) 
Of Metamorphosed Elements 
Of those Motions or Figures that turn Water to Snow, Hail, Ice and 
Frost (similar to the middle section of 1655 chapter) 
Why Snow is Rougher and Lighter than Ice and Hail (similar to 
middle section of 1655 chapter) 
Of Colours (middle section in 1663 is similar to 1655 chapter) 
Of Aery Figures 
Of several Sorts of Vapors 
Of the Agreement and Disagreement of Fire and Wind 
The Difference of Cold and Hot Winds and Vapors 
OfWind 
Of the Noise of Tempest and Storms 
Of Thunder and Lightning 
The Difference of Salt and Fresh water 
Of the Alteration of Motions 
Of the local motions of Water, Air, and Fire 
The Motions of the Sun and Planets 
All Heat is not only Inherent in the Sun 
Of the Sun 
Of the Moon 
Of the Planets 
All Creatures are Intermixed or Joyned or Have Commerce with each 
other 
Of the Tempers of the four Seasons of the Year, as Spring, Summer, 
Autumn, and Winter 





























































































Of the Motion of the Body 
Of the Frame of Man's Body 
Of Natural Self-tyranny 
Of the Understanding, Sense, and Reason 
The two Ground motions in the Rational Animate matter 
The two Chief parts belonging to Man, are the Head and the Heart, 
wherein Reside the Rational Spirits 
Whether the Passions are made in the Head or Heart 
Of Different Passions in one and the same Part 
The Affinity betwixt Imaginations and Passions 
Of the Brain 
Of the Multitude of Figures in the Rational matter, in the Brain, and 
Heart 
OfThoughts 
Of Thinking or Thoughts 
The Cause why a Man hath not his usual Knowledge, Sense, and 
Reason, in a Swoon or Trance 
Of Sense and Knowledge in Dead and Living men 
Of the Motions of the Rational and Sensitive matter 
The Power of the Rational motions over the Sensitive 
Of the Regular and Irregular motions of the Rational and Sensitive 
Animate matter 
Of Sleep 
Of the Disturbance of some Parts, causing a Disturbance in the 
Whole, as to hinder from Repose or Sleep 
The Difference between Sleeping and Waking 
Of Sleep and Dreams 
Dreaming of Living and Dead Figures 
Of Local Dreams 
The rational and Sensitive motions do not at all times take a general 
Notice or Knowledge of their own Body and Mind 
Of the Figures presented to the Senses (different phrasing) 
Of the Several Senses (1655 title: "Of Sight") 
Of Hearing, Seeing, and the other Senses (similar in general content) 
Of particular Objects entring into several Men's particular Senses 
Of Light and Colours 
Of Hearing 
Of Taste, Touch, and Smell 
OfTouch 
















































































Of Natural Warrs in Animal Figures 
Of the Motions of the Blood 
Of the several Ways of Bleeding Physically 
Of Diseases caused by Conceit or Imagination (similar, but not 
identical) 
Of the four Natural Humors of the Body 
The Four Natural Maladies of the Body, and Two Unnatural (1655 
title: "The five natural Maladies of the body") 
Of the Motions that make Sickness (1655 title: "I will treat first of 
the motions that make sicknesse") 
Of the Motions which cause Pain 
Of Swimmering or Dissiness in the Head 
Of Weakness 
Of Numb and Dead Palsies 
Of that we call a Sleepy Numbness 
The Manner of Motion, or Disorder in Madness 
Of Madness in the Body and Mind 
Madness is not always in the Head 
Musick may Cure those that are Mad in Mind (1655 title: "Musick 
may cure mad folks") 
Of Natural Fools or Ideots, also of Deaf and Dumb Men 
Of Fundamental Diseases (1655 title: "Of the fundamental diseases, 
first of fevours") 
Of the Spotted Feaver, especially the Spotted Plague 
Of the Small Pox and Measles 
Of Expelling the Malignity to the outward Parts of the Body 
Of Hectick Feavers 
Of ordinary Feavers 





Of Sweating Diseases 
Of Gangrenes 
Of Cancres and Fistulas 
Of the Gout 
The 1655 edition has two chapters numbered 167 (pp. 125, 127). Here, the reference is to page 125. 
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Of hard white Swellings 




Of Shaking Palsies 
Of Convulsions and Cramps 
OfColicks 
Of Surfeits 
Of Unnatural Purging and Fluxes 
Several Causes of the Flux, of Purging or Vomiting 
Of Diseases in the Head, and Vapors to the Head 
Whether the Brain turns Round in the Head 
Of the Sound or Noise in the Head 
Of the Head feeling Numb 
Of the Winter, and the Diseases therein 
Of the Season of the Spring, and the Diseases most Frequent therein 
Of the Season, and the Diseases of the Summer 
Of the Autumn, and the Diseases most Frequent therein 
Of the Infections of Animals, Vegetables, and Elements 
Of the Superfluity of the Humors,, as Phlegm, Choler, Melancholy and 
Blood 
Of those Parts of the Veins which draw Nourishment into the Body 
Of the several Motions in an Animal Body 
Of the Animal or Radical and Vital Spirits in Animal Bodies 
Of Cordials and Opium 
Of Pleasure and Pain 
The nature of Purging Medicines 
The Motion of Medicines (chapter 203 is incorrectly numbered in 1655) 
Of Purging 
The reason why one and the same Quantity of Physick shall Purge some 
Bodies to Death, and not Move other Bodies, or at least not to that Degree 
The Agreeing and Disagreeing of Food, as also Physick and Cordials 
The Agreeing, and Disagreeing of Humors, Senses, and Passions . 
Of Outward objects Disagreeing with Natural Motions, and Humors in the 
Body 
Of the Inward and Outward Senses and Parts of the Body 
The Sympathies and Antipathies of Sound to the Mind and Actions 
The Knowledge of Diseases 
Of Diseases in General 
The reason why Animals are Hot whilst they Live, and Cold when Dead 
A Conclusion of this Part, of Diseases 
The Deitical Centre 
201 
APPENDIX C 
An Example of Cavendish's Editing Processes 
In the 1655 edition of Philosophical and Physical Opinions, Cavendish discusses 
the figure of the circle in several chapters, but most specifically in chapters 88 and 91. In 
1663, a discussion of approximately the same length occurs in two consecutive chapters, 
33 and 34, in the fourth part of her treatise. The two editions are similar but not identical 
in phrasing. By 1668, in Grounds of Natural Philosophy, the discussion of the circle is 
cut by more than two-thirds. Comparing the 1668 and 1663 versions shows how much 
more substantially Cavendish edited and rewrote her original opinions. 
Phrasing from the 1663 edition that is similar or retained verbatim in 1668 is 
indicated in bold print. Portions cut from the 1663 edition are shown with strikethrough. 
New additions are in bold italics. 
From Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1663), Part 4, Chapter 33, "Of Circles": 
A Circle is a Round figure without Ends, having a Circumference, and a Centre, and 
the Figure of a Circle may, more aptly alter the Exterior form than any other Figure ean; 
for a Circle-line may be drawn Contracted many several ways, and after divers forms or 
fashions, but it cannot be Dilated but after one manner of way, which is to Dilatate, and so to 
inlarge the Circumference, and the Parts from the Centre by an equal Dilatation to the 
Circumference; for if a Circle be extended in part, and not in whole, as it Extends or Dilates one 
way, it Contracts in another way, whereas a Parallel line may be Dilated or Extended in Parts, 
without a General alteration, but a Circle line cannot, for as one part stretches out, another part 
draws in; but, to conclude, a Circle figure may be Dilated and Contracted, and be Changed into 
many several Exterior figures or forms, and yet keep the Interior figure or form; also a circle may 
move Interiously, as also Exteriously several ways, as to move from the Centre to the 
Circumference, and from the Circumference to the Centre; as also to move Circle ways according 
to the Figure, as to move Round. 
202 
From Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1663), Part 4, Chapter 34, "Of the Extension 
and Contraction of Circle-figures, or Circle-lines": 
The Nature of Extensions and Dilatations strives or indeavours to get Space, Ground, or 
Compass, as also to Smooth, Plain, or Level, the Substance or Matter those Motions work on, and 
with, but the Nature of Contracting motions indeavours or labours to cast or thrust out Space, 
Place, Ground or Compass, labouring to draw and croud Substance Matter or Parts close together, 
and this is the reason that Circle lines or Figures may be Contracted many several Ways, Forms 
or Figures , because Contraction flings out the Compass, and onely makes use of the Line or 
Circumferent circle, drawing and laying the Line into millions of several Works or Figures, 
without breaking or dividing the Exterior form, which is the Circle; and this is the reason, that 
when the Contractions are over powered by Dilations, and that the Circle extends the full 
Compass, it returns to its Original form, which is a Round circle, without any alteration; and thus 
may a Circle figure or Line Exteriously alter several ways by Contraction several times, and yet 
keep the Interior form, figure or nature; also Circle Lines or figures may be Exteriously altered by 
Mixt Exterior motions, as for Example, when a Circle line should be wound about a Round staff, 
or such like thing, the winding about the Pole or Staff is the Motion of Contraction, at least one 
way, as when the Compass is turned Inward, as towards the Centre, yet by winding one Line 
above another is Extenuation, and millions the like Examples may be given. But to draw towards 
a conclusion of this Chapter, a Circle may be Drawn or Contracted also, it may be contracted or 
extended into a less or wider compass; and drawn or formed into many several sorts of 
Figures, or Works; as into a Square figure, and into a Triangular figure, or Oval, or Cylinder 
or like several sorts of Flowers, and never dissolve the Circular Line and into a Cube figure, and 
into a Parallel figure, the Parallel is made by drawing the Circle long ways; but all those several 
Figures, and many other Figures, made partly of each figure without dividing the Circle; also 
Circle lines may be very Different, and yet not different in the compass or Circle, But this is to be 
noted, that there may be several sorts of Circular Lines; as some Circles may be Broad, some 
Narrow, some Round, some Flat, some Ragged or Twisted, some Smooth, some Rough, some 
Edged, some Pointed, and numbers of the like; and yet the compass be exactly round fer 
though the Compass may be evenly Round, yet the Matter of the Circle may be uneven; and 
though the Figure of a Circle is to be but one intire figure in and of it self, yet the Substance, or 
Matter of the Circle may be different; but as for the Figure of a Circle, But some may say, that a 
Circle is not a circle, when by several motions it is made Square or Triangular; I answer that 
it is circle squared, but not a Circle broken, or divided; for if the Circle be whole, as not 
broken or divided, the Interior nature is not Dissolved or Destroyed, howsoever the Exterior 
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figure or form is changed or altered, it is a Natural or Perfect circle still, although it 
Exteriously should be put into a Mathematical Square or other figure. But, to conclude, (fori 
have digress'd) it is to be observed, / say that all those Figures that are (like Circular Lines) by 
Nature made of one Piece, without Distinct parts and Several Tempered substances, their 
Exterior forms or shapes may be changed and re-changed without any alteration of their 
Interior proprieties, forms or natures, whereas those creatures or Figures, that are made into 
several Distinct parts, and composed of several Tempered substances or Matter, could not be so 
changed without an Interior Destruction, besides the alteration of Different parts and Different 
composures or temperaments, would cause—a Confusion—of Several—Motions in—their 
Transformations. 
From Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668), Part 11, Chapter 14, "Of CIRCLES": 
A Circle is a Round Figure, without End; which Figure can more easily and aptly alter 
the Exterior Form, than any other Figure. For example, A Circular Line may be drawn many 
several ways, into different and several sorts of Figures, without breaking the Circle: also, it may 
be contracted or extended into a less or wider compass; and drawn or formed into many several 
sorts of Figures, or Works; as, into a Square, or Triangle, or Oval, or Cylinder, or like several 
sorts of Flowers, and never dissolve the Circular Line. But this is to be noted, that there may be 
several sorts of Circular Lines; as, some Broad, some Narrow, some Round, some Flat, some 
Ragged or Twisted, some Smooth, some pointed, some Edged, and numbers of the like; and yet 
the compass be exactly round. 
But some may say, that, When a Circle is drawn into several Works, it is not a Circle: As 
for example When a Circle is squared, it is not a Circle, but a Square. 
I answer: It is a Circle squared, but not a Circle broken, or divided: for, the Interior 
Nature is not dissolved, although the Exterior Figure is altered: it is a Natural Circle, although it 
should be put into a Mathematical Square. But, to conclude this Chapter, I say, That all such sorts 
of Figures that are (like Circular Lines) of one piece, may change and rechange their Exterior 
Figures, or Shapes, without any alterations of their Interior Properties. 
